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1.1 Motivation of the topic and problem statement 
 
This research project is based on a personal curiosity into the innovative behavior of 
managers. Students all over the world are all taught the same theories and methods in 
business schools. After graduating they are expected to manage an organization according 
to its manuals and Standard Operating Procedures. They are advised by consultants who use 
uniform approaches, and have to comply to standard formats in their management reports. 
Still, despite such pressures to uniformity, we see organizations in comparable conditions 
following different 
strategies. As if Weber or 
DiMaggio and Powell had 
never existed and 
institutional theories were 
null and void. We can 
observe similar differences 
in other fields, for example 
in military strategies.  
 
Although there are several 
reasons why organizations 
differ from each other, 
organizational innovation is 
always based on individual 
behavior that generates 
innovative ideas (Scott & 
Bruce, 1994). Hence my 
particular interest is in the 
question why managers 
sometimes come up with 
the new ideas that drive 
change and lead to 
differences in organizational 
strategies. One case that 
inspired me in particular is 
about Hilton Amsterdam 
and is described in Box 1.1.  
 
Box 1.1 Roberto Payer and Hilton Amsterdam 
 
Hilton Hotels are well-known for offering highly standardized 
services that are based on equally highly standardized 
processes. For a frequent traveler this is wonderful because 
there are no surprises. From a (corporate) management 
perspective the benefit is the strong control of operational 
processes. When in 2005 I met Roberto Payer, the then General 
Manager of Hilton Amsterdam, I asked him how the strategy of 
Hilton Amsterdam was formulated in such a strict setting. Mr. 
Payer replied by explaining the annual budgeting process. 
When I replied that strategy is more than a budget, he told me 
that every seven years a consultancy firm was hired to 
formulate an investment plan. And after some more probing, 
he told me about his role and day-to-day activities. These 
involve speaking with guests, trainees, other hoteliers, 
government officials, and business people. They also include 
monitoring new developments and having a close eye on 
internal processes. According to Mr. Payer, all the information 
gathered from these diverse activities ultimately are 
transformed into creative ideas that lead to innovative 
behavior. He concluded with one example: As a newly 
appointed GM, he had to manage a hotel without a proper 
restaurant. Nevertheless, despite having hardly any seed-
money and against all company policies, he built a beautiful 
Italian restaurant in the hotel that later would later become 




This example describes how one middle manager deviates from existing practices and comes 
up with a major change, leading to a substantially different organization. In more general 
terms it shows how the innovative behavior of middle managers influences the course and 
direction of an organization. This case illustrates Janssen’s (2000) definition of innovative 
work behavior as the intentional creation, introduction and application of new ideas within a 
work role, group or organization, in order to benefit the organization. The example shows 
the role of creativity in innovative work behavior, but equally emphasizes the importance of 
realizing those ideas. It also shows that innovative work behavior has an element of 
deliberately deviating from the existing standard practices, though clearly with the aim to 
benefit the organization. And most of all, it shows that it is the actual individual behavior to 
generate and realize innovative ideas that lies at the origin of organizational innovation 
(Scott & Bruce, 1994). 
 
There is a growing recognition for the important role middle managers play in innovation. 
The relevance of middle managers’ innovative work behavior is based on their key positions 
in organizations and their influence on organizational performance. In particular, recognition 
has increased for middle managers’ contribution to an organization’s strategy, their 
entrepreneurial role, and their contribution to innovation (Balogun, 2003; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 2017; Floyd, Schmid, & Wooldridge, 2008; Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002). 
But not all middle managers are as innovative as this General Manager from Hilton in Box 
1.1. If we want to understand organizational innovation, it is key to recognize the relevance 
of middle managers. Hence, the question is: what drives middle managers’ innovative work 
behavior? This question will be the main focus of this thesis, and can be formulated as 
follows in the problem statement: 
 
Problem Statement: What explains variation in middle managers’ innovative work behavior? 
 
To understand the relevance of a middle manager perspective on innovative work behavior, 
I will first describe the context of this thesis by briefly discussing theoretical insights on 
middle managers, leading to three research questions that guide this research thesis. I will 
then elaborate on these research questions to describe the scope of this thesis, to be 
followed by a section describing stochastic actor oriented models, a statistical analysis 
method I used extensively in my research. I conclude this introductory chapter with a section 




1.2 Context of the study: Middle Managers 
 
There are several definitions of a middle manager. A simple definition is that a middle 
manager is a manager below top management and above first level supervisors (Dutton et 
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al., 1997). A second definition describes middle managers as having access to top 
management and close contact with operations as well. This enables them to relate strategy 
and operations (Floyd, Schmid, & Wooldridge, 2008). While middle managers have 
responsibility for only a limited part of the organization, top managers are primarily decision 
makers on a corporate level and responsible for the whole organization. Compared to top 
management, middle managers have detailed knowledge of market developments, daily 
competition, as well as the internal strengths and weaknesses of their organizations (Chen et 
al., 2018; Floyd, Schmid, & Wooldridge, 2008). Middle managers primarily implement 
strategies, gather information and exchange information between top and operational levels 
(Glaser, Fourné, & Elfring, 2015; Huy, 2001; Kuratko et al., 2005). In this traditional view, 
based on a top-down and control perspective of management, a middle manager is a 
bureaucratic filter (Hope, 2010). It sees middle managers as costs, as obstacles to change, 
and sources of inertia (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994, 2000). According to some authors, this is 
the reason why middle managers’ value to the organization declined during the past 
decades. Middle managers’ jobs became increasingly routinized (Redman, Wilkinson, & 
Snape, 1997), control over middle managers increased (Ogbonna & Wilkinson, 2003) and 
many middle managers have been laid off due to organizational restructuring and delayering 
(Rajan & Wulf, 2006). Some authors (e.g., Meyer, 2006) claim that middle managers are 
primarily interested in pursuing their own goals, even if these are detrimental to the 
organization. It is not a surprise that according to this view, middle manager autonomy 
should be limited so they have just enough freedom to implement top management’s 
policies.  
  
In contrast to this traditional and negative view on middle managers, there is a positive view 
that sees them as strategic assets and as personally involved entrepreneurs with a strategic 
focus (Balogun, 2003; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1990, 1997; Huy, 2001). Burgelman (1983) argues 
that middle managers contribute to an organization’s strategy by championing or selling new 
initiatives to top management. Involving middle managers in strategic planning has a 
positive impact on an organization’s performance because their knowledge leads to 
improved and more realistic planning (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000). Middle managers 
contribute to an organization by identifying opportunities, they develop initiatives, and they 
build and renew organizational capabilities (Ren & Guo, 2011). In particular in companies 
that emphasize corporate entrepreneurship, the role of middle managers in innovation is 
strongly emphasized. Their familiarity with market developments and internal strengths and 
weaknesses is assumed to facilitate entrepreneurial roles for middle managers (Huy, 2001; 
Kuratko, 2017; Kuratko et al., 2005; Mustafa, Martin, & Hughes, 2016). 
 
In this positive perspective, middle managers are considered crucial for an organization’s 
performance and success. One of the fundamental raisons d’être for a middle manager is to 
implement strategies and other decisions taken by top level managers. Middle managers 
collect and filter information from inside and outside the organization, interpret it and 
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convey relevant issues to top management. Their detailed knowledge of operational 
processes enables them to propose new plans to top management or to initiate new actions 
themselves (Zandberg, 2018). In this role, middle managers not only connect top 
management and operations, but they also connect to other middle managers and other 
units, or with other organizations (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2013; Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007; 
Shi, Markoczy, & Dess, 2009). Being connected to all kind of different actors enables middle 
managers to stay ahead of new developments and to ensure proper coordination in 
proposing new ideas and implementing plans.  
 
To understand better why middle managers are more or less innovative, I will focus on the 
following three research questions.  
 
1. A core role of middle managers is communication and forwarding information. Not only 
between higher and lower levels in the organization, but also with peers and other 
stakeholders. In this process, middle managers strongly rely on their internal and 
external network relationships (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007; Shi, Markoczy, & Dess, 
2009). Following Cohen & Nair (2017), I want to explore how a middle managers’ social 
network position influences their innovative work behavior. 
2. Research on a micro level suggests that individual characteristics and traits influence the 
extent to which middle managers are able to translate new information into innovative 
behavior (Anderso, Potocnik, & Zhou, 2014). Therefore, the second question is how 
individual characteristics influence innovative work behavior 
3. A middle manager is a cog in the wheel of a large organization. This means a middle 
manager is constrained in his/her autonomy (Acar, Tarakci, & van Knippenberg, 2019). 
Research on corporate entrepreneurship has shown that a key condition for middle 
managers to be entrepreneurial, is a sufficient level of autonomy to make decisions, 
including space to make errors (Kuratko et al., 2005). The question how autonomy 
influences middle managers’ innovative behavior will be the third research question.  
 
After discussing innovative work behavior first, I will discuss these research questions in 
greater detail in the next section.  
 
 
1.3 Scope of the thesis 
 
1.3.1 Innovative Work Behavior  
Innovative work behavior is related to innovation. OECD (2018, p. 20) defines business 
innovation as “a new or improved product or business process (or combination thereof) that 
differs significantly from the firm's previous products or business processes and that has been 
introduced on the market or brought into use by the firm.” 
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At the foundation of all organizational innovation lies actual individual behavior to generate 
and realize these ideas (Scott & Bruce, 1994). Innovative work behavior refers to intentional 
and individual behavior to create and implement new ideas, processes, procedures, and 
products. This may be done within an organization, a smaller unit or department within an 
organization, or even relate to specific work roles (Janssen, 2000). Janssen distinguishes 
three behavioral elements in innovative work behavior: idea generation, idea promotion, 
and idea realization. Idea generation relates to new ideas about processes, products etc. 
Often problems, new developments, or increased competition lead to new ideas. Idea 
promotion is about organizing support and resources, and idea realization represent the 
final phase of implementation. Other authors (e.g., Anderson, Potocnik, & Zhou, 2014) 
distinguish between idea generation and implementation, where implementation is the 
combination of idea promotion and realization.  
 
Innovative work behavior differs from creativity. Amabile (1983) and Amabile and Pillemer 
(2012) define creativity as the production of new ideas. Creativity can be seen as a crucial 
component of innovative work behavior, most evident in the beginning of the innovation 
process when problems or performance gaps are recognized and ideas are generated in 
response to a perceived need for innovation. In addition, creativity is also often necessary 
when implementing innovations. Unlike creativity, innovative work behavior is explicitly 
intended to provide some kind of benefit. It has a clear applied component and is expected 
to result in innovative output. This can be seen in the example of the Hilton manager in Box 
1.1. Here, the middle manager’s goal was to open an innovative hotel restaurant, leading to 
potential benefit for the organization. The example also shows that often innovation has an 
element of deviation from accepted practices and can be seen as the opposite of routines 
(Mainemelis, 2012; Soda & Bizzi, 2012; Vadera, Pratt, & Mishra, 2013). 
 
1.3.2 A middle manager’s social network 
A middle manager is a liaison between different levels in the organization. Having timely 
access to new developments is important for generating new ideas. Middle managers also 
play a critical role in establishing and maintaining the organizational linkages that are 
needed for the communication and coordination underlying successful implementation of 
innovations (Taylor & Helfat, 2009). This suggests that a middle manager’s social context is 
crucial for a middle managers performance in general, and a middle manager’s innovative 
work behavior in particular. This is the reason I want to focus on the social network of a 
middle manager as a first factor in understanding innovative work behavior.  
 
Innovative work behavior is to a certain extent a social process, in which communication and 
interaction with others support and lead to creativity (Perry-Smith, 2006). This is typically a 
role for middle managers, which differs from top management in several key aspects 
(Kauppila, Bizzi, & Obstfeld, 2018): top managers often consider only a limited number of 
options and respond quickly to external developments. Conversely, middle managers who 
bring people and their diverse ideas together, have more impact on an organization’s 
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creative performance and innovation. Because their network and their structural position 
are crucial for a middle managers’ innovative work behavior, social network analysis (SNA) 
enables us to analyze the interaction of innovative work behavior with structural position 
and personal characteristics (Cohen & Nair, 2017). The structural position of a middle 
manager in his or her social network may result in constraints or in opportunities for 
innovative work behavior (Long, Cunningham, & Braithwaith, 2013). For example, Burt’s 
(1992, 2001) theory of structural holes suggests that middle managers in brokerage 
positions have early access to and control of information, which enables them to be more 
innovative. Middle managers in dense networks find their contacts directly connected, 
which means they are poorly positioned to broker between otherwise unconnected (groups 
of) middle managers. This suggests that a network structure either enables or constrains the 
innovative work behavior of middle managers. This thesis investigates to what degree a 
middle managers’ network position enables or hampers a middle manager’s innovative work 
behavior.  
 
The contribution of SNA to research on middle managers and innovative work behavior is 
relatively new and results are limited (Cohen & Nair, 2017). Several authors (Chen, Chang, & 
Chang, 2015; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1999; Turner & Pennington, 2015; Pappas & Wooldridge, 
2007) have investigated the influence of social networks on organizational performance. 
However, many of the social network studies in organizational behavior are cross-sectional 
(Kalish, 2019) due to difficulties in collecting the necessary data for longitudinal studies and 
the specialized statistical analysis needed. Exploring the possibilities of SNA in organizational 
behavior, in particular in a longitudinal setting, will be an additional goal of this thesis. 
 
1.3.3 Individual characteristics of the middle manager 
Next to their social network structure, personal characteristics may help to explain why 
some middle managers are more innovative than others. In this thesis I focus on personality 
and on motivation and goal orientation.  
 
Personality traits are relatively stable over longer periods of time and therefore suited to 
explain differences in innovative work behavior (see Anderson, Potocnik, & Zhou, 2014, for 
an overview of the research in this area). In particular, the relationship between traits and 
creativity received a lot of attention (Abdullah, Omar, & Panatik, 2016; Anderson, Potocnik, 
& Zhou, 2014; Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2017). Research on the influence of personality 
traits on innovative work behavior has paid much attention to the relation between the 
personality traits of the Five Factor Model and innovative work behavior. Of these five 
factors, openness to experience and conscientiousness in particular have been found to be 
associated with innovative work behavior (Baer, 2010; Woods et al., 2018). Individuals 
scoring high on conscientiousness are more dependable and committed, therefore it is often 
assumed that people scoring high on conscientiousness are highly motivated to find new 
solutions to problems that arise, or to make use of opportunities that evolve (Judge et al., 
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2013). Individuals scoring high on openness, often think divergent, are willing to work on 
new ideas, are curious, and are willing to explore the world (Judge et al., 2013), which leads 
to being more creative.  
Besides the Big Five Personality traits, other traits such as generalized self-efficacy, 
innovativeness, stress tolerance, need for autonomy, dominance, proactivity (Rauch & Frese, 
2007; 2008), and need for achievement (Collins, Hanges, & Locke, 2004; Rauch & Frese, 
2008) are also found to be associated with innovative work behavior.  
 
Besides personality traits, motivation and goal orientation are also found to influence 
innovative work behavior. In the componential theory of creativity, Amabile (1983), Amabile 
and Pillemer (2012) suggest that intrinsic motivation supports and fosters creativity. 
Additional research showed the positive relation between intrinsic motivation and creativity 
is even stronger when prosocial motivation is higher (Grant & Berry, 2011). Individuals have 
different goal orientations that influence how people behave in achievement situations. For 
example, a learning goal orientation emphasizes personal development and is positively 
related with creativity (Hirst, Van Knippenberg, & Zhou, 2009; Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009). 
Similar, mastery orientation is positively related to innovative work behavior (Janssen & Van 
Yperen, 2004). The motivation to engage in innovative behavior is also influenced by the 
expected benefits. Yuan and Woodman (2010) found that expected performance outcomes 
and expected image risks or gains explained innovative work behavior. 
 
1.3.4  The autonomy of a middle manager 
Next to a middle manager’s personal characteristics or social network position, the 
organizational context plays a role in explaining innovative work behavior. A middle manager 
is an actor in a larger organization and has only limited autonomy for innovative work 
behavior. It is generally believed that a lack of autonomy will constrain a middle manager’s 
innovative work behavior. For example, theories on corporate entrepreneurship stress the 
importance of decentralization and discretionary space for middle managers (Foss, Lyngsie, 
& Zahra, 2015; Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Covin, 2014). There 
are several reasons why autonomy and decentralization may lead to increased innovative 
work behavior. First of all, autonomy might motivate middle managers to become more 
innovative. According to self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), control over a task, 
and responsibility for successful implementation will increase intrinsic motivation. Besides 
the motivating dimension, autonomy enables innovative work behavior. Middle managers 
are often directly connected to the market and familiar with opportunities and challenges. 
This knowledge can guide them in innovative work behavior (Foss, Lyngsie, & Zahra, 2015). 
But middle managers need a certain level of autonomy to benefit from their local 
knowledge, otherwise they are only able to stick to corporate rules and implement top level 
strategies. Autonomy and decentralization give middle managers the opportunity to use 
their market knowledge to adjust corporate strategies while implementing them. 
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1.4 Research strategy 
 
The main goal of the study is to investigate if the social network position of a middle 
manager together with other (personal) attributes explain innovative work behavior. Until 
now, this is an unexplored area. While ample research has been conducted on either 
innovative work behavior or on social network studies, there has hardly been empirical 
research on the combination. To investigate this question, three empirical studies, each in a 
different context, were conducted: A longitudinal study among two cohorts of 42 and 47 
international students who aspire to become (middle) managers, a longitudinal study among 
110 middle managers in a listed company in Europe, and a cross-sectional study among 64 
civil servants in Mexico City. In addition, a methodological study was conducted to 
investigate strategies to deal with missing attribute data in longitudinal social network 
studies.  
 
In the longitudinal study among 47 international master students in the Netherlands, four 
surveys were conducted in weeks 1, 5, 13, and 21 after the start of the academic year 
2012/2013. In each questionnaire, students were asked to whom of their fellow students 
they had turned for advice in the past three weeks, and to describe their relation with their 
peers. The answers to both questions were used to construct advice and friendship networks 
for all four surveys. As students cannot show innovative work behavior, in all surveys 
personal initiative, measured using the seven-item scale of Frese et al. (1997), was used as 
proxy. Personality traits using the NEO Five Factor Inventory test (Costa & McCrae, 1992) 
were measured in the first survey only. One year later the data collection was replicated 
with a second cohort of 42 new students. In this replication study the items in the 
questionnaire were identical to the original study.  
 
The second empirical study is based upon a longitudinal panel study among middle 
managers of a Dutch company that operates 75 leisure parks in Europe. This company 
belongs to a larger holding in the USA that is listed at the stock exchange. Of the whole 
management team of the organization, consisting of seventy-five park managers plus sixty 
office managers, 110 managers participated in this panel study. The group of office-
managers consisted of board members, area managers and managers of staff departments. 
In spring 2013 interviews were conducted with seven middle managers of this company and 
in October 2013 and May 2014 two surveys among all middle managers were conducted. In 
each survey, middle managers were asked to whom of their fellow middle managers they 
had turned for advice in the past six months. Based on these answers, advice networks were 
constructed. In addition, middle managers were asked about their innovative work behavior, 
using a six-item scale (Scott & Bruce, 1994) and job autonomy using a five-item scale (Hage 
& Aiken, 1967). The influence of the organizational structure was measured by describing 
the formal ownership structure of the leisure parks (parks fully owned or managed, parks 
under a management contract, or franchised parks) or whether the middle manager was 
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working at the head office. The influence of spatial distance was measured by taking the 
logarithm of the distance in kilometers from the park to the head office. 
 
The third empirical study is a cross-sectional study among 64 middle managers in Milpa Alta, 
a semirural municipality in Mexico City in which managerial positions are often appointed 
using discretionary and political instead of professional criteria. The study was conducted 
online (response rate = 69%) in June 2012 and the first time such a research method was 
conducted in this environment. The variables representing innovative work behavior were 
based on the innovative roles of middle managers (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996). Tests for 
common method variance were negative. 
 
Next to these three empirical studies, a simulation study was carried out to analyze seven 
different methods to deal with missing attribute data in social network studies. In a 
simulation study based on four real-life data sets, the impact of these methods was 
investigated. Missing behavior data were created for four different missingness mechanisms 
and four different levels of missingness. The generation of the observed and missing data 
resulted in 4 (data sets) × 500 (replications) = 2,000 complete data sets (two waves of 
network and behavior two waves), and 4 (data sets) × 500 (replications) × 4 (proportion 
missing) × 3 (missingness mechanism) = 24,000 incomplete data sets. The resulting re-
estimated parameters of the pre-defined models for these data-sets were then compared to 
the original model-parameters. The effect of the missing data methods was evaluated using 
three criteria: model convergence, parameter bias, and parameter coverage. 
 
The strong empirical focus on network studies caused three major challenges. First, while 
many common statistical methods are based on samples, a longitudinal network study 
requires that all network relations of the complete network (population) to be collected at 
two different moments at least. Achieving a sufficient response in a sequence of surveys 
poses the first challenge. The second challenge is dealing with the missing data that were 
encountered during the data collection process and statistical analyses. While there are 
several strategies to deal with missing data in cross-sectional social network studies, little is 
known about the performance of these strategies in longitudinal settings. To address this 
question, a methodological study (see section 5) was conducted to select an optimal strategy 
to deal with missing data. The third challenge is the nature of network data, which prohibits 
the use of common statistical methods that analyze relations between attributes only. The 
remaining part of this section describes a method to deal with this third challenge. 
 
From a methodological perspective analyzing social network data is a challenge because in 
network studies the behavior of middle managers not only depends on their own attributes, 
but also on their network and therefore also on the attributes and behavior of their peers. 
The complex dependencies (relationships) between the respondents (actors) prevent the 
use of more common statistical methods, that are based on the assumption of independent 
observations, and we have to use social network analysis to quantify the relations between 
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middle managers (Cohen & Nair, 2017). However, the large majority of social network 
analysis in management studies is based on cross-sectional data, preventing the analysis of 
causal relations. To enable the longitudinal analysis of the dynamic interaction between 
network and behavior, a specific family of stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOM) was 
developed (Snijders, 2017). SAOMs are particularly well suited to model the co-evolution of 
network and behavior.  
 
A SAOM is based on observed panel data, and assumes the observed data are 
“visualizations” of an underlying and unobserved process of small sequential changes or mini 
steps in network and behavior. Each mini step gives one randomly selected actor the 
opportunity to change either one network tie (adding or dropping a tie to another actor, or 
no change) or to change his behavior variable (increasing or decreasing one level, or no 
change). The decisions of actors to change a network tie or behavior score are modeled by 
objective functions that are linear combinations of effects that represent the current 
network structure and behavior. These effects are functions of the network of the focal 
actor, as well as the behavior of that actor and the behavior of his network partners. One 
example of an effect is reciprocity: If A goes to B for advice, it may become more likely that B 
will also approach A for advice. A second example is outdegree: A middle manager who 
approaches many peers for advice may be considered well informed and hence more likely 
to be innovative. In this manner, the changes in the network can also be related to the state 
of the actors’ behavior, and vice versa, and a mutual dependence between the network 
dynamics and the behavior dynamics can be established. 
  
Because these mini steps between observed waves are unobserved, the SAOM uses 
simulations to model the sequence of mini step as a Markov process. The simulation starts 
with the first observation of the network (W1) and simulates a series of sequential changes 
until the second observation (W2) is reached. The simulated network at W2 is then 
compared to the observed network at W2. Based on a comparison of simulated and 
observed W2 network, the parameters are updated. With these updated parameters the 
simulation is repeated. This iterative process is repeated until the model has reached 
convergence and parameters are stable. Once convergence has been achieved, the final 
parameter estimates are used to generate a number of additional sets of simulated mini 
steps that are used to estimate standard errors. 
 
Kalish (2019) and Snijders, van den Bunt, and Steglich (2010b) provide accessible 
introductions to SAOMs. Adams and Schaefer (2018) provide a clear visualization of the 
sequential mini steps underlying a SAOM. More theoretical background can be found in 





1.5 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis consists of three parts. Part one is this introductory chapter. Part two is the main 
part and addresses the research questions. This part consists of four chapters that are 
reprints of published articles or submitted manuscripts. Part three is the final chapter in 
which I discuss the contribution of the individual chapters in answering the problem 
statement.  
 
Part 2, consisting of chapters 2 to 5, is a combination of three empirical studies plus a 
supportive methodological study. The empirical studies are set in three different contexts 
and in different international settings, each focusing on a specific aspect of the problem 
statement. 
 
Chapter 2 is a methodological study that aims to find an optimal method to deal with 
missing attribute data in longitudinal network studies. Stochastic actor oriented modelling, 
the main analytical method I have used in my research, is a relatively new technique, and 
only a few studies investigated the effects of missing data treatments in longitudinal social 
network data, where missing attribute data in social network analysis remained mainly 
unstudied (Krause, 2019). For field studies as reported in this dissertation, missing data are 
common, and therefore we have conducted a simulation study to determine the best 
method to deal with such missing data.  
 
Chapter 3 is a longitudinal study among two classes of respectively 42 and 47 students of a 
business school. Many of these students will likely become middle managers at some point 
in their career. Unlike a work context, the class setting comes with relatively low levels of 
functional interdependence between students. This setting therefore provides a good 
opportunity to disentangle the relation between personal initiative, personality, and the 
structural autonomy stemming from their social network position. Since students are not yet 
in a professional setting in which they have the opportunity for innovative decisions and 
behavior, we investigated their personal initiative instead of their innovative work behavior.  
Chapter 4 is a longitudinal study among 110 middle managers of an international company 
that operates 75 leisure parks. The main focus of this study is on the influence of autonomy 
on middle managers’ innovative work behavior. This study attempts to increase our 
understanding of autonomy’s influence by distinguishing four dimensions of autonomy: 
structure, structural (network) constraint, spatial distance, and governance structure.  
Chapter 5 is a cross-sectional study among 64 middle managers in Milpa Alta, a municipality 
in Mexico City. According to public management and Public Service Motivation theories, 
public managers have a collective orientation aimed at producing public goods. Therefore, 
we investigated if, next to intra-organizational networking, an individual career motive or a 
collective motivation for networking explains innovative work behavior. 
 12 
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2  Missing behavior data in longitudinal network studies: the impact of 




This chapter has previously been published as: Zandberg, T. and Huisman, M. (2019). Missing 
behavior data in longitudinal network studies: the impact of treatment methods on 
estimated effect parameters in stochastic actor oriented models. Social Network Analysis 
and Mining, 9(1), 8. 
 
Abstract  
Research into missing network data is growing, with a focus on the impact of missing ties on 
network statistics or network model parameters. Longitudinal network studies using 
stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs) focus on the co-evolution of network structure 
and behavior/attributes to disentangle influence and selection mechanisms. Still little is 
known about the impact of missing behavior data on estimated effect parameters in SAOMs. 
This paper examines seven different methods that are currently available to deal with 
missing behavior data: complete cases, three single-imputation procedures (imputing the 
mean, random hot deck, nearest neighbor hot deck), one multiple-imputation procedure 
(based on predictive mean matching), and two methods available in the SIENA software to 
estimate SAOMs (default method based on imputation and available cases, and a method 
based on dummy variables). In a simulation study based on four real-life data sets, the 
impact of these methods on estimated parameters of SAOMS was investigated. Missing 
behavior data were created under different conditions (proportions, mechanisms), and the 
missing data methods were used to estimate SAOMs on the incomplete data. The effect of 
the missing data methods was inspected using three criteria: model convergence, parameter 
bias, and parameter coverage. The results show that, in general, the default method 
available in the SIENA software gives the best outcomes for all three criteria. The dummy-
based method generally performed worse than the default method, as did the imputation 
procedures. The multiple-imputation procedure sometimes outperformed the single 
imputations and the three single-imputation methods often gave the same results. The 
effects of missing data mechanism and data set were small.  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Social scientists often face the problem of missing data when analyzing empirically collected 
data. In the analysis of social networks, missing data constitute even a larger problem, 
because the complexity of collecting the network data and survey items are more likely to 
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generate missing data (Burt, 1987; Borgatti & Molina, 2003). Moreover, due to the 
dependencies in the network, network analysis is especially sensitive to missing data, as the 
missingness not only limits the modeling of the local network of the actors involved, but also 
limits the modeling of the local network structures of all neighboring actors (Robins, 
Pattison, & Woolcock, 2004).  
 
In recent years, the effects of missing data in network studies are often studied, especially 
for cross-sectional data (e.g., Kossinets, 2006; Žnidaršič, Ferligoj, & Doreian, 2012; Smith & 
Moody, 2013; Smith, Moody, & Morgan, 2017). The general conclusion that can be drawn 
from these studies is that missing data has a negative impact on describing and estimating 
the structural properties of the network, underestimating the strength of relationships, 
centrality measures, degree measures, or clustering coefficients (e.g., Kossinets, 2006; Smith 
& Moody, 2013; Smith, Moody, & Morgan, 2017). However, due to the unique property of 
networks that information on missing actors is (at least partially) available through the out-
going ties of observed neighboring actors, measures based on indegrees are reasonably 
robust for small amounts of missing data (Costenbader & Valente, 2003; Smith & Moody, 
2013). 
 
For longitudinal network data where respondents are repeatedly observed, missing data are 
even more likely to occur. Some respondents will not be available at every observation 
moment, a situation known as wave non-response (Huisman & Steglich, 2008), or they will 
even drop out completely from the study after a certain time point. Huisman and Steglich 
(2008) studied the effect of missing longitudinal network data within the framework of 
stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs), a family of models often used to analyze the 
dynamics of network and behavior (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). They found that 
restricting the analysis to completely observed cases leads to model convergence problems 
and generally gives biased parameter estimates. Non-convergence due to missing data was 
also encountered by de la Haye et al. (2017) while analyzing the complete cases, which lead 
them to propose and study different analytic strategies for longitudinal networks with 
missing data.  
 
Simple treatment procedures for missing network data were already suggested by Burt 
(1987) and Stork and Richards (1992). More recent, model-based procedures were proposed 
by Robins, Pattison, and Woodcock (2004), Handcock and Gile (2010), Koskinen, Robins, & 
Pattison (2010), Koskinen et al. (2013), all based on modeling observed and missing data 
within the framework of exponential random graph models (ERGMs). Imputation-based 
procedures were proposed and studied by Huisman (2009), Wang et al. (2016), Huisman and 
Krause (2017), and Krause, Huisman, Steglich & Snijders, (2018). All these procedures treat 
missing actors and ties in cross-sectional network data. For longitudinal network data, 
missing data procedures for analyses based on SAOMs were investigated by Huisman and 
Steglich (2008), Hipp et al. (2015), and de la Haye et al. (2017). Huisman and Steglich (2008) 
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use simulations to study simple imputation schemes, one of which is the built-in (default) 
missing data treatment in SIENA, the software to estimate SAOMs (Ripley et al., 2017). This 
SIENA method was found, in general, to result in small biases in model parameters for small 
to medium missingness levels (up to 20% per wave). In the studies of Hipp et al. (2015) and 
de le Haye et al. (2017), analytical strategies are proposed that are based on inclusion of 
different subsets of actors depending on the availability of data in particular waves. Some of 
the strategies rely on the simple default imputations in SIENA, and one of the strategies 
proposed by Hipp et al. (2015) expand these simple imputations by including ERGM-based 
imputations for missing values in the first wave. This procedure creates the opportunity for 
multiple imputation (of the first wave), as suggested by Hipp et al. (2015). Krause, Huisman, 
and Snijders (2018) present a full multiple-imputation procedure based SAOMs. 
 
Although research in missing data procedures for social networks is increasing in the past 
decades for both cross-sectional and longitudinal data, all methods are designed to treat 
missing ties in the network data and very few do address the problem of missing actor 
behaviors or behavior data. Missing actor behavior could be regarded as ‘ordinary’ missing 
data in any non-network data set, and thus treated as such by one of the ample general 
missing data methods for survey data available in statistical literature. However, treating 
missing behavior without considering their (often strong) relationship with the structural 
properties of the network, may bias effects of behavior and may lead to biased estimates of 
the structural properties. Koskinen et al. (2013) illustrate the effect of missing behavior data 
and present an ERGM-based procedure to analyze the incomplete data. Ouzienko and 
Obradovic (2014) propose an ERGM-based imputation procedure for the case of longitudinal 
network data (i.e., temporal ERGMs). In a small simulation study, using simulated and real-
life data, they showed that, in general, their imputations result in more accuracy in 
predicting tie and behavior variables (comparing observed and imputed scores) than simpler 
methods. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the performance of several treatment methods to handle 
missing behavior data in longitudinal networks. More specifically, we analyze the impact of 
different treatment methods on estimated effect parameters in SAOMs that are used to 
model the dynamics of network and behavior (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). We 
restrict the missingness to the behavior variable, that is, the networks are completely 
observed. This means that any effect found can only be attributed to the missing behavior 
data and is not confounded by missing ties or actors. The network and behavior data are 
simulated under known co-evolution models (the base models in our study) and we examine 
missing data strategies that are available for SAOMs (complete case analysis, dummy 
variable adjustment in SAOMs, SIENA method) and some simple, ad hoc treatments (i.e., 
simple single imputations, based on means and hot deck, and somewhat more sophisticated 
multiple imputations using observed network statistics as predictors). The simulated data 
are based on four empirical, observed data sets, in the tradition of Smith and Moody (2013), 
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Smith, Moody, and Morgan (2017), and others. In that respect, the current paper can be 
regarded as a continuation of the study of Huisman and Steglich (2008), focusing on missing 
behavior data. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the stochastic actor-oriented 
models for the dynamics of networks and behavior (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich 2010) 
that are used to simulate the data sets and analyze the treated missing data to examine the 
effects of missing data treatments. Section 3 addresses the problem of missing data in 
networks and especially in behavior data and introduces the available missing data 
treatments of which the performance is studied. The design of the simulation study is 
described in Section 4, and the results are presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 the 
results are discussed and some general recommendations are given. 
 
 
2.2  stochastic actor-oriented models 
 
A common model to analyze the dynamics of networks and behavior is the family of 
stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs; Snijders, 2005, 2017; Snijders, Koskinen, & 
Schweinberger, 2010), of which the estimation is implemented in the SIENA software 
(RSiena package, Ripley et al., 2017). In this paper, we consider directed networks where the 
tie variable xij is binary with values 1 (indicating a tie going from actor i to actor j) or 0 
(absence of a tie between actors i and j). For example, the tie variable is friendship, where xij 
= 1 means that actor i nominates actor j as a friend. Self-nominations are not allowed, that 
is, xii = 0. The behavior variable is assumed to be an ordinal discrete variable representing 
levels of some behavior (e.g., smoking). In the SAOM approach, the network dynamics part 
in the co-evolution process constitutes the social selection process, and the behavior 
dynamics part constitutes the social influence process.  
 
Stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs) model the co-evolution of network and behavior. 
A SAOM is based on panel data, and assumes that the observed data are snapshots of an 
underlying and unobserved process of continuous change in network and behavior between 
the observation moments. This change process is modelled as a continuous-time Markov 
chain of small sequential mini steps, where the first observation is taken as starting point. 
Each mini step gives a randomly selected actor the opportunity to change either a tie or the 
value of the behavior variable. For the tie variable, a change means adding a tie to another 
actor or dropping an existing tie, or no change. For the behavior variable, a change means 
increasing or decreasing the value with one unit, or no change. See Adams and Schaefer 
(2018) for a visualization of the model mini steps. 
 
The change processes consist of two steps. First, a stochastic rate function determines when 
an actor gets the opportunity for a new change (mini step). Secondly, the probabilities of the 
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changes for both tie and behavior variables are determined by objective functions that are 
modeled as linear combinations of effects that represent the current network structure and 
behavior. These effects are functions of the network of the focal actor, as well as the 
behavior of that actor and the behavior of his network partners. Because the changes in the 
network are also dependent on the state of the actors’ behavior, and vice versa, a mutual 
dependence between the network dynamics and the behavior dynamics is established. 
Examples of effects and the corresponding parameters are given in Section 4; for a more 
elaborate discussion of the objective functions and examples and illustration of effects, see 
Snijders, Koskinen, and Schweinberger (2010) and Snijders (2017). 
 
Because the mini steps between observed measurements are unobserved, a SAOM is used 
to simulate the Markov chains of mini steps. The simulation starts with the first observation 
of network and behavior (W1), and, using an initial set of model parameters, simulates 
changes until the second observation (W2). Based on a comparison of the simulated data at 
W2 and the observed data at W2, the model parameters are updated. With these updated 
parameters the simulations are repeated. This iterative process is repeated until the model 
has reached convergence. After convergence, the final parameter estimates are used to 
generate additional series of simulated mini steps to estimate standard errors of the 
parameter estimates (for details see Snijders, 2001, 2017). 
 
 
2.3  Non-response in longitudinal network studies 
 
2.3.1  Missing behavior data 
In this paper, we focus on missing data due to non-response. Other types of missing network 
data are described by Kossinets (2006) and Žnidaršič, Ferligoj, and Doreian (2012), for 
example missingness caused by boundary specification problems. We consider two 
observation moments where the networks are completely observed and one behavior 
variable that is missing for some actors at both observation moments. The non-response 
pattern is important because it determines the amount of data available to estimate the 
SAOMs.  
 
Another important aspect of the non-response is the relationship of the missingness to the 
data. According to the typology of Rubin (1976; see also Schafer & Graham, 2002), three 
different mechanisms can be distinguished, depending on the relation between being 
missing on a behavior variable and the scores on (the behavior or tie) variables. If the 
missingness is unrelated to the value of the behavior variable itself, the data are called 
missing at random (MAR). In this situation, the non-response can be related to the observed 
tie variables, or function thereof, but not to the behavior itself. If the missingness is even 
unrelated to the observed tie variables (or, in general, to any other variable in the data), the 
data are called missing completely at random (MCAR). If the missingness is related to the 
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unknown value of the behavior itself, the data are missing not at random (MNAR). In this 
latter situation, parameters related to the behavior may be severely biased due to the 
systematic difference between responding actors and non-respondents. 
 
2.3.2  Treatments for missing behavior data 
In recent years, missing data treatment procedures have received ample attention, for both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal network data. In general, missing data treatments can 
roughly be categorized in three classes of treatments (e.g., Schafer & Graham, 2002)1: 1) 
deletion methods (also known as available case methods), 2) model-based methods, and 3) 
imputation. Model-based methods for missing cross-sectional network data were proposed 
by Robins, Pattison, and Woodcock (2004), Handcock and Giles (2010), Koskinen, Robins, & 
Pattison (2010), Koskinen et al. (2013), all within the family of exponential random graph 
models. Imputation methods for cross-sectional network data were proposed and examined 
by Huisman (2009), Wang et al. (2016), Huisman and Krause (2017), and Krause, Huisman, 
and Snijders (2018), and for missing longitudinal network data by Huisman and Steglich 
(2008), Ouzienko and Obradovic (2014), Hipp et al. (2015), and Krause, Huisman, and 
Snijders (2018). A combination of available case strategies and imputation within SAOMs 
(i.e., the default method implemented in the SIENA software) was examined by Hipp et al. 
(2015), de la Haye et al. (2017), and Krause, Huisman, and Snijders (2018). 
 
The problem of missing actor behavior data has received far less attention in network 
analysis. One possible strategy to handle the non-response is treating the behavior or 
behavior variables as “ordinary” survey data and using general missing data methods. The 
advantage of this strategy is that general missing data treatments have been investigated 
extensively and there are well-known and sophisticated methods, for example, multiple 
imputation using stochastic regression imputation with actor attributes or other behavior 
variables as predictors (as illustrated for actor behavior data by Huitsing et al. (2014). A 
major disadvantage is that the network structure is not taken into account and the 
associations between behavior and ties are ignored. Unless network and behavior are 
completely independent, this can lead to biased estimates of these relationships as well as 
biases in the estimates of network properties. To prevent the results from becoming biased, 
either network properties should be incorporated in general missing data procedures, or 
missing data treatments should be based on network models. 
 
For missing behavior data, an ERGM-based estimation method was proposed by Koskinen et 
al. (2013). In this method, ERGMs are estimated on partially observed data (both network 
and behavior data) using Bayesian procedures that take into account the relations between 
network and behavior. Imputation methods for behavior data are scarcely investigated. 
Ouzienko and Obradovic (2014) present an ERGM-based imputation model for imputing 
                                                        
1 Often a fourth class of treatments is distinguished, i.e., (re)weighting procedures, which are not considered 
for missing network data. 
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both missing tie variables and missing actor behaviors for longitudinal network data. For 
missing behavior variable in SAOMs, Ripley et al. (2017) propose a simple imputation 
scheme in which either the previous observation, the next observation, or the mode of the 
variable is imputed, in order of availability. These imputed values are then used to simulate 
the mini steps that constitute the behavior (and network) dynamics, but not for the 
calculation of the target statistics to estimate the model parameters, preventing a direct 
effect of the imputed values on model estimation. 
 
In this paper, we consider procedures that are currently available to handle missing behavior 
data within the SAOM framework. This means that we investigate the possibilities in the 
SIENA software and compare these with either simple (complete case analysis or single-
imputation) methods, or with more elaborate multiple-imputation methods in which the 
missing behavior variable is regarded as “ordinary” survey data in non-network analyses. 
Specific details about the use of the methods in the simulation study are given in Section 4. 
 
Complete case analysis 
Complete case analysis is based on the smaller network of complete cases. This means that 
all actors with missing behavior data are removed from the analysis, including the ties to or 
from them. The reduction in the data can be considerable and the results of the method will 
be highly sensitive to the proportion missing data. This may result in biased estimates of 
network characteristics even if data are MCAR. Moreover, model estimation is difficult if the 
remaining complete data set is small and may lead to convergence problems. 
 
Single imputation 
To avoid the loss of data due to complete case analysis, the missing data can be replaced by 
suitable values in order to create a completed data set. A simple procedure is to replace the 
missing values by the mean of the observed data. Although this method is simple and 
therefore attractive, it will lead to biased estimates even when data are MCAR, as it seriously 
underestimates variances and covariances (e.g., Schafer & Graham, 2002). In order to 
preserve variation in the data, imputations can be generated by drawing from the 
distribution of the (missing) data. One way to generate such distributions, is by using 
observed donor cases and replacing the missing values by the observed values of the donors. 
These methods are known as hot deck imputations. Although hot deck partially solves the 




A drawback of single imputations is that they do not take into account the extra variability 
due to missing data and imputation. This leads to underestimation of standard errors and 
therefore biased inferences. By imputing multiple times, the increased variability is 
accounted for and valid inferences are obtained (Rubin, 1987; Schafer & Graham, 2002; Van 
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Buuren, 2012). With multiple imputation, m (m > 1) completed data sets are created using 
stochastic single-imputation methods. This leads to m completed data sets, which will be 
different from each other due to the stochastic nature of the imputations, the extent of 
which reflects the uncertainty due to missing data and imputation.  
 
After imputation, the m completed data sets are analyzed separately (i.e., the parameters of 
the specified model are estimated for each of the data sets) and the results are combined 
using Rubin’s rules (Rubin, 1987). For parameter estimates, this simply means averaging the 
m parameter estimates for each imputed data set: !̅ = $%∑ !'(
%
()$ , where !'(  is the estimated 
parameter for the ith imputed data set. For the variances of the estimates (i.e., standard 
errors), the average within-imputation variance is combined with the between-imputation 
variance to reflect increased variability due to non-response and imputation: * = +, +




()$  equals the average variance within each imputed data set, 
with +(  the variance in each imputed data set, and 1 = $%2$∑ (!'( − !̅)
6%
()$  equals the 
variance between the m estimated parameters. The factor $% in the equation of the total 
variance * reflects the finite number of imputations. Standard errors for parameters are 
obtained by taking the square root of the variance *. 
 
SIENA procedures 
The last two methods investigated in the simulation study, are procedures within the 
framework of SAOMs that are available in the SIENA software. The first procedure is the 
model-based hybrid imputation method for ties (Huisman & Steglich, 2008) extended to 
behavior variables, the default procedure for missing data treatment in the SIENA software. 
The method is called hybrid because in estimating the SAOM parameters, it uses imputed 
values during the simulation of the Markov chains of mini steps, but during the calculation 
(updating) of the estimates, the imputations are not used. This means that during the 
simulation of the Markov chains of mini steps between two consecutive waves, all actors 
(observed and missing) are allowed to make changes. At the end of the simulation runs 
when the simulated and observed data of the second time point are compared, the 
parameter updates are based on the observed data only, and imputations are not taken into 
account. As a result, the imputations only have indirect effects on the estimates through the 
Markov process in the simulation phase of the procedure. In the default procedure, 
imputation consists of replacing missing values with previous observations from an earlier 
wave, if available, otherwise the mode of the variable (for the corresponding wave) is 
imputed. 
 
The second procedure investigated in the simulation study is handling missing behavior data 
by using dummy effects in the SAOM. In this procedure, a dummy variable is created that 
indicates whether an actor is missing (value 1) or observed (value 0). The dummy is included 
in the SAOM by specifying a dummy effect in the objective function of the behavior part of 
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model, where the value of the parameter is fixed at a large negative value. In this way, a 
large (artificial) negative effect on the objective function of the missing actor is created if this 
actor would choose to make a change in the behavior variable (i.e., take a mini step in the 
Markov process modeling the behavior dynamics). As a result the actor will decide not to 
change his behavior. The missing actor will thus not influence the behavior dynamics in the 
model. 
 
This dummy variable procedure differs from the traditional dummy variable adjustment of 
missing values in regression models. In the traditional setting, a dummy variable is created 
indicating missing values on the predictor and a new predictor variable 7∗ is constructed 
with values equal to 7 for the observed cases, and 9 (any constant) for the missing cases. 
The estimated parameter of the dummy variable represents the influence of missing 
predictors on the outcome variable. The estimated parameter for the new predictor 7∗ 
represents the estimated effect of 7 for the observed cases. This procedure redefines the 
parameters estimates and generally produces biased estimates of the coefficients (Allison, 
2001; Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
 
 
2.4  Simulation study 
 
In order to investigate the impact of various missing data treatments on the parameter 
estimates of the SAOMs, a simulation study was performed. In this study, a modified version 
of the general pattern of the simulation study by Huisman and Steglich (2008) was followed: 
1. Select a data set consisting of both network and behavioral data. In line with Smith 
and Moody (2013) and Smith, Moody, and Morgan (2017), data sets representing a 
variety of commonly studied networks were selected, limited to small networks 
(smaller than 65 nodes), which are typically found in empirical research using SAOMs.  
2. For each data set, estimate a SAOM, the so-called base model, on the first two 
observed waves. This base model represents the ‘true’ model and is based on the 
complete data set, before generating missing actors.  
3. Using the selected data set and the base model, generate complete (i.e., non-
missing) sets of longitudinal data consisting of two waves. 
4. Generate missing data in both waves by deleting the behavioral data of a fraction of 
the actors. Note that the network data are not deleted. 
5. Use the procedures outlined in Section 2.3.2 to handle the missing data and re-
estimate the SAOM. 
6. Investigate the effect of missing data handling on the estimation procedure and the 
estimated parameters of the SAOM by comparing the parameters of the re-
estimated models after treating for the missing (deleted) behavior, with the 
parameters of the base model. This comparison is based on the following three 
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criteria: convergence of the estimation procedure, parameter bias, and parameter 
coverage. 
Details and specifications of various steps in the simulation process are given in the following 
subsections. 
 
2.4.1 Selection of data sets and generation of longitudinal data 
Four different data sets were selected to be used in the simulation study. Each data set 
consists of at least two waves of network and behavioral data. To limit computation time 
and convergence problems, from each data set, the first two waves of one network and one 
behavioral variable are used. The sampled networks are similar in size, ranging from 50 to 63 
actors, and consist of friendship or advice relations. Data sets one and two are subsets of the 
friendship networks from the Teenage Health and Lifestyle study (Michell & Amos, 1997; 
Pearson & West, 2003). The first consists of 50 girls (labeled s50) with the behavioral 
dependent variable alcohol consumption, which is coded on a five-point frequency scale 
ranging from 1 (“I don’t drink”) to 5 (“I drink more than once a week”). This data set was also 
used by Adams and Schaefer (2018) for a visualization of the mini steps in SAOMs and in the 
simulation studies of Huisman and Steglich (2008), Huisman (2009), and Krause, Huisman, 
and Snijders (2018). The second data set consists of a subset of 58 boys from the same study 
(labeled G58), also with friendship defining network ties and alcohol consumption as 
dependent behavioral variable.  
 
The third data set comes from a study among 63 managers of an international company 
(labeled L63; Zandberg, Huisman, & Wittek, 2020) It consists of two waves of an advice 
network and the behavioral variable is information synthesizing, which involves gathering, 
evaluating, and distributing strategic information to the top management of an organization 
(Floyd & Wooldridge 1997). Synthesizing is coded on a six-point frequency scale ranging 
from 1 (“hardly synthesizing information”) to 6 (“regularly synthesizing”). The fourth data set 
(labeled H57) comes from a study among 57 staff members of a housing corporation in the 
Netherlands (Whitmeyer & Wittek, 2010). It consists of an advice network and dependent 
behavioral variable stress at work. The behavioral variable is coded on a five-point frequency 
scale ranging from 1 (“not or hardly ever stressed at work”) to 5 (“very often or always 
stressed at work”). 
 
Some data characteristics of the first and second observation of the data are presented in 
Table 2.1, and a visual presentation of the first wave of each network is given in Figure 2.1. 
In Table 2.1, density is calculated as the number of actual ties divided by potential number of 
ties, and degree is the number of ties of each actor. Moran’s I is the spatial autocorrelation 
index that measures the association between behavior and network (i.e., the correlation of 
behavior between actors that are related to each other). The Jaccard index is the Jaccard 
distance between two successive networks (wave 1 and wave 2) and measures stability 
between the waves. 
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The networks are comparable in terms of size, but differ in density, with the friendship 
networks s50 and G58 having the lowest densities. The advice networks are denser, with the 
H57 network showing some cliques and some actors in (very) central positions. The L63 
network is rather dense showing high levels of interaction between the actors. In the s50 
data, Moran’s I, the network autocorrelation, equals 0.43 and 0.40 for wave 1 and wave 2, 
respectively, which means there is a strong association between network and behavior. In 
the G58 data, Moran’s I decreases from 0.33 to 0.05, signifying a decrease in association 
between network and behavior. In the L63 data, Moran’s I equals 0.12 and -0.04, for wave 1 
and 2, respectively, and 0.05 and 0.03 in the H57 data, which signifies a rather low 
association between the network and behavior in both data sets (Veenstra et al., 2013). The 
Jaccard index measures the amount of change in the network between two waves, and 
should be large enough to provide enough information to estimate the parameters. A value 
of 0.3 is usually considered adequate (Ripley et al., 2017). The Jaccard index varies from 0.30 
to 0.67, indicating there is enough change between the waves to enable estimation of a 
SAOM in all data sets.  
 
Table 2.1 Sample network descriptive statistics for all three data sets (S50, G58, L63, H57): 
Network size, density, average degree, Moran’s I, the Jaccard index, and relative frequencies 
of the categories of the behavioral variable. 
 
 
Network s50 G58 L63 H57 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 Wave 2 
         
Network size (n) 50 58 63 57 
Density 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04  0.38  0.39 0.10 0.10 
Average degree 2.26 2.32 2.69 2.33 23.40 24.10 5.32 5.70 
Moran’s I 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.05  0.12 –0.04 0.05 0.03 
Jaccard Index 0.33 0.30 0.67 0.39 




        
1 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.14 
2 0.32 0.32 0.48 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.14 0.07 
3 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.40 0.02 0.27 0.37 0.38 
4 0.28 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.24 
5 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.15 
6 - - - - 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.00 
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Figure 2.1: Graphs (wave 1) of the networks used in the simulation study: Friendship 
networks s50 and G58 (top row) and advice networks L63 and H57 (bottom row). 
 
 
The first two waves in each data set were used to generate simulated co-evolution processes 
of networks and behavior. On each data set, a SAOM was estimated that is used as the base 
or ‘true’ co-evolution model to generate the data in the study. These base models are 
presented in Table 2.2. As the data sets differ in type of network and behavior, we tried to 
keep the base models as similar as possible by using the following set of standard effects: 
 
The first three effects specify the dynamics of the network. 
• Density (outdegree), the basic tendency of actors to have ties. 
• Reciprocity, the tendency of relations to be returned. If actor A asks actor B for advice, 
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• Transitive triplets, the tendency to form transitive triplets. If actor B is a friend of actor A, 
and actor C is a friend of actor B, the probability of A becoming a friend of C will increase 
(friends become friends with their friends’ friends).  
 
The following three effects model the influence of behavior on network structure. 
• Behavior alter describes the effect of behavior on the actor’s popularity to attract other 
actors; a positive parameter indicates a tendency that actors with high levels of behavior 
will receive more incoming tie requests. For example, spending lots of money might be a 
reason for getting befriended. 
• Behavior ego describes the influence of an actor’s level of behavior on extending ties to 
others. For example, being successful leads to more easily approaching others. 
• Behavior similarity describes the effect of forming a tie with actors with similar levels of 
behavior, like non-smokers befriending non-smokers. 
 
The following three effects model the influence of network structure on behavior. 
• Behavior total similarity describes the actors’ preference to be similar to their alters.  
• Behavior indegree describes the tendency that popular actors (with more incoming ties) 
have higher values for behavior. 
• Behavior outdegree describes the tendency that more active actors (with more outgoing 
ties) have higher values for behavior. 
 
In a first attempt, a model containing all the described effects was estimated on each data 
set. In order to obtain acceptable convergence results for all data sets, in a second round 
some effects were removed from the model of some data sets. This resulted in simple base 
models that have slightly different specifications for all data sets, good convergence 
qualities, do not take too much computing time, and are able to generate empirically 
informed simulations. A drawback is that some parameters are not significant. All four base 
models satisfy the common convergence criteria (Ripley et al., 2017), with convergence 
statistics for individual parameters smaller than 0.10 and t-statistics for overall convergence 
smaller than 0.25. It should be noted that the satisfying convergence of the base models is 
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• Transitive triplets, the tendency to form transitive triplets. If actor B is a friend of actor A, 
and actor C is a friend of actor B, the probability of A becoming a friend of C will increase 
(friends become friends with their friends’ friends).  
 
The following three effects model the influence of behavior on network structure. 
• Behavior alter describes the effect of behavior on the actor’s popularity to attract other 
actors; a positive parameter indicates a tendency that actors with high levels of behavior 
will receive more incoming tie requests  For example, spending lots of money might be a 
reason for getting befriended. 
• Beha ior ego describes the influence of an actor’s level of behavior on extending ties to 
others. For example, being successful leads to more easily approaching others. 
• Behavior similarity describes the effect of forming a tie with actors with similar levels of 
behavior, like non-smokers befriending non-smokers. 
 
The following three effects model the influence of network structure on behavior. 
• Behavior total similarity describes the actors’ preference to be similar to their alters.  
• Behavior indegree describes the tendency that popular actors (with more incoming ties) 
have higher values for behavior. 
• Behavior outdegree describes the tendency that more active actors (with more outgoing 
ties) have higher values for behavior. 
 
In a first attempt, a model containing all the described effects was estimated on each data 
set. In order to obtain acceptable convergence results for all data sets, in a second round 
some effects were removed from the model of some data sets. This resulted in simple base 
models that ave slightly different specifications for all data sets, good convergence 
qualities, do not take too much computing time, and are able to generate empirically 
informed simulations. A drawback is that some parameters are not significant. All four base 
models satisfy the common convergence criteria (Ripley et al., 2017), with convergence 
statistics for individual parameters smaller than 0.10 and t-statistics for overall convergence 
smaller than 0.25. It should be noted that the satisfying convergence of the base models is 
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Table 2.2. Specification of base models to generate longitudinal data for networks and behavior for the four data sets: Estimated parameters b 
(with standard errors) and convergence t statistics. The t-statistic is the average deviation between simulated values of the statistics and their 
target value  in the final phase of the estimation phase where the standard errors of the statistics are estimated. 
 Effect s50 G58 L63 H57 
  b (SE) t b (SE) t b (SE) t b (SE) t 
          
1 Network rate 5.94 (0.99) –0.01 5.78 (0.70) –0.02 14.63 (0.90) 0.01 7.68 (0.64) 0.02 
2 Density –2.59 (0.17) 0.01 –2.49 (0.23) 0.02 –1.70 (0.08) –0.01 –1.36 (0.07) 0.00 
3 Reciprocity 2.06 (0.26) 0.02 2.27 (0.29) 0.00 1.17 (0.09) –0.02 0.99 (0.14) 0.00 
4 Transitive triplets 0.61 (0.12) 0.02   0.04 (0.00) –0.02   
5 Behavior alter –0.14 (0.11) –0.05 0.58 (0.28) 0.03 –0.20 (0.05) –0.02 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 
6 Behavior ego   –0.15 (0.28) 0.01   –0.12 (0.06) 0.01 
7 Behavior similarity 1.60 (0.75) –0.03 2.1  (1.60) 0.01   –0.78 (0.32) 0.04 
          
8 Behavior rate 1.02 (0.40) 0.03 1.76 (0.54) –0.01 6.64 (1.59) 0.02 0.92 (0.27) 0.02 
9 Behavior linear –0.35 (1.23) 0.05 –0.38 (0.54) 0.04   –0.20 (1.01) 0.03 
10 Behavior quadratic –0.16 (0.36) 0.00 –0.2  (0.20) 0.01   0.61 (0.75) 0.00 
11 
Behavior total 
similarity   2.36 (1.85) 0.03   
2.26 (2.95) 0.00 
12 Behavior indegree –0.69 (1.46) 0.03 0.01 (0.43) 0.03   –0.05 (0.20) 0.03 
13 Behavior outdegree 1.10 (2.16) 0.03 0.29 (0.54) 0.04 –0.05 (0.02) 0.01 0.17 (0.31) 0.02 
          
 
Overall convergence t-
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The four estimated base models are used to simulate the co-evolution processes. The first 
observation of each network and corresponding behavioral variable are taken as initial state 
of the process and using the estimated model parameters, the co-evolution process was 
simulated 500 times. This resulted in 500 simulated networks and 500 simulated behavioral 
variables at the second time point. These simulated data (network and behavior) are taken 
as wave two data in the simulation study (after generating missing data). 
 
2.4.2  Generating missing data 
As the study is restricted to missing behavior (endogenous) variables, missing data were 
created by selecting actors according to some stochastic procedure and deleting the values 
of the behavioral variable of these actors. Four proportions of non-response were 
generated: 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6. For each proportion, actors were sampled using one of the 
selection mechanisms described below, and missing values were created in the behavior 
variable at both time points. That is, an actor with non-response on behavior, has missing 
values on both time points. In line with Huisman and Steglich (2008) and using the typology 
defined by Rubin (1976), we used three different mechanisms to select the actors with 
missing behavioral values. 
1. Missing completely at random (MCAR): Completely random selection, where 
missingness is not related to characteristics of the network or the actors. 
2. Missing at random (MAR): Probability of selection is proportional to  
1/(outdegree + 1)2, where missingness is related to an observed network 
characteristic. 
3. Missing not at random (MNAR): Probability of selection is proportional to  
1/(behavior + 1)2, where missingness is related to the behavioral variable itself. 
 
In the second and third mechanism, the selection is such that actors with lower scores on 
the characteristic (outdegree and behavior, resp.) have a larger probability to have missing 
data. While these may not be the only realistic mechanisms to select actors with missing 
behavior data, they are very suitable to illustrate the impact of the different types of 
mechanisms.  
 
The generation of the observed and missing data resulted in 4 (data sets) × 500 (replications) 
= 2,000 complete data sets (two waves of network and behavior two waves), and 4 (data 
sets) × 500 (replications) × 4 (proportion missing) × 3 (missingness mechanism) = 24,000 
incomplete data sets. 
 
2.4.3 Treatment of missing data and re-estimation of SAOM 
For each network, the data were analyzed using the SAOM that was used to generate the 
data (see Table 2.2). Next, the same SAOM was fitted to the incomplete data, were the 
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missing behavior data were treated using one of the missing data procedures described in 
Section 3.2: 
1. Complete cases (CC). 
2. Single imputation by imputing the mean of the observed data (AV). 
3. Single imputation by imputing the value of a randomly selected donor case (RAN). 
For each missing actor, a donor case is selected at random from the set of observed 
actors and the value of the behavior variable of the donor actor is used to replace the 
missing data. 
4. Single imputation by imputing the value of a selected donor case (hot deck 
imputation; HD). As in the previous procedure, the missing behavior is imputed by 
the behavior value of a donor actor. The donor actor, however, now is an actor 
resembling the actor whose behavior is missing. The selection of a matching donor is 
based on the absolute difference in outdegree between the actor with missing 
behavior data and the donor actor (the smaller the difference, the higher the 
probability of the donor to be selected).  
5. Multiple imputation based on predictive mean matching (MI). Predictive mean 
matching (Little, 1988) is a hot deck procedure in which donor actors are selected of 
which the observed values are imputed. The selection of the donors is based on 
matching predictions from regression models. In the case of missing behavior data, a 
set of three observed donor actors is found of whom the predicted behavior scores 
are close to the predicted value of the missing actor, and from this set one donor is 
randomly drawn (van Buuren, 2012). The regression models on which the predictive 
mean matching is based, consist of additional behavioral or attribute variables and 
network effects, depending on the data set that is imputed (one of the four 
described in Section 4.1). For all four networks, the network statistics that were used 
in the imputation model are indegree, outdegree, number of reciprocal ties, number 
of transitive ties, number of three-cycles, and number of two-paths. The additional 
behavior variables that were used in the imputation model are use of tobacco, use of 
cannabis, sports participation (s50 data set), use of tobacco, use of cannabis, amount 
of pocket money, having a romantic relation, distance to school (G58 data set), 
proactive behavior, discretionary space, organizational support, organizational 
commitment, and organizational connectedness (L63 data set). For the H57 data set 
no additional behavioral variables were used as predictors in the imputation model, 
as none were available. The multiple imputation for each incomplete data set was 
performed using the R software package mice (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 
2011), based on m = 5 imputations. These imputations were simulated until five 
convergent runs were obtained. When less than five convergent runs were obtained 
after twenty-five attempts, simulation was stopped. In that case, if we had achieved 
four convergent runs, multiple imputation was based on these four imputations, and 
in case we had obtained less than four convergent single imputations, this particular 
simulated data set was discarded for further analysis. 
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6. The default SIENA method (SIENA) based on imputation and restricted parameter 
estimation (as described for ties by Huisman & Steglich, 2008). 
7. The dummy variable procedure for SAOMs (DUM). The parameter for the effect of 
the dummy variable (indicating missing actors) was fixed at the value –40, which 
proved large enough (in absolute value) to prevent missing actors from making a 
change in the dynamic processes. 
 
2.4.4  Analysis of the simulation outcomes 
Three measures of performance were used to investigate the effect of the missing data 
procedures for behavioral variables on modeling the longitudinal data: convergence 
(number of converged estimation runs), relative bias (compared to true score, i.e., the 
parameter of the data-generating SAOM), and coverage (percentage of intervals containing 
the true parameter value). A convergent simulation is a prerequisite for a reliable parameter 
estimation in SIENA. Convergence indicates that the statistics of the simulated networks in 
the estimation procedure, are close to their target values. In our study, we considered a 
simulation run converging if after one simulation run the t-statistic for overall model 
convergence is smaller than 0.25 (Ripley et al., 2017). While one usually reruns a simulation 
when convergence is not satisfactorily in a first attempt, we did not rerun simulations as we 
considered the number of convergent runs in a first attempt a good indication of the effect 
of a missing data treatment on convergence characteristics. For multiple imputation, the 
approach is slightly different because MI is based on five (or four) convergent sub runs. 
Therefore, obtaining a MI-result for a specific run automatically implies that it is based on 
convergent sub runs. The difference with the other methods is that we had more 
opportunities in obtaining convergent runts. If a run was not converging, it was discarded for 
further analysis. 
 
To evaluate the robustness of the missing data handling methods, the relative bias of the 
estimated parameters was calculated: bias = (treated – true) / true, where treated is the 
estimated parameter for the treated missing data, and true is the estimated parameter in 
the original base model. Because for some combinations of data set, parameter, mechanism, 
and method, the number of convergent simulation runs was very low, only those 
combinations with at least 100 converging runs were considered. 
 
To evaluate the distribution of the estimated parameters, the proportion of population 
parameters (base model) within two-standard-errors distance from the estimated 
parameter was calculated. In case of a normal distribution of estimated parameters, this 
distance would be smaller than two standard errors in approximately 95% of the cases. 
Although the distribution of estimated parameters in SAOMs is unknown, we will use this 
procedure to approximate parameter coverage. Similar to the relative biases, this is based 
on combinations with at least 100 convergent runs only. 
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2.5  Results 
 
2.5.1  Convergence 
The results are presented in Figure 2.2, which shows the number of convergent simulation 
runs for each combination of data, method, missingness mechanism, and level of 
missingness. Each combination has been simulated 500 times, and the graphs show how 
many of these 500 runs were convergent. For example, in the G58 data set, the number of 
convergent simulations is approximately 380 when there is no missing data, but below 100 
for 60% missing data and complete case analysis (CC). 
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Figure 2.2: Number of converging simulation runs. 
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First, we observe that the missingness mechanism hardly matters in most cases. In the G58 
data set, mean imputation (AV) shows the worst performance for the MAR mechanism, 
while multiple imputation (MI) performs worst for MCAR. In the L63 data set, MAR generally 
shows lowest convergence rates (especially for the imputations based on donor cases: RAN, 
HD, and MI) for high levels of missingness. As a general conclusion, we can say that the 
missingness mechanism seems to have only a small impact on convergence. 
 
When we look at the convergence characteristics of the different methods, it can be 
observed from Figure 2.2 that for all data sets CC leads to low numbers of convergent 
simulations for higher levels of missingness. This is no surprise as the number of network 
relations declines exponentially and the remaining number of actors and ties quickly 
becomes too small. The implication is that CC is not a useful method to deal with missing 
data. The single imputation-methods AV, RAN, and HD replace the missing data by a value 
that is based upon the observed data. It is therefore no surprise that their convergence 
results show similar patterns. Multiple imputation shows patterns that are often similar to 
mean imputation (AV) and is frequently hardly better than complete case analysis. Although 
MI imputes observed information (based on donor cases), the variation in imputed values is 
probably too large to lead to stable estimation. The two single-imputation methods based 
on donor cases (RAN and HD) often result in increased numbers of convergent runs, 
indicating that they insert information that benefits model estimation, which may not 
actually reflect true data processes.  
 
The default SIENA method shows rather strong convergence performance, even for high 
levels of missingness. However, using SIENA with the dummy option (DUM) leads to 
convergence problems with higher levels of missingness. The explanation of this difference 
might be due to the manner SIENA treats missing data. In the case of the default, the mode 
of the variable is imputed for the missing behavior data, and this value is allowed to change 
in the Markov sequence that models the behavior between the waves. This means that the 
incomplete cases still participate in the co-evolution of behavior and network between the 
waves, though they are excluded in the procedure for parameter estimation. In the dummy 
method, any change of the missing behavior is effectively prohibited, limiting the co-
evolution process between waves. Especially for higher fractions of missing data this may 
lead to convergence problems.  
 
The overall conclusion is that the SIENA method is least affected by convergence problems. 
Single imputation gives acceptable convergence rates for small numbers of missing data, but 
for higher percentages the performance gets worse. The same pattern can be seen for the 
multiple-imputation method, however the effects are even larger, especially for higher levels 
of missingness. 
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2.5.2  Parameter bias 
The average relative biases of the estimated model parameters are presented in Figures 
2.3a-d, which consists of one subfigure for each data set. Each of these subfigures in turn 
contains a number of graphs for different combinations of method and estimated 
parameter. These figures show the average relative bias of the estimated parameters as a 
function of missingness level for the three different missingness mechanisms. 
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Figure 2.3a: Data set s50. Relative average bias in all data sets, for all missing data methods 
(columns) and parameters of the corresponding base models (rows), mechanisms (lines in 
figures), and percentages of missing data (x-axis). 
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Figure 2.3b: Data set G58. Relative average bias in all data sets, for all missing data methods 
(columns) and parameters of the corresponding base models (rows), mechanisms (lines in 
figures), and percentages of missing data (x-axis). 




Figure 2.3c: Data set L63. Relative average bias in all data sets, for all missing data methods 
(columns) and parameters of the corresponding base models (rows), mechanisms (lines in 
figures), and percentages of missing data (x-axis). 
 




Figure 2.3d: Data set H57. Relative average bias in all data sets, for all missing data methods 
(columns) and parameters of the corresponding base models (rows), mechanisms (lines in 
figures), and percentages of missing data (x-axis).   
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From Figures 2.3a-d it can be seen that the missingness mechanisms (MCAR, MAR, and 
MNAR) seem to have little impact on the relative parameter bias. With some minor 
exceptions, there is some variation in performance, single-imputation methods (AV, RAN, 
and HD) perform rather similarly. Depending on the type of the relation and the strength of 
the effect in the data, some effects will be more sensitive to missing data than others, 
leading to a variation in relative biases. The performance of the multiple-imputation 
procedure is comparable to single imputations in a number of cases, but sometimes 
outperforms them, for example in the L63 data set. The default SIENA method clearly 
outperforms the other methods. The figures also indicate that the performance of this 
procedure seems to be rather independent of the level of missingness, whereas most 
methods show deteriorating performance for higher level of missingness. This is likely to be 
caused by the way SIENA deals with missing behavior values: While a value is imputed for 
the missing observation and behavior may change between the waves, the parameter 
estimation is based upon the non-missing cases only. This gives the SAOM a high level of 
flexibility and the possibility to adapt, while at the same moment only taking into account 
observed values for parameter estimation.  
 
Factorial ANOVAs were performed to find the most important factors that affect the average 
relative bias of the estimated parameters. To reduce the amount of effects to be estimated 
and to increase clarity of interpretation, the ANOVAs were performed for each combination 
of data set and model parameter separately. That is, the main effects on bias of missingness 
mechanism, level of missingness, and treatment method were estimated, as well as all two-
way and three-way interactions. The partial eta-squared values, hp2, of main, two-way and 
three-way effects are presented per parameter and per data set in Table 2.3. 
 
In addition, for each data set a linear regression was performed to predict the relative biases 
of the estimated parameters using dummy variables representing the different categorical 
factors (only main effects, no interactions). In this analysis, the default SIENA method was 
chosen as the reference for method, because Figures 2.3a-d indicated this to be the best 
performing method. For the missingness mechanism, we chose MCAR, as a theoretical ideal 
situation. For the level of missingness, we chose 10 percent, the lowest percentage. And for 
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Table 2.3. Partial eta squared values from factorial ANOVAs for each combination of data set and model parameter to compare the main effects of missingness mechanism 
(MCAR, MAR, MNAR), level of missingness (10, 20, 40, 60%), and treatment method (CC, AV, RAN, HD, MI, SIENA, DUM), and their two-way and three-way interactions on 





























  density recip transtrip beh alter beh ego Beh sim Tot sim Indegree outdegree 
           
s50 mechanism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 
 mislevel 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 - 0.04 - 0.00 0.00 
 method 0.23 0.09 0.00 0. 4 - 0.25 - 0.03 0.06 
 mechanism*mislevel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 
 mechanism*method 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 
 mislevel*method 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.01 - 0.09 - 0.00 0.00 
 mechanism*mislevel*method 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 
           
G58 mechanism 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 mislevel 0.00 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 method 0.28 0.11 - 0.86 0.16 0.32 .23 0.00 0.04 
 mechanism*mislevel 0.00 0.00 - 0. 0 0.00 0.00 .00 0.00 0.00 
 mechanism*method 0.00 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
 mislevel*method 0.08 0.04 - 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.01 
 mechanism*mislevel*method 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
L63 mechanism 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 - - - - 0.00 
 mislevel 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 - - - - 0.01 
 method 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.29 - - - - 0.27 
 mechanism*mislevel 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - - 0.00 
 mechanism*method 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 - - - - 0.00 
 mislevel*method 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 - - - - 0.08 
 mechanism*mislevel*method 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - - - - 0.00 
           
H57 mechanism 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 mislevel 0.01 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 method 0.07 0.00 - 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.02 
 mechanism*mislevel 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 mechanism*method 0.01 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 mislevel*method 0.05 0.00 - 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 mechanism*mislevel*method 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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• Transitive triplets, the tendency to form transitive triplets. If actor B is a friend of actor A, 
and actor C is a friend of actor B, the probability of A becoming a friend of C will increase 
(friends become friends with their friends’ friends).  
 
The following three effects model the influence of behavior on network structure. 
• Behavior alter describes the effect of behavior on the actor’s popularity to attract other 
actors; a positive parameter indicates a tendency that actors with high levels of behavior 
will receive more incoming tie requests. For example, spending lots of money might be a 
reason for getting befriended. 
• Behavior ego describes the influence of an actor’s level of behavior on extending ties to 
others. For example, being successful leads to more easily approaching others. 
• Behavior similarity describes the effect of forming a tie with actors with similar levels of 
behavior, like non-smokers befriending non-smokers. 
 
The following three effects model the influence of network structure on behavior. 
• Behavior total similarity describes the actors’ preference to be similar to their alters.  
• Behavior indegree describes the tendency that popular actors (with more incoming ties) 
have higher values for behavior. 
• Behavior outdegree describes the tendency that more active actors (with more outgoing 
ties) have higher values for behavior. 
 
In a first attempt, a model containing all the described effects was estimated on each data 
set. In order to obtain acceptable convergence results for all data sets, in a second round 
some effects were removed from the model of some data sets  This resulted in simple base 
models that have slightly different specifications for all data sets, good convergence 
qualities, do not take too much computing time, and are able to generate empirically 
informed simulations. A drawback is that some parameters are not significant. All four base 
models satisfy the common convergence criteria (Ripley et al., 2 17), with convergence 
statistics for individual parameters smaller than 0.10 and t-statistics for overall convergence 
smaller than 0.25. It should be noted that the satisfying convergence of the base models is 
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Table 2.4. Estimated parameters (with standard errors) of the regressions predicting the 
average relative bias using dummy variables for missing data method, missingness 
mechanism, missingness level, and model parameter, for all four data sets. 
 s50 G58 L63 H57 
 
Intercept   0.063 (0.006)   0.075 (0.003)   0.190 (0.004)   0.067 (0.006) 
 
CC   0.140 (0.005)   0.062 (0.003)   0.080 (0.004)   0.139 (0.005) 
AV –0.059 (0.005) –0.037 (0.003) –0.120 (0.004) –0.063 (0.005) 
RAN –0.094 (0.005) –0.022 (0.003) –0.200 (0.004) –0.130 (0.006) 
HD –0.109 (0.005) –0.022 (0.003) –0.214 (0.004) –0.129 (0.006) 
MI –0.287 (0.007) –0.325 (0.003) –0.176 (0.004) –0.174 (0.006) 
DUM –0.139 (0.005) –0.237 (0.003) –0.381 (0.004) –0.185 (0.006) 
 
MAR –0.001 (0.004)   0.004 (0.002)   0.025 (0.003) –0.002 (0.004) 
MNAR   0.002 (0.004)   0.002 (0.002)   0.001 (0.003)   0.014 (0.004) 
 
mis20 –0.020 (0.004) –0.001 (0.002) –0.036 (0.003) –0.024 (0.004) 
mis40 –0.019 (0.004)   0.013 (0.002) –0.097 (0.003) –0.020 (0.004) 
mis60   0.043 (0.004)   0.034 (0.002) –0.127 (0.003)   0.066 (0.004) 
 
recip   0.033 (0.005)   0.004 (0.003)   0.019 (0.003) –0.043 (0.006) 
transtrip –0.111 (0.005)           - –0.044 (0.003)           - 
beh_alter   0.002 (0.006)   0.468 (0.003) –0.395 (0.003)   0.206 (0.006) 
beh_ego            -   0.912 (0.003)           - –0.357 (0.006) 
beh_sim –0.466 (0.006) –0.014 (0.003)           - –0.445 (0.006) 
totsim            -   0.059 (0.003)           -   0.031 (0.006) 
indegree   0.596 (0.006)   0.969 (0.003)           -   0.910 (0.006) 
outdegree   0.449 (0.006)   0.818 (0.003) –0.269 (0.003)   0.340 (0.006) 
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The first observation from the factorial ANOVA is that the hp2 values for the missingness 
mechanism are all very small. This indicates that of the variances in bias, the proportions 
associated with the missingness mechanism are very small. The largest values are found in 
the L63 data set with hp2 = 0.015 for the density effect and hp2 = 0.017 for the behavior alter 
effect. This is confirmed in the regression on the dummy variables in Table 2.4, where MAR 
and MNAR only add minor and often insignificant differences to MCAR. The results in Figures 
2.3a-d also show often little differences between the missingness methods. The conclusion is 
that the differences between missingness mechanisms are very small for almost all cases 
and that the missingness mechanism is not a major factor to consider for the selection of a 
method to deal with missing data.  
 
A second conclusion to be drawn from the ANOVAs is that the level of missingness is only 
limited associated with the variation in parameter bias. Large partial eta-squared values are 
hp2 = 0.044 for transitive triplets (transtrip) and hp2 = 0.080 for behavior alter effects in the 
L63 data set, hp2 = 0.037 for the behavior similarity effect in the s50 data set, and hp2 = 0.026 
for the behavior similarity effects in the H57 data set. These results can also be seen in 
Figures 2.3a-d, where for the mentioned cases an increase in (negative) average relative bias 
can be seen.  
 
Much larger partial eta-squared values can be found for method. Primarily for the main 
effect of method (e.g., hp2 = 0.231 and 0.283 for density in the s50 and the G58 data set, 
resp.), but as well for some two-way interactions between method and missingness level 
(e.g., for the behavior alter effect, hp2 = 0.138 in the G58 data set and hp2 = 0.103 in the L63 
data set, and for the behavior similarity effect, hp2 = 0.088, 0.070, and 0.066 for the s50, 
G58, and H57 data sets, resp.). That the method to deal with missing data is the largest 
source of variation in parameter bias indicates that choosing the right method is the most 
important concern.  
 
Looking at the different methods, CC shows relatively large deviations from the true model 
parameters. Further, in Figures 2.3a-d it can be seen that the four imputation methods (AV, 
RAN, HD, and MI) show comparable patterns, and especially RAN and HD almost give similar 
results. In data set s50, MI shows similar results as RAN and HD. In data set L63, MI performs 
better for reciprocity, transitive triplets and outdegree. In G58, MI differs slightly from the 
other three methods, showing less deviation for behavior ego, but more deviation for 
behavior similarity, total similarity, and outdegree. This is confirmed by the regression 
analyses, where again we see that RAN and HD show almost identical effects.  
 
In most cases SIENA shows the smallest bias, and DUM is similar to the imputation methods. 
This is not unexpected, as with dummies the value of missing behavior is fixed to a constant 
level by using a high penalty for change. SIENA imputes the mode and carries out a 
simulation as if the data set was complete. The actual parameter estimation is then based on 
Missing behavior data in longitudinal network studies 42 
the non-missing data. The difference with the dummy method is the allowed change in the 
underlying sequences of mini steps. It appears that denying these micro changes for missing 
data, which effectively means putting a lock on behavior, results in larger biases relative to 
the true parameter. 
 
2.5.3  Coverage 
To evaluate the distribution of the estimated parameters, the proportion of population 
parameters (base model) within two-standard-errors distance from the estimated 
parameter was calculated. In case of a normal distribution of estimated parameters, this 
distance would be smaller than two standard errors in approximately 95% of the cases. 
Although the distribution of estimated parameters in SIENA is unknown, we will use this 
procedure to approximate parameter coverage. Similar to the relative biases, this is based 
on combinations with at least 100 convergent runs only. 
 
The coverage results are presented in Figures 2.4a-d. These figures show the proportions of 
population parameters that are within two-standard-errors distance from the corresponding 









Figure 2.4a: Data set s50. Proportion of runs with difference between population parameter 
and estimated parameter smaller than two standard errors.  




Figure 2.4b: Data set G58. Proportion of runs with difference between population parameter 
and estimated parameter smaller than two standard errors.  




Figure 2.4c: Data set L63. Proportion of runs with difference between population parameter 
and estimated parameter smaller than two standard errors.  
 






Figure 2.4d: Data set H57. Proportion of runs with difference between population parameter 
and estimated parameter smaller than two standard errors 
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The first observation is that there is hardly a difference between the three missingness 
mechanisms. Inspection of the missing data methods shows that in most cases CC leads to 
95% of the population parameters within the expected boundary, although it should be 
noted that for high percentages missing (60%), the proportions could not be calculated in 
three of the four data sets (due to low numbers of convergent model runs). Only the L63 
transitive triplets parameter, and the G58 behavior alter and ego effects, indegree, and 
outdegree parameters show an unexpected low proportion of smaller than 2 SE deviations. 
For the G58 data, these parameters show similar poor results for all other methods as well.  
 
In general, the imputation methods perform similar or worse than CC, especially for higher 
levels of missing data. The single imputations AV, RAN, and HD give similar results (again 
RAN and HD are almost identical in their patterns) and are not able to give acceptable 
parameter coverage for high levels of missing data. Multiple imputation can only do a little 
better, indicating that the number of imputations (m = 5) is probably too low. In the L63 
data, MI clearly outperforms the single imputation for parameter coverage of the transitive 
triples and outdegree effects and is slightly better for other effects. MI also clearly 
outperforms CC, AV, RAN, and HD in the G58 and H57 data sets.  
 
The outcomes of SIENA are always at the .95 level, except for a number of effects in the G58 
data set. The dummy method is on a number of individual cases on the 0.95 level, but often 
clearly much lower (for some parameters in all data sets, e.g., s50 behavior alter and 
behavior sim, or L63 all parameters but reciprocity). This is not surprising as the dummy 
effect prevents development of the behavior between waves, and so hampers effects 
related to behavior.  
 
There is no clear indication that one parameter is experiencing more coverage problems 
than others. All parameters show poor results in some conditions. For example, indegree 
and outdegree show satisfactorily results in the s50 and H57 data sets, poor results for most 
methods in the G58 data set, and mixed results in the L63 data set. Overall, the conclusion is 
that SIENA outperforms other methods.  
 
There are two notable effects of type of data set. First, the L63 data shows more variation in 
coverage than the other data sets, with low coverage levels for high missingness levels. Only 
for the SIENA method coverage is stable and at the desired level. Second, the G58 data 
shows extremely low coverage for some behavior effects (alter, ego, indegree, outdegree), 
for all methods. These effects were already nonsignificant in the base model (in the sense 
that the estimated value is smaller than two times the standard error), and the simulations 
show wildly varying results. Multiple imputation can partly compensate for this by taking 
into account the between-imputations variance. 
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2.6  Discussion 
 
Missing data is a challenge for network researchers. While much research has focused on 
the effect of missing actors, we addressed the influence of missing actor behavior in 
longitudinal network studies. In particular we focused on strategies to deal with missing 
behavior data in SAOMs. These strategies are based on general principles to deal with 
missing data and can be categorized as complete cases only, imputation-based, and model-
based methods. We have used three criteria to evaluate these strategies: estimation 
convergence, relative parameter bias, and coverage. We argue that relative parameter bias 
is the most important of these three criteria, as it reflects the accuracy of the parameter 
estimates. Coverage describes the proportion of two-standard-errors intervals around the 
estimated parameter that contain the original parameter (true parameter of the base model 
which generated the simulated data). We have to realize that the distribution of the 
parameter estimates is unknown, which implies that a priori we cannot expect 95% of the 
estimated intervals to contain the true parameter. Despite this caveat, the proportion found 
is an indication of the spread and stability of outcomes. Therefore, we consider coverage the 
second criteria to apply. Thirdly, convergence is an indication of correct model specification. 
Poor convergence means that the data set contains not enough information to estimate the 
model parameters properly. This might be an indication the chosen strategy leads to a too 
strong loss of information as we have witnessed for the complete cases strategy in the 
simulation, or to an imputation that represents the missing information incompletely or 
imperfectly.  
 
Regarding the relative parameter bias, the results show that the methods based on single 
imputation are roughly comparable. Multiple imputation sometimes outperforms the single 
imputations but performs worse in other cases. In most cases, the default SIENA procedure 
shows the smallest bias and the SIENA dummy method shows strongest parameter bias. 
These latter results show that the dummy method is too restrictive in allowing change 
between consecutive waves, as missing actors are not allowed to make changes, thereby 
biasing parameter estimates. The default SIENA procedure is more flexible and missing 
actors do influence the co-evolution process, which leads to better results. The default 
SIENA procedure is more a model-based approach to deal with missing data, in that it 
estimates the missing values in the course of parameter estimation (i.e., in simulating the co-
evolution process) and missing actors do have an indirect influence on parameter estimates. 
However, contrary to the dummy approach or the imputation-based strategies, the final 
estimation is based only on the observed cases. This is shown to lead to better results (i.e., 
smaller biases in parameter estimates).  
 
Single imputations often show a poor parameter coverage, especially for high levels of 
missingness and for parameters related to (the missing) behavior. Multiple imputation often, 
but not always, outperforms single imputation. This also shows that the number of 
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imputations used in the simulations (m = 5) is not large enough. The SIENA dummy method 
often gives coverage results below the 0.95 level, and gives in general similar results as 
imputation, and in some cases even worse. For the default SIENA method, however, in 
almost all combinations of data set and effect parameter, 95% of the two-standard-errors 
intervals around the estimated parameters contain the original parameter, making it the 
best performing procedure with respect to coverage. 
 
The single donor-based imputation methods (RAN and HD) often see an increase of 
convergent runs for higher levels of missingness. This suggests information is inserted that 
benefits model estimation, that is, there are enough changes between consecutive waves to 
result in some converged solution. This solution, however, often is biased and coverage is 
poor. Mean imputation and especially multiple imputation give poorer results with respect 
to convergence. The latter result may be due to large variation between imputations, 
indicating that there are large differences between imputation runs, which do not allow for 
stable estimation of SAOMs. The SIENA methods perform better, where SIENA with the 
dummy option leads to convergence problems with higher levels of missingness, but the 
default SIENA method shows rather strong convergence performance, even for high levels of 
missingness. 
 
We observed only a limited influence of the missingness mechanisms MCAR, MAR 
(probability of missingness proportional to outdegree), and MNAR (probability of 
missingness proportional to behavior). This suggests that the performance of each 
treatment strategy is mostly unaffected by the used missingness mechanisms. There was 
also a small effect of the data set used, especially on the coverage criterion, but there were 
no methods that performed substantially better in one data set than another. 
 
Taking all three criteria into consideration, we recommend the default SIENA procedure as 
the optimal strategy currently available to deal with missing behavior data. First, it leads to 
the smallest average parameter bias. Secondly, for almost all combinations of effect 
parameter and data set we investigated, 95% of the two-standard-errors intervals around 
the estimated parameters contain the original parameter. And thirdly, it has the best 
convergence performance, which besides being an indication of operational strength, 
indicates that other methods are less capable of dealing with the loss of information due to 
the missing behavior data. 
 
The study has a number of limitations. First, is the use of real-life data sets instead of 
simulated data. As it is impossible to draw clear conclusions about the effect of data 
characteristics on the performance of the missing data procedures, the potential influence 
of the characteristics has to be explored further. For example, closure effects are more likely 
to be affected in low-density networks than in high-density networks because the impact of 
missing data well be felt more severely. This holds in particular for friendship networks. 
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Although the explored data sets differed in terms of network characteristics like density, 
type of ties (friendship/advice) and behavior variables, we have not been able to establish a 
relation between these characteristics and their impact on the three evaluation criteria we 
applied.  
 
Secondly, one likely reason for the worse performance of the imputation methods, might be 
their neglect of the influence of network structure. To deal with missing ties in cross-
sectional network studies, Krause (2019) and Krause, Huisman, & Snijders (2018) proposed a 
multiple imputation based on Bayesian ERGMS, which uses the information contained in the 
network structure. Applying this approach to missing behavior data might lead to improved 
performance because better use is made of the information contained in the data set. 
 
 
Do social capital and personality breed personal initiative? 51 
3 Do social capital and personality breed personal initiative? A 





Personal initiative, or proactive work behavior that overcomes barriers to achieve a goal, is 
key to many important individual or organization level outcomes. Its antecedents, in 
particular its interplay with personality and personal social networks, are little understood. 
According to the independent main effects model, personality (openness to experience and 
conscientiousness) and personal networks (structural autonomy) complement each other as 
triggers of personal initiative. The network mediation model predicts personality to impact 
personal initiative indirectly through its effect on personal networks. And according to the 
network outcome model, personality affects personal initiative, which in turn shapes 
personal networks. Four waves of sociometric data were collected in two newly established 
cohorts of international students (n = 42 and n = 47). Stochastic actor-oriented modelling 
provides partial support for the independent main effects model, suggesting that students 
scoring high on conscientiousness have a stronger tendency towards personal initiative. 





Personal initiative is a trait desired by many, and is believed to be a condition for being 
successful in personal, social and professional settings. For example, entrepreneurship and 
innovation are often among the criteria to evaluate a manager’s performance (Kuratko et al., 
2005). Personal initiative is proactive work behavior that overcomes barriers to achieve a 
goal (Frese & Fay, 2001), with ‘proactive’ referring to a long-term focus and initiative before 
one is forced to act (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). The concept captures the idea that 
individuals are able to identify or to create new opportunities and to exploit these 
opportunities. Personal initiative is related to many concepts, like agency (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998), (corporate) entrepreneurship (Ma & Tan, 2006; Ren & Guo, 2011), creativity 
and innovation (Mainemelis, 2010), learning (Gašević, Zouaq, & Janzen, 2013; Hwang, 
Kessler, & Francesco, 2004), pro-active behavior (Fuller & Marler, 2009; Parker, Bindl, & 
Strauss, 2010), and organizational citizenship (Caza, 2012).  
 
Given its manifold consequences for individuals and organizations, a key question is what 
triggers personal initiative. The major perspectives addressing this question point to two 
different sets of antecedents. Personality theories claim that stable personality traits are 
associated with personal initiative (Fay & Frese, 2001; Frese & Gielnik, 2014; Hogan, 2005). 
For example, two meta-analytical studies found entrepreneurial intention associated with 
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proactive personality (Fuller & Marler, 2009) and four dimensions (openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism) of the Five Factor Model of personality 
(Zhao, Seibert, & Lumpkin, 2010). Fay and Frese (2001) report personal initiative to be 
associated with the need for achievement, extraversion, and conscientiousness. In a study 
among 183 employees of a financial services firm, proactive personality was found to be 
positively associated with the Five Factor Model (Major, Turner, & Fletcher, 2006).  
 
Evidence from social network research suggests that the structure and content of an 
individual’s web of personal relationships is an important antecedent of personal initiative. 
For example, business school alumni were found to build and use networks to pursue 
initiatives (Thompson, 2005), strong ties with entrepreneurial peers incite students to take 
the step to entrepreneurship after graduating (Kacperczyk, 2013), and managers spanning 
structural holes are more likely to successfully propose new ideas (Burt, 2004). 
 
Both approaches have identified important antecedents, and a potential conclusion could be 
that both personality and social networks affect personal initiative independently from each 
other. The present study argues that current explanations based on this independent main 
effect model remain incomplete unless they disentangle the complex causal interplay 
between personality, social networks, and personal initiative. If both personality differences 
and network structure are antecedents of personal initiative, the question arises to what 
degree their effects on personal initiative are independent of each other (Balkundi, Kilduff, & 
Harrison, 2011; Burt, 2012). More specifically, two other possible mechanisms require closer 
scrutiny. First, personality may affect personal initiative indirectly, through its impact on 
personal social networks (network mediation model). For example, individuals with an 
entrepreneurial personality have been found to occupy brokerage positions in the informal 
networks of organizations (Burt, Jannotta, & Mahoney, 1998; Burt, 2012). The same holds 
for high self-monitors, though the effect sizes of this trait are low, as a recent meta-analysis 
has shown (Fang et al., 2015). Second, personality may indeed have a direct effect on 
personal initiative, which in turn affects the structure of someone’s personal network 
(network outcome model).  
 
The present study aims to disentangle these three mechanisms. The key question is: to what 
degree personal initiative is either the product or the driver of an individual’s personal 
network, while accounting for personality differences? Stochastic actor-oriented models 
(Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010; Veenstra & Steglich, 2012) are applied to analyze 
four waves of longitudinal sociometric data of a newly created group of international 
students. The study is replicated using a second dataset. The next section outlines the 
theoretical framework and derives testable hypotheses. This is followed by sections on the 
research design, results, and a discussion and conclusion. 
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3.2 Theoretical background 
 
3.2.1. Personality as an antecedent of personal initiative 
A first perspective to understand personal initiative is to look at personality traits. 
Personality traits can be described as complex psycho-physiological structures that cause 
individual behavior (Brandstätter, 2011). Though there is some discussion if personality traits 
are stable throughout one’s life (Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011), it is commonly accepted 
that they are stable during relatively longer time periods and able to explain variation in 
individual behavior (Hogan, 2005). According to the Five-Factor Model (McCrae & Costa, 
1999), human personality can be exhaustively described by five personality traits: Openness 
to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Of these 
five traits, openness to experience and conscientiousness are particularly conducive to 
personal initiative (Parker & Collins, 2010; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). 
 
Individuals open to experience are intellectually curious, have an interest in unusual thought 
processes, are more creative, willing to try new things, are not afraid of uncertainty, seek 
out new ideas, and have a preference for variety of experiences (McCrae & John, 1992). 
Their broad and multifaceted interests make them aware of many new opportunities. 
Together with their willingness to try new things and preference for variety (Zhao, Seibert, & 
Lumpkin, 2010) individuals scoring high on openness to experience are likely to show a high 
level of personal initiative. 
 
Conscientious individuals are organized, dependable, prefer planned behavior, and show 
self-discipline (McCrae & John, 1992). Their sense of duty and aim for achievement are 
strong drives to take action when considered necessary. Therefore, individuals who score 
high on conscientiousness are likely to show a high level of personal initiative. 
 
Empirical studies provide evidence of a positive relationship between these two personality 
traits and personal initiative (Parker & Collins, 2010; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010) and 
entrepreneurial intention, as shown in a meta-analysis (Zhao, Seibert, & Lumpkin, 2010). In 
sum, individuals high in conscientiousness and openness are likely to exhibit higher levels of 
personal initiative compared to individuals scoring low on these personality traits. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (independent personality effect model): The higher an individual’s (a) 
conscientiousness or (b) openness to experience, the higher the level of personal 
initiative. 
 
3.2.2. Personal networks as an antecedent of personal initiative 
Structural Hole Theory (Burt, 1992) argues that individuals in brokerage positions – which 
allow them to connect individuals or groups that are otherwise unconnected – show more 
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entrepreneurial behavior than individuals lacking this kind of network structure. Due to the 
large number of diverse contacts, such brokers have early access to and control of 
information, as well as more opportunities to mobilize support, leading to higher levels of 
personal initiative as well as improved performance. The opposite holds for individuals 
lacking brokerage opportunities because they find themselves in dense networks, in which 
their contacts are directly or indirectly connected (Burt, 2000). They lack access to new and 
alternative information or sources of support. Such network structures reflect a high degree 
of constraint, and leave little room to exploit structural holes, which limits opportunities for 
personal initiative. A high level of constraint also implies embeddedness in a dense network. 
In such a dense network, closure mechanisms like conformity to group values become 
important, which in turn also may lead to a reduced personal initiative. 
 
There is some empirical evidence for these claims. For example, a study among students 
showed that network brokers have more ideas and more valued ideas (Burt, 2012). A study 
among a group of managers in an American electronics company showed that brokerage 
was associated to variety in thinking and new ideas (Burt, 2004). Similarly, in a study among 
research scientists, Perry-Smith (2006) found that weak ties support divergent and 
autonomous thinking, which in turn leads to individual creativity. Summarizing this 
reasoning, an individual’s personal initiative increases to the degree that this individual’s 
personal network is characterized by structural autonomy as opposed to structural 
constraint. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Independent network effect model): The higher an individual’s 
structural autonomy, the higher this individual’s level of personal initiative. 
 
3.2.3. Personality as antecedent of network opportunities 
Though the personality perspective and the social network perspective often assume the 
other perspective constant, there is reason to combine them in one framework because 
research suggests that personality differences shape the structure of personal networks. A 
study of individuals who created multiple characters in an online virtual world indicates that 
individuals tend to recreate similar kind of networks. Those who created closed networks in 
one role, did the same in other roles, and those who build networks rich in structural holes 
in one role, also tend to build such networks in other roles (Burt, 2012). Other research 
suggests that self-monitors are more likely to occupy central positions in social networks 
(Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001; Sasovova et al., 2010).  
 
Individuals with a high openness to experience have a wide variety of interests and a desire 
for new original experiences (Fang et al., 2015; McCrae & John, 1992). Because they tend to 
be different from others, they resist pressures to similarity and network closure (Baer, 2010; 
Landis, 2016). They are more likely to form ties with otherwise unconnected individuals from 
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disparate social circles, thereby a network rich in structural holes instead of network closure 
(Landis, 2016). 
 
Conscientiousness has been found to be the most stable indicator of job performance across 
occupational groups in several meta studies (Hogan 2005). Conscientious individuals are 
hardworking, competent, and dependable, and therefore often considered attractive 
partners (McCrae & John, 1992). These characteristics also lead to a more effective 
interaction with others (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001), resulting in more intense network 
relations. Because they are primarily valued for their qualities, also individuals from different 
social circles may select them which result in conscientious individuals selected in brokerage 
positions. This leads to hypothesis three: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Network mediation model): The higher an individual’s (a) 
conscientiousness or (b) openness to experience, the higher this person’s level of 
structural autonomy. 
 
3.2.4 Personal Initiative as an Antecedent of Personal Network Structure 
Though previous research focused mainly on how network structures influence personal 
initiative, the reverse may also hold. For example, a study into the networking-motivations 
of students found that they pursue the creation of new contacts with the aim to increase 
their social capital (Villar & Albertín, 2010). Another study (Hwang, Kessler, & Francesco, 
2004) found that an individualistic versus collectivistic background of students influenced 
their attitude towards networking behavior; students with an individualistic orientation were 
more inclined to rely on themselves instead of on others. As a result, they showed a higher 
level of initiative with regards to networking. 
 
Individuals scoring high on personal initiative also take initiatives before they are forced to 
act (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010), suggesting that they proactively create new 
opportunities through building more heterogeneous personal networks rich in structural 
holes (Burt, 2004). Findings of a study among 867 students in Barcelona are in line with this 
argument: students with more heterogeneous relations were more successful than students 
with less diverse relations (Daza, 2016). This leads to the final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (Network outcome model): The higher the level of an individual’s 
personal initiative, the higher this person’s level of structural autonomy. 
 
 
3.3 Research design and data 
 
3.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
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A four-wave sociometric panel study was conducted in 2012 and 2013 among a cohort of 47 
students at a Dutch University of Applied Sciences (dataset 1). The sample consists of 
students enrolled in two international masters’ programs (coded S and L). Due to a shared 
common core, students of both programs worked closely together in the first three months 
and therefore the whole group was considered as one network. The boundaries of the group 
were clear and interaction with students outside these programs was on average much 
lower than inside the group. The students had a diverse international background. With few 
exceptions, all students arrived at the beginning of the academic year and didn't know each 
other before the start of their study. One year later the data collection was replicated with a 
second cohort of 42 new students (dataset 2). In this replication study the items in the 
questionnaire were identical to the original study. Table 3.1 summarizes descriptive 
information on the samples. 
 





   
Proportion of students in program S 0.64 0.66 
Proportion of male students 0.25 0.29 
Proportion of Asian students 0.80 0.90 
 
 
Data were collected in four waves. For dataset 1, data were collected in weeks 1, 5, 13, and 
21 after the start of the program. For dataset 2, data were collected in weeks 2, 6, 13, and 
20. The period between the first two waves is shorter because we expected a faster 
development of the networks in the first weeks. Hardcopies of the questionnaire were 
distributed and filled out during lectures. Absent students were asked by email to fill out the 
questionnaire. Participation was not related to credits or any other incentive. Complete 
name rosters were used for the network questions. It was explained to the participants that 
in order to ensure confidentiality, their names would be replaced by numerical codes during 
the analysis phase. All students (47 in dataset 1 and 42 in dataset 2) participated in at least 
one wave. In dataset 1, three students left the program between waves 2 and 3. In dataset 
2, a total of five students left, two just before wave 2, and three between waves 2 and 3. On 
top of these students leaving, the non-response in the first dataset was 2, 2, 7, and 4 




Personal initiative is measured using the seven-item scale of Frese et al. (1997) on self-
reported initiative (SRI). Answer categories represent a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 
low to high on taking initiative. Values of Cronbach’s alpha were between 0.70 and 0.84, 
indicating sufficient reliability of this scale.  
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Two types of personal networks were collected. For the friendship network, participants 
were asked to describe their relation with fellow students (0 = don't know this student, 1 = 
neutral, 2 = friendly, and 3 = friendship). For the advice network, participants were asked to 
describe how often they asked their fellow students for help or support during the past 
three weeks. This could be for both study and personal matters (0 = never asked for help, 1 = 
1 or 2 times, 3 = 3 or 4 times, and 4 = about daily). All network items were dichotomized 
with 0 representing the answer 0 (don’t know student/never asked for help) and 1 
representing an answer of 1 or higher (at least neutral relationship/some advice asked).  
 
Structural autonomy of each actor was measured with the constraint index !"  that describes 
the extent to which a network consists of redundant contacts (Burt 2000). Network 
constraint measures if a student’s network consists of unconnected clusters of relations, or if 
it is a cohesive group in which alters are connected among themselves, leading to many 
redundant contacts. A high value for constraint means there is less opportunity to broker 
and control information and resources between clusters of relations. For each actor #, the 
constraint is the sum of direct and indirect relations with all other actors $ in the network: 
!" = 	∑ ("))   where (")	 = 	 *+") +	∑ +"-- +-).
/	012	3 ≠ #, $	with  +") = 	 678∑ 6799  and :")  
expressing the relation between # and $ (adjacency matrix). The dyadic constraint cij 
measures the degree to which actor j constrains actor i. The first component of cij measures 
the time and energy spend by i to reach j. The second component measures how j is tied to 
other contacts of i.  When an actor i invests times and energy in a relation with actor j who is 
also tied to many other contacts of j the dyadic constraint cij will be high and i will not bridge 
structural holes. A low dyadic constraint cij will be found when actors j don’t have many ties 
to other contacts of i. !"  is measured on a scale from 0 to 1. A low value indicates that the 
actor spans more structural holes and is less constrained by his network. The constraint 
index is negatively associated with structural autonomy. If structural holes are considered 
sources of social capital, then !"  should be negatively related to performance or personal 
initiative. However, if closure is considered a source of social capital, then the relation 
should be positive. A constraint measure was calculated for both the friendship and the 
advice network. 
 
Personality traits (openness to experience and conscientiousness) were measured using the 
NEO Five Factor Inventory test (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a self-reported measure with 12 
items per dimension. These items are answered on a five-point Likert scale with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of openness or conscientiousness. Values of Cronbach’s alpha 
for openness were 0.43 and 0.47, and for conscientiousness 0.74 and 0.67, respectively. For 
openness, these values are low and indicate a limited reliability of this scale.  
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Controls. The study program was coded 0 for students in program S and 1 for students in 
program L. Gender was coded 0 for female and 1 for male students. Region was coded 0 for 
Asian and 1 for non-Asian students. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes descriptive information on these variables. 
 
Table 3.2 Attribute values of sample (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 




     
Openness 3.27 (1.23) 0.43 3.18 (0.36) 0.47 
Conscientiousness 3.90 (1.15) 0.74 3.64 (0.40) 0.67 
personal initiative wave 1 3.61 (0.52) 0.76 3.80 (0.56) 0.71 
personal initiative wave 2 3.61 (0.45) 0.71 3.79 (0.59) 0.84 
personal initiative wave 3 3.60 (0.52) 0.81 3.63 (0.57) 0.81 
personal initiative wave 4 3.48 (0.37) 0.70 3.81 (0.57) 0.84 
 
 
3.3.3 Analytical Strategy 
A stochastic actor-oriented model for the co-evolution of network and behavior (Steglich, 
Snijders, & Pearson, 2010) was used. It assumes that network structures and behavior evolve 
and interact continuously in small unobserved micro steps between the observations of the 
network and behavior obtained in waves according to a panel design. By simulating 
sequences of the micro steps, the models simulate the co-evolution of network structure 
and behavior. In each micro step an actor can decide to change either one network tie 
(initiate a new or dissolve an existing tie), to change his or her behavior, or do nothing. 
Conditional upon wave 1, the micro steps leading towards subsequent waves are simulated 
repeatedly until simulated network states for the following waves have been achieved that 
resemble actual observations. In this manner, the parameters of the specified effects can be 
estimated. The R package RSiena 4.0, version 1.1-304 (Ripley et al., 2016) was used. 
 
Two categories of dynamic effects are estimated. Selection dynamics represent the 
development of the network due to structural network effects and the influence of behavior 
on the network. Behavior dynamics represent the development of behavior due to structural 
shape effects and the influence of the network. 
 
For each data set two different models were estimated, a friendship model and an advice 
model. These models represent the interaction between either friendship or advice relations 
on the one hand and personal initiative on the other hand. They were used to estimate the 
hypotheses together with several structural network effects (density, reciprocity, transitivity, 
3-cycles, and betweenness) and structural shape effects (linear and quadratic; Steglich, 
Snijders & Pearson, 2010). The linear shape effect represents the effect of high or low scores 
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on behavior and the quadratic effect represents a feedback of behavior. A positive quadratic 
effect parameter indicates self-enforcing behavior, while a negative parameter indicates a 
self-correcting effect. Next to these standard structural effects, we also controlled for the 
possible influence of indegree popularity and the effect personal initiative might have on the 
network by testing for ego, alter and similarity effects. Huisman & Snijders’ (2003) procedure 
for composition change was applied to deal with students who entered or left the program 
during the study. The network constraint index !"  cannot be calculated inside the RSiena 
package, therefore it was calculated separately for each wave. This implies that the 
constraint index is treated as an external covariate. Due to SIENA’s co-evolutionary 
approach, it can still be used simultaneously as a dependent and an explanatory variable. 
Note that because the constraint variable does not vary between the waves, the effect of 
constraint is based on the observed values of the last wave.  
 
Estimated models were checked for convergence by calculating t-ratios (Ripley et al., 2016). 
For convergence of individual parameters, the t-ratios should be smaller than 0.10 and the t-
ratio for overall convergence should be smaller than 0.25. Further, the quality of the models 
was evaluated by the goodness of fit (GOF) of the model with respect to three auxiliary 
statistics: The indegree, the outdegree, and the IWB distributions (Ripley et al., 2016). For 
this test, the estimated model is used to create a number of simulated outcomes for the 
cumulative indegree frequency, the cumulative outdegree frequency, and the cumulative 
IWB frequency. These simulated outcomes are compared to the actual cumulative 






Table 3.3 summarizes the main descriptives of both networks. Density of the networks 
increases strongly in the beginning, and becomes more stable later on. The Jaccard index, 
calculated as the fraction of stable ties compared to the sum of stable, new and terminated 
ties, tests if there is enough stability in the datasets between two waves. Preferably Jaccard 
values should be higher than 0.3, though for strong growing networks a value above 0.2 is 
still acceptable (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). In the first dataset we found a 
Jaccard value of 0.21 between the first and second wave, but given the strong growth of the 
network density from 0.10 to 0.31, this is acceptable. All other Jaccard values are between 
0.55 and 0.73, indicating enough stability for our analysis.  
 
To assess if there is any association between personal initiative (personal initiative) and 
social network characteristics, Moran’s I, a network autocorrelation coefficient, was 
calculated (Veenstra et al., 2013). For these calculations, we used the adjacency matrices as 
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distance matrices. The results indicate that there are only weak relations between network 
position and personal initiative.  
 
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive network statistics 
 Friendship network Advice network 
Wave 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
         
Data set 1         
Density 0.10 0.33 0.48 0.46 0.09 0.25 0.33 0.33 
Average degree 4.56 15.38 22.27 21.33 4.04 11.64 15.27 15.38 
Number of ties 205 692 824 853 182 524 565 615 
Missing fraction 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.15     
Jaccard index  0.21 0.62 0.73  0.25 0.56 0.71 
Moran’s I 0.021 -0.025 0.007 -0.062 0.020 –0.017 0.027 -0.062 
         
Data set 2         
Density 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.32 0.46 0.47 
Average degree 9.61 12.05 14.47 14.51 9.34 13.10 18.81 19.15 
Number of ties 365 482 463 478 355 524 602 632 
Missing fraction 0.10 0.05 0.24 0.21     
Jaccard index  0.55 0.60 0.69  0.52 0.63 0.74 





The estimation results for the models (excluding time dummies) are presented in table 3.4. 
The results of the complete models including time dummies and results for time 
heterogeneity and goodness-of-fit tests are presented in the supplementary materials 
section (Appendix to Chapter 3). Adding time dummies was found necessary, due to time 
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Table 3.4 Model estimation, parameters and standard errors 
   Advice  




dataset 2  
Friendship 
dataset 2 
  Network dynamics     
1  Constant advice rate (period 1) 15.06 (1.65) 21.25 (2.15) 10.85 (1.06) 9.10 (0.93) 
2  Constant advice rate (period 2) 11.05 (0.98) 10.41 (1.03) 10.30 (1.09) 12.75 (1.86) 
3  Constant advice rate (period 3) 6.39 (0.61) 7.26 (0.84) 11.68 (1.28) 9.20 (1.12) 
4  Outdegree (density) 1.35 (0.50) 0.64 (0.43) 0.53 (0.50) 1.76 (0.59) 
5  Reciprocity 1.27 (0.16) 1.32 (0.15) 0.85 (0.14) 1.07 (0.16) 
6  Transitive triplets 0.26 (0.02) 0.24 (0.02) 0.13 (0.04) 0.13 (0.02) 
7  3-cycles -0.23 (0.03) -0.20 (0.03) -0.08 (0.04) -0.11 (0.03) 
8  Betweenness -0.21 (0.04) -0.13 (0.03) -0.18 (0.06) -0.26 (0.04) 
9  Indegree - popularity -0.13 (0.02) -0.11 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02) -0.10 (0.03) 
10  Outdegree - activity (sqrt)   0.14 (0.17)  
11  Personal initiative alter 0.06 (0.09) -0.06 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) -0.03 (0.09) 
12  Personal initiative ego -0.12 (0.14) 0.11 (0.31) 0.20 (0.11) 0.31 (0.11) 
13  Personal initiative similarity -0.39 (0.83) -0.48 (0.73) -1.94 (0.72) 0.09 (0.96) 
       
  Behavior personal initiative dynamics     
14  Rate personal initiative (period 1) 2.06 (0.67) 1.98 (0.68) 3.20 (1.13) 3.02 (1.12) 
15  Rate personal initiative (period 2) 3.28 (1.61) 3.84 (3.43) 4.45 (2.33) 4.43 (2.26) 
16  Rate personal initiative (period 3) 6.84 (6.86) 7.12 (9.47) 2.29 (0.84) 2.34 (0.88) 
17  Personal initiative linear shape 0.02 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) 0.08 (0.10) 0.12 (0.11) 
18  Personal initiative quadratic shape -0.41 (0.08) -0.38 (0.08) -0.23 (0.06) -0.23 (0.07) 
19 H1b Personal initiative: effect from openness -0.03 (0.34) -0.05 (0.33) -0.51 (0.31) -0.60 (0.37) 
20 H1a Personal initiative: effect from conscien 0.71 (0.28) 0.69 (0.27) 0.93 (0.34) 0.98 (0.36) 
21  Personal initiative: effect from gender -0.24 (0.25) -0.22 (0.26) 0.20 (0.22) 0.22 (0.23) 
22  Personal initiative: effect from program 0.02 (0.21) 0.04 (0.19) -0.05 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) 
23  Personal initiative: effect from nationalit 0.36 (0.28) 0.38 (0.28) 0.24 (0.39) 0.21 (0.40) 
24 H2 Personal initiative: effect from constr. 0.12 (0.17) 0.14 (0.14) -0.06 (0.14) -0.12 (0.13) 
       
  Behavior constraint dynamics     
25  Rate constraint (period 1) 2.42 (0.39) 2.77 (0.49) 2.42 (0.39) 1.91 (0.60) 
26  Rate constraint (period 2) 1.15 (0.34) 2.95 (1.05) 1.15 (0.34) 2.78 (1.10) 
27  Rate constraint (period 3) 0.73 (0.27) 0.88 (0.32) 0.73 (0.27) 1.12 (0.39) 
28  Constraint linear shape -2.11 (1.93)  -2.11 (1.93)  
29  Constraint quadratic shape -1.30 (1.21)  -1.30 (1.21)  
30 H3b Constraint: effect from openness -0.24 (1.93) 0.46 (0.49) -0.24 (1.93) -0.60 (0.38) 
31 H3a Constraint: effect from conscientiousness 0.95 (1.64) 0.29 (0.43) 0.95 (1.64) 0.35 (0.39) 
32 H4 Constraint: effect from personal initiative 1.21 (1.85) -0.18 (0.30) 1.21 (1.85) -0.07 (0.16) 
 
 
We found partial support for the claim that personality traits affect self-rated initiative (H1). 
Whereas the effect of conscientiousness is positive and significant in both datasets, as 
predicted by H1a, no significant effect was found for openness to experience, leading us to 
reject H1b. No evidence was found for the remaining hypotheses. There is no significant 
effect of structural autonomy on personal initiative (H2), of personality on structural 
autonomy (H3), or of personal initiative on structural autonomy (H4). This leads us to reject 
both the network mediation and the network outcome model. Results across both datasets 
are largely consistent, pointing to the robustness of our findings. Overall, the findings lend 
partial support only to the independent main effects model: personality, in particular 
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conscientiousness, increases personal initiative, but the structure of personal networks, in 
particular structural autonomy, doesn’t. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
In one of the first sociometric field studies of the co-evolution of networks, personality, and 
personal imitative, we found limited evidence for a systematic interrelation. At least in the 
two cohorts of newly formed networks of students at a Dutch University of Applied Sciences, 
someone’s brokerage position in the friendship or advice network does not trigger higher 
levels of initiative, nor does personal initiative result in different types of personal networks. 
We also did not find that openness to experience boosts personal initiative. What we did 
find is that conscientious students show more personal initiative. The overall conclusion is 
that goal orientation explains personal initiative, but that the relation between network 
constraint and personality and personal initiative is minimal. This finding is in line with 
earlier research (Parker & Collins, 2010; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). It points to the 
importance of goal-orientations as a trigger for personal initiative. These results support 
earlier more general calls to pay closer attention to personality differences in organizational 
settings (Barrick & Ryan, 2004), but also suggest that more in-depth research is needed with 
regard to the link between individual differences and social networks (Day & Kilduff, 2003). 
  
We conclude with some reflections on potential reasons for the non-significant results. First, 
the low reliability of the psychometric scale measuring the personality trait openness to 
experience in our study reflects findings in previous studies that suggest the construct 
actually reflects more than one latent dimension (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014; 
Woo et al., 2014). Future studies may explore to what degree refined measures tapping into, 
for example, cultural and intellectual openness (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), relate 
to personal initiative and social networking. 
 
Second, the absence of any systematic co-variation between the structure of advice and 
friendship networks on the one hand, and personal initiative on the other hand is at odds 
with previous studies showing that social networks affect a large variety of individual 
behavior. One possible explanation might be related to the specific nature of our study 
population, consisting of two newly established cohorts of international students. 
Developing much personal initiative may not be among the primary concerns of young 
adults during this phase of their studies, and in such a setting. This may be different for 
newly hired professionals working in for-profit settings, for whom both personal initiative 
and social capital become pivotal tools to perform their tasks well and receive good 
evaluations from their bosses. A recent meta-analysis (Fang et al., 2015) points into this 
direction. It shows that brokerage only works in settings in which information is crucial for 
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performance, for example for managers in knowledge intense industries like the banking 
sector. 
 
Another context condition may be group size. The effectiveness of brokerage increases with 
the number of disconnected groups. Our two study populations were relatively small (n = 42 
and n = 47). With each of the two cohorts being further divided into two subgroups, 
brokerage hardly ever involved bridging otherwise disconnected groups. This may limit the 
relative benefits accruing to an individual broker.  
 
Finally, discussions with individual students revealed that many of them perceived the group 
structure as static and were reluctant to approach students outside their own clique. Though 
the observed dynamics in the networks partially contradict these perceptions, these 
perceptions are nevertheless likely to affect behavior. Hence, the absence of a systematic 
link between personal initiative and network structure may be due to the fact that many 
students perceive the network as a collection of static cliques, which in turn may decrease 
the expected success and benefits of building new brokerage ties.  
 
In sum, our findings imply that the interrelation between networks, personality and behavior 
might be more complex than our current theories seem to suggest. In order to disentangle 
the various underlying mechanisms, longitudinal sociometric research carried out in a 
variety of institutional and organizational settings is essential. Our study is a step in this 
direction.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Supplementary materials 
 
 
This appendix contains per estimated model the specification of the full model plus the 
results for tests on overall convergence, time heterogeneity and Goodness of Fit (Lospinoso 
et al., 2011).  
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Table S1. Full model estimation Dataset 1 Advice  
 Effect Parameter and SE. 
   
1 Constant advice rate (period 1) 15.06 (1.65) 
2 Constant advice rate (period 2) 11.05 (0.98) 
3 Constant advice rate (period 3) 6.39 (0.61) 
4 Outdegree (density) 1.35 (0.50) 
5 Reciprocity 1.27 (0.16) 
6 Transitive triplets 0.26 (0.02) 
7 3-cycles –0.23 (0.03) 
8 Betweenness –0.21 (0.04) 
9 Indegree - popularity –0.13 (0.02) 
10 Personal initiative alter 0.06 (0.09) 
11 Personal initiative ego –0.12 (0.14) 
12 Personal initiative similarity –0.39 (0.83) 
13 Dummy2:advice ego 0 (NA) 
14 Dummy3:advice ego –0.89 (0.91) 
15 Dummy2:advice ego x transitive triplets –0.16 (0.05) 
16 Dummy3:advice ego x transitive triplets –0.30 (0.05) 
17 Int. Dummy2:advice ego x 3-cycles 0.22 (0.06) 
18 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x 3-cycles 0.25 (0.07) 
19 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x betweenness 0.11 (0.07) 
20 Dummy3:advice ego x indegree - popularity 0.09 (0.04) 
21 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x personal initiative alter 0.12 (0.24) 
22 Int. Personal initiative ego x dummy2:advice ego –0.25 (0.22) 
23 Int. Personal initiative ego x dummy3:advice ego 0.48 (0.32) 
24 Rate personal initiative (period 1) 2.06 (0.67) 
25 Rate personal initiative (period 2) 3.28 (1.61) 
26 Rate personal initiative (period 3) 6.84 (6.86) 
27 Personal initiative linear shape 0.02 (0.11) 
28 Personal initiative quadratic shape –0.41 (0.08) 
29 Personal initiative: effect from openness –0.03 (0.34) 
30 Personal initiative: effect from conscien 0.71 (0.28) 
31 Personal initiative: effect from gender –0.24 (0.25) 
32 Personal initiative: effect from program 0.02 (0.21) 
33 Personal initiative: effect from natio 0.36 (0.28) 
34 Personal initiative: effect from constraint.a 0.12 (0.17) 
35 
Personal initiative: effect from constraint.a x Dummy2:personal initiative: 
effect from Dummy2:personal initiative 
0.44 (0.44) 
36 
Personal initiative: effect from constraint.a x Dummy3:personal initiative: 
effect from Dummy3:personal initiative 
–0.12 (0.34) 
37 Dummy2:personal initiative: effect from Dummy2:personal initiative 0 (NA) 
38 Dummy3:personal initiative: effect from Dummy3:personal initiative 0 (NA) 
39 Rate constraint.a (period 1) 2.42 (0.39) 
40 Rate constraint.a (period 2) 1.15 (0.34) 
41 Rate constraint.a (period 3) 0.73 (0.27) 
42 Constraint.a linear shape –2.11 (1.93) 
43 Constraint.a quadratic shape –1.30 (1.21) 
44 Constraint.a: effect from openness –0.24 (1.93) 
45 Constraint.a: effect from conscien 0.95 (1.64) 
46 Constraint.a: effect from personal initiative 1.21 (1.85) 
 
 
The t-ratio for overall convergence = 0.18, well below the standard 0.25 limit, indicating a 
good convergence. There is no evidence of time heterogeneity, c2(30) = 30.5 (p = 0.26). 
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Goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (PI), outdegree and indegree show p-values of 0.24, 0.12 
and 0.00 respectively. The cumulative boxplots show the distribution of the observed value 
compared to the boxplots of the simulated values. It can be seen that overall the observed 
values fall well inside the band-width, except for low values of indegree. The reason might 
be that due to the start-up of the networks in wave 1, the frequency of low indegrees is 
rather high, and difficult to replicate in a simulation and therefore explaining the low p-
value. Therefore, we have confidence that the estimated model specification reflects the 




Figure S1. GOF Dataset 1 Advice  
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Table S2. Full model estimation Dataset 1 Friendship  
 Effect Parameter and SE. 
   
1 Constant friendship rate (period 1) 21.25 (2.15) 
2 Constant friendship rate (period 2) 10.41 (1.03) 
3 Constant friendship rate (period 3) 7.26 (0.84) 
4 Outdegree (density) 0.64 (0.43) 
5 Reciprocity 1.32 (0.15) 
6 Transitive triplets 0.24 (0.02) 
7 3-cycles –0.20 (0.03) 
8 Betweenness –0.13 (0.03) 
9 Indegree - popularity –0.11 (0.02) 
10 PI alter –0.06 (0.06) 
11 PI ego 0.11 (0.31) 
12 PI similarity –0.48 (0.73) 
13 Dummy2:friendship ego 0 (NA) 
14 Dummy3:friendship ego 0.24 (0.54) 
15 Int. Dummy2:friendship ego x reciprocity –0.09 (0.29) 
16 Int. Dummy3:friendship ego x reciprocity –0.53 (0.34) 
17 Dummy2:friendship ego x transitive triplets –0.13 (0.04) 
18 Dummy3:friendship ego x transitive triplets –0.13 (0.05) 
19 Int. Dummy2:friendship ego x 3-cycles 0.17 (0.07) 
20 Int. Dummy3:friendship ego x 3-cycles 0.10 (0.08) 
21 Dummy2:friendship ego x indegree - popularity 0.04 (0.02) 
22 Dummy3:friendship ego x indegree - popularity 0.03 (0.04) 
23 Int. PI ego x Dummy2:friendship ego –0.46 (0.25) 
24 Int. PI ego x Dummy3:friendship ego 1.02 (0.88) 
25 Int. Dummy2:friendship ego x PI similarity –2.86 (1.70) 
26 Rate PI (period 1) 1.98 (0.68) 
27 Rate PI (period 2) 3.84 (3.43) 
28 Rate PI (period 3) 7.12 (9.47) 
29 PI linear shape 0.01 (0.09) 
30 PI quadratic shape –0.38 (0.08) 
31 PI: effect from openness –0.05 (0.33) 
32 PI: effect from conscien 0.69 (0.27) 
33 PI: effect from gender –0.22 (0.26) 
34 PI: effect from program 0.04 (0.19) 
35 PI: effect from natio 0.38 (0.28) 
36 PI: effect from constraint.f 0.14 (0.14) 
37 Rate constraint.f (period 1) 2.77 (0.49) 
38 Rate constraint.f (period 2) 2.95 (1.05) 
39 Rate constraint.f (period 3) 0.88 (0.32) 
40 Constraint.f: effect from openness 0.46 (0.49) 
41 Constraint.f: effect from conscien 0.29 (0.43) 
42 Constraint.f: effect from PI –0.18 (0.30) 
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The t-ratio for overall convergence = 0.17, well below the standard 0.25 limit, indicating a 
good convergence. There is no evidence of time heterogeneity, c2(28) = 27.8 (p = 0.48). 
Goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (PI), outdegree and indegree show p-values of 0.27, 0.40 
and 0.00 respectively. The cumulative boxplots show the distribution of the observed value 
compared to the boxplots of the simulated values. It can be seen that overall the observed 
values fall well inside the band-width, except for low values of indegree. The reason might 
be that due to the start-up of the networks in wave 1, the frequency of low indegrees is 
rather high, and difficult to replicate in a simulation and therefore explaining the low p-
value. Therefore we have confidence that the estimated model specification reflects the 





Figure S2. GOF Dataset 1 Friendship  
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Table S3. Full model estimation Dataset 2 Advice  
 Effect Parameter and SE 
   
1 Constant advice rate (period 1) 10.85 (1.06) 
2 Constant advice rate (period 2) 10.30 (1.09) 
3 Constant advice rate (period 3) 11.68 (1.28) 
4 Outdegree (density) 0.53 (0.50) 
5 Reciprocity 0.85 (0.14) 
6 Transitive triplets 0.13 (0.04) 
7 3-cycles –0.08 (0.04) 
8 Betweenness –0.18 (0.06) 
9 Indegree - popularity –0.08 (0.02) 
10 Outdegree - activity (sqrt) 0.14 (0.17) 
11 PI alter 0.07 (0.06) 
12 PI ego 0.20 (0.11) 
13 PI similarity –1.94 (0.72) 
14 Dummy2:advice ego –1.19 (0.95) 
15 Dummy3:advice ego 0 (NA) 
16 Int. Dummy2:advice ego x reciprocity 0.18 (0.38) 
17 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x reciprocity 0.07 (0.32) 
18 Dummy2:advice ego x transitive triplets 0.01 (0.04) 
19 Dummy3:advice ego x transitive triplets –0.09 (0.03) 
20 Int. Dummy2:advice ego x 3-cycles 0.01 (0.07) 
21 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x 3-cycles 0.01 (0.06) 
22 Int. Dummy2:advice ego x betweenness 0.19 (0.06) 
23 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x betweenness 0.15 (0.04) 
24 Dummy2:advice ego x indegree - popularity –0.02 (0.04) 
25 Dummy3:advice ego x indegree - popularity –0.01 (0.02) 
26 Int. Dummy3:advice ego x pi alter –0.17 (0.11) 
27 Int. Pi ego x dummy2:advice ego 0.34 (0.26) 
28 Int. Pi ego x dummy3:advice ego 0.30 (0.18) 
29 Rate PI (period 1) 3.20 (1.13) 
30 Rate PI (period 2) 4.45 (2.33) 
31 Rate PI (period 3) 2.29 (0.84) 
32 PI linear shape 0.08 (0.10) 
33 PI quadratic shape –0.23 (0.06) 
34 PI: effect from openness –0.51 (0.31) 
35 PI: effect from conscien 0.93 (0.34) 
36 PI: effect from gender 0.20 (0.22) 
37 PI: effect from program –0.05 (0.21) 
38 PI: effect from natio 0.24 (0.39) 
39 PI: effect from constraint.a –0.06 (0.14) 
40 Rate constraint.a (period 1) 1.54 (0.49) 
41 Rate constraint.a (period 2) 2.94 (0.68) 
42 Rate constraint.a (period 3) 1.27 (0.61) 
43 Constraint.a linear shape –0.48 (0.30) 
44 Constraint.a quadratic shape –0.37 (0.21) 
45 Constraint.a: effect from openness 0.25 (0.63) 
46 Constraint.a: effect from conscien 0.62 (0.71) 
47 Constraint.a: effect from PI –0.09 (0.30) 
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The t-ratio for overall convergence = 0.17, well below the standard 0.25 limit, indicating a 
good convergence. There is no evidence of time heterogeneity, c2(28) = 41.6 (p = 0.048). 
Goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (PI), outdegree and indegree show p-values of 0.02, 0.82 
and 0.05 respectively. The cumulative boxplots show the distribution of the observed value 
compared to the boxplots of the simulated values. It can be seen that overall the observed 
values fall well inside the band-width, except for values 0 for indegree. The reason might be 
that due to the start-up of the networks in wave 1, the frequency of zero degrees is rather 
high, and difficult to replicate in a simulation and therefore explaining the low p-value. 
Therefore we have confidence that the estimated model specification reflects the underlying 
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Table S4. Full model estimation Dataset 2 Friendship  
 Effect Parameter and SE. 
   
1 Constant friendship rate (period 1) 9.10 (0.93) 
2 Constant friendship rate (period 2) 12.75 (1.86) 
3 Constant friendship rate (period 3) 9.20 (1.12) 
4 Outdegree (density) 1.76 (0.59) 
5 Reciprocity 1.07 (0.16) 
6 Transitive triplets 0.13 (0.02) 
7 3-cycles –0.11 (0.03) 
8 Betweenness –0.26 (0.04) 
9 Indegree - popularity –0.10 (0.03) 
10 PI alter –0.03 (0.09) 
11 PI ego 0.31 (0.11) 
12 PI similarity 0.09 (0.96) 
13 Dummy2:friendship ego –2.06 (0.63) 
14 Dummy3:friendship ego –2.02 (1.33) 
15 Int. Dummy2:friendship ego x reciprocity 0.06 (0.29) 
16 Int. Dummy3:friendship ego x reciprocity 0.78 (0.43) 
17 Dummy3:friendship ego x transitive triplets –0.03 (0.03) 
18 Int. Dummy2:friendship ego x betweenness 0.35 (0.09) 
19 Int. Dummy3:friendship ego x betweenness 0.34 (0.11) 
20 Dummy3:friendship ego x indegree - popularity 0.00 (0.05) 
21 Int. Dummy3:friendship ego x pi alter –0.61 (0.25) 
22 Int. Dummy2:friendship ego x pi similarity –2.33 (2.22) 
23 Int. Dummy3:friendship ego x PI similarity 4.07 (2.27) 
24 Rate PI (period 1) 3.02 (1.12) 
25 Rate PI (period 2) 4.43 (2.26) 
26 Rate PI (period 3) 2.34 (0.88) 
27 PI linear shape 0.12 (0.11) 
28 PI quadratic shape –0.23 (0.07) 
29 PI: effect from openness –0.60 (0.37) 
30 PI: effect from conscien 0.98 (0.36) 
31 PI: effect from gender 0.22 (0.23) 
32 PI: effect from program –0.03 (0.21) 
33 PI: effect from natio 0.21 (0.40) 
34 PI: effect from constraint.f –0.12 (0.13) 
35 Rate constraint.f (period 1) 1.91 (0.60) 
36 Rate constraint.f (period 2) 2.78 (1.10) 
37 Rate constraint.f (period 3) 1.12 (0.39) 
38 Constraint.f: effect from openness –0.60 (0.38) 
39 Constraint.f: effect from conscien 0.35 (0.39) 
40 Constraint.f: effect from PI –0.07 (0.16) 
 
The t-ratio for overall convergence = 0.15, well below the standard 0.25 limit, indicating a 
good convergence. There is no evidence of time heterogeneity, c2(29) = 40.0 (p = 0.083). 
Goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (PI), outdegree and indegree show p-values of 0.023, 0.63 
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and 0.35 respectively. The cumulative boxplots show the distribution of the observed value 
compared to the boxplots of the simulated values. It can be seen that overall the observed 
values fall well inside the band-width, except for low values of indegree. Therefore we have 
confidence that the estimated model specification reflects the underlying network and 
behavior dynamics.  
 
 
Figure S4. GOF Dataset 2 Friendship  
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4 Middle manager autonomy and innovative work behavior; The effect of 





A middle manager’s autonomy is considered a key factor to explain middle manager’s 
innovative work behavior (IWB). Because many middle managers work in large and multi-
site organizations with complex governance structures, we argue that next to formal 
autonomy based on job design, current conceptualizations of middle managers’ autonomy 
should be extended to include a potential wider scope of autonomy. At the individual level, 
the social network of a middle manager may constrain or enhance a middle manager’s 
autonomy. At the organization level, two conditions affecting autonomy so far have received 
relatively little attention: the formal and the spatial structure of the organization. This is 
particularly problematic given that many middle managers work in large multi-site 
organizations with complex governance structures. This study investigates to what degree 
four dimensions of middle manager autonomy jointly affect middle managers’ innovative 
work behavior: job design, personal network structure, distance to the head-office, and the 
structure of the formal organization. 
 
We conducted a longitudinal field study in a multi-national firm that manages 75 leisure 
parks (franchised, managed, or owned). Using stochastic actor oriented modeling, we 
modeled to what degree informal networks and job autonomy affect variations in the 
innovative work behavior of 110 middle managers. 
 
The study revealed no systematic association between innovative work behavior and 
autonomy based on job design, personal network structure, distance to the head office, or 
the degree of formal organizational constraint. Our findings suggest that at least in this 
particular organization, autonomy may not be an important precondition for IWB. We 
believe this may be caused by two characteristics of the particular case, the relative high 





OECD (2018, p. 20) defines innovation as “a new or improved product or process (or 
combination thereof) that differs significantly from the unit’s previous products or processes 
and that has been made available to potential users (product) or brought into use by the unit 
(process)”. Middle managers’ innovative work behavior contributes significantly to an 
organization’s innovation. Innovative Work Behavior (IWB) is intentional behavior that 
introduces new ideas in order to improve products or processes with the explicit aim to 
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benefit the organization. IWB differs from creativity and the development of new ideas, 
because it also includes the implementation of new ideas (de Jong & den Hartog, 2010; 
Ramamoorthy et al., 2005). 
 
The importance of middle managers’ role in innovation is well described (Burgess, 2013, 
Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002; Kuratko 2017). They contribute to an organization’s 
strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Floyd, Schmid, & Wooldridge, 2008) and facilitate 
entrepreneurial action (Kuratko et al., 2005). Their central position enables them to 
assemble information about internal strengths and weaknesses and to become familiar with 
market developments and the competition. Being linking pins between top management 
and operations enables them to feed top management with relevant strategic information 
and plans for innovations, and to identify and provide access to the resources needed for 
successful innovations (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The 
IWB of middle managers is therefore considered to be key to the success of companies. 
Consequently, understanding why some middle managers excel in IWB, whereas others lag 
behind is high on the agenda of scholars and practitioners alike. For a comprehensive review 
of IWB we refer to (Anderson, Potocnik, & Zhou, 2014).  
 
Autonomy, that is, a middle manager’s discretion to make independent decisions regarding 
his or her work, is since long considered as one of the key enablers and triggers of IWB (Foss, 
Lyngsie, & Zahra, 2015; Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002). The present study builds on this 
insight, but argues that current conceptualizations of autonomy should be extended to 
include a potential wider scope of autonomy. More specifically, we posit that middle 
manager autonomy rests on four key pillars: job design, the structure of the formal 
organization, the structure of the informal organization, and the spatial distance to its 
headquarters. Whereas quite some insights are available on the job design-IWB link, far less 
is known about the other three bases of middle manager autonomy. 
 
The present paper makes three distinct contributions to current scholarship on middle 
managers’ IWB. Synthesizing the different IWB studies on job design, informal networks, and 
organizational governance, we first introduce a refined multi-dimensional conceptualization 
of a key theoretical construct, middle manager autonomy. 
 
Second, this study is among the first to assess how four dimensions of autonomy jointly 
affect IWB in a longitudinal field study of a real-life multi-national firm, which manages 75 
leisure parks, sizeable proportions of which consist of franchises, and managed parks. In a 
multi-method research study, we used a longitudinal sociometric research design to model 
to what degree informal networks and job autonomy affect variations in the IWB of 110 
middle managers. 50 of them work at headquarters, the rest are park managers. This is 
supplemented with structured interviews of seven managers to interpret the results of this 
sociometric research. 
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Third, shifting the focus to individual level changes in IWB through time, our study pioneers 
into the hitherto understudied longitudinal co-evolution between innovative behavior and 
intra-organizational social networks. Until now, research into middle managers’ social 
network is limited to a small number of cross-sectional studies (for an overview see Cohen & 
Nair, 2017). Stochastic actor oriented models (SAOM; Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 
2010; Snijders, 2017) allows to disentangle to what degree informal constraints in the 
personal social network of middle managers affect and are affected by IWB.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The theoretical background and 
hypotheses are sketched in the next section. This is followed by an outline of the research 




4.2 Theoretical Background 
 
Current explanations of IWB focus on antecedents at three levels of analysis, one capturing 
individual characteristics, the other two representing organizational or job design features. 
At the level of the individual, personality (e.g., conscientiousness and openness to 
experience), goal orientation (pro-activeness), values (conformity value), strategic 
knowledge, and affective commitment (Anderson Potocnick, & Zhou, 2014; Jafri, 2010) were 
found to be important predictors. At the level of job design, a key condition fostering 
innovative behavior is a middle manager’s decision-making autonomy (Hornsby, Kuratko, & 
Zahra, 2002). Finally, addressing the level of organizational design, decentralized governance 
structures were found to increase opportunity discovery and realization (Foss, Lyngsie, & 
Zahra, 2015). According to these studies, a middle manager’s independence from 
organizational or job requirements is among the major preconditions for engaging in 
innovative thinking and behaviors. Hence, middle managers’ IWB is expected to flourish in 
organizational environments designed to keep formal restrictions imposed on middle 
managers’ decision making to a minimum, and to enhance their ability to operate 
autonomously. 
 
Whereas this multi-level perspective yielded important insights, the picture emerging from 
current research remains incomplete because it neglects the multidimensional nature of 
autonomy. The present study addresses this gap. It posits that assessing the impact of 
autonomy on IWB requires a more refined conceptualization of autonomy at the three levels 
of analysis. Four different bases of autonomy need to be considered when modeling IWB. 
First, the link between IWB and autonomy based on a middle manager’s job design has been 
well studied (Foss, Lyngsie, & Zahra, 2015; Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002). It reflects 
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formal rights and responsibilities as agreed in the manager’s contract or job descriptions, 
and defining what falls within his or her decision space.  
 
Second, at the individual level, a middle manager’s autonomy can also be affected by 
informal pressures and conventions as they are usually conveyed through the personal social 
network. For example, a large body of research has shown that dense, close-knit social 
network structures tend to stifle individual creativity and innovative behavior, whereas 
conformity pressures are far less strong in loose-knit structures and brokerage positions 
(Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2017; Soda, Stea, & Pedersen, 2017; Burt, 2004).  
 
And third, at the organization level, two conditions affecting autonomy so far have received 
relatively little attention: the formal and the spatial structure of the organization. This is 
particularly problematic given that many middle managers work in large multi-site 
organizations with complex governance structures. First, such organizations are often 
characterized by networked governance structures like franchising, joint ventures, or 
strategic alliances (Podolny & Page, 1998). In such networked organizations, operations are 
intertwined between units that formally belong to different legal entities, resulting in 
opposing interests of stakeholders (Detlefsen & Glodz, 2013; Hodari, Turner, & Sturman, 
2017; Turner & Guilding, 2010, 2013). These different interests often lead to more 
regulations and constraints, as well as to a close monitoring of operations by stakeholders. 
Both factors are likely to decrease a middle manager’s scope for IWB. Second, multi-site 
organizations are often geographically dispersed (Turner & Pennington, 2015), with the 
result that many sites are spatially separated from each other and from the head office 
(Chang & Harrington, 2002). In an extensive study of the strategy making process in four 
multinational companies, Regnér (2003) found that strategy making in the periphery of an 
organization is generally more inductive and less formal than at the center and is more 
exploratory by nature. This suggests that next to job autonomy, social network structure, 
and the structure of the formal organization, a middle managers’ spatial distance to the 
center of their organization is a fourth structural factor that may influence IWB. 
 
The main objective of the present study is to understand how variations in middle managers’ 
IWB can be explained by the interplay between these four conditions affecting their 
autonomy: their job design, the structure of their informal network and of their formal 
organization, and the spatial distance to their head office. Previous scholarship has treated 
them separately, rather than in combination (Boyett & Currie, 2004; Glaser, Fourne, & 
Elfring, 2015; Hodari, Turner, & Sturman, 2017; Regnér, 2003; Turner & Pennington, 2015).  
  
4.2.1 Autonomy Based on Job Design 
Job autonomy is not a direct cause of IWB but it gives managers the freedom to make 
choices, which is also known as managerial discretion. Carpenter and Golden (1997, p. 187) 
define managerial discretion as “executives' ability to affect important organizational 
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outcomes”. Managerial discretion emphasizes freedom of choice, the capacity to evaluate 
situations and to make choices to realize the goals of their company (de Rond & Thietart, 
2007). Managerial discretion may lead to increased performance as middle managers are 
given the opportunity to be innovative (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2013).  
 
Several studies have indeed shown that a middle manager’s IWB is strongly influenced by 
the freedom they have to make decisions. A variety of different mechanisms contributes to 
this effect. Job autonomy fosters opportunities to discover new opportunities (Foss, Lyngsie 
& Zahra, 2015), it stimulates risk taking and proactivity (Miller, Kets de Vries, & Toulouse, 
1982), contributes to an entrepreneurial culture (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002), 
motivates managers (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007), and increases their commitment to the 
organization (Yan, Chong, & Mak, 2010). This leads to hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Job autonomy): The higher a middle manager’s job autonomy, the 
higher a middle manager’s Innovative Work Behavior. 
 
4.2.2 Autonomy Based on the Structure of the Informal Network 
According to Burt’s structural holes theory, individuals in brokerage positions derive benefits 
from being connected to individuals who are not (yet) connected to each other. This 
structural autonomy gives them early access to a wider range of information and support for 
implementing new ideas. Brokers can exploit the resulting information advantage for their 
own benefit (Burt, 1992, 2000). They are exposed to more perspectives, which influences 
individuals’ cognitive structures and may lead to new knowledge combinations (Perry-Smith 
& Mannucci, 2017; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). Conversely, managers who lack structural 
holes and are locked into dense personal networks miss access to new and alternative 
information. Combined with the conformity pressures resulting from close-knit social 
structures (Burt, 1992), their personal networks become a liability for their IWB, as 
illustrated by a study in French franchise chains (El Akremy, Mignonac, & Perrigot, 2011), 
where a strong positive correlation between social cohesion among franchisees and 
conformity with chain standards was found. Hypothesis 2 summarizes the structural 
autonomy effect: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Social network): The higher a middle manager’s structural autonomy, 
the higher a middle manager’s Innovative Work Behavior.  
 
4.2.3 Autonomy Based on the Structure of the Formal Organization 
Different governance structures such as franchising, joint ventures, management contracts, 
or strategic alliances have led to organizations that no longer resemble traditional unitary 
organizations (Turner & Pennington, 2015), but are better described as networked 
organizations. As an illustration, Box 4.1 describes the different stakeholders a hotel 
manager has to deal with when seeking approval for an investment plan for a rather simple 
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upgrade of the breakfast 
area. The example shows 
that a seemingly 
standard unitary 
organization like a hotel 
is in reality composed of 
a combination of 
different stakeholders 
with different interests.  
 
In the hotel industry it is 
common that hotel 
chains follow asset-light 
strategies in which asset 
ownership and 
management are split. In 
such settings, each 
individual hotel in a 
hotel chain consists of a 
cooperation between 
two or more 
participating companies, 
like an investor who 
owns the real estate, an 
asset management 
company managing the 
real estate, a hotel 
management company 
managing the hotel 
operations, and a 
franchiser who is 
responsible for brand 
standards as well as 
marketing and sales 
(Ivanova, Ivanov, & 
Magini, 2016). Hotel 
chains operating several types of hotels, like corporate managed hotels, franchised hotels, 
and hotels under a management contract (Ivanova, Ivanov, & Magini, 2016) represent a type 
of networked organization that is quite common in the hospitality industry, and it is also the 
focus of the present study. A middle manager’s scope for IWB depends on the business 
model of the hotel in such a chain. 
Box 4.1 A hotel as a networked organization. 
 
The General Manager of an upscale hotel considers changing 
the breakfast area into a restaurant concept matching the 
character of an International DeLuxe branded hotel. From a 
financial perspective a rather straightforward case. In her 
proposal, she has to deal with the following stakeholders: 
1. The owner of the property, a real estate investment fund 
(REIT).  
2. The foreign based real estate development company who 
leases the property from this REIT and operates it as a hotel. 
All employees are employed by this company.  
3. The asset management company, who manages the assets 
on behalf of the owner. The main duties of the asset 
management company are: Property planning & 
development, risk evaluation, operational analysis & review, 
and property repositioning analysis. 
4. The management company who manages the hotel on 
behalf of an international hotel chain. This means that the 
hotel chain acts as franchisor, but in addition effectively 
manages the property and supports it with a variety of 
services and systems. The general manager in this case is 
employed by this international hotel chain.  
 
In case she decides not to develop the restaurant herself, she 
may rent it out to a third party, or alternatively join a franchise 
organization specialized in upscale restaurant concepts. Both 
alternatives would further add an influential stakeholder to the 
hotel as networked organization. 
 
Regarding this investment decision, the stakeholders have 
different interests. The owner and the asset management 
company focus on a long-term return on investment. For the 
hotel chain upholding brand standards is important to maintain 
brand integrity. 
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In a corporate managed hotel, the hotel chain owns or leases the real estate, but is fully in 
control of the operations in the hotel. A managed hotel resembles the traditional unitary 
organization in which the middle manager reports to the top management. 
 
In case of franchising, the hotel chain is the franchisor, and primarily acts as supplier of 
brand standards and as a distribution channel, while the franchisee manages the hotel. The 
middle manager responsible for the hotel is typically employed by the franchisee who owns 
the company. The chain organization aims to keep up brand standards, which specify in 
detail how to operate the hotel. These brand standards may severely limit a middle 
manager’s autonomy (Martin, 2017). In addition, the interests of the owner/franchisee also 
need to be served, possibly leading to additional constraints. For example, in a study among 
hotel managers in the Aberdeen area, Martin (2017) found that in comparison to hotel 
managers in owned hotels, hotel managers in franchised hotels suffered from reduced 
decision-making autonomy because they were strongly focused on complying with the brand 
standards. And in a study among chain hotels, Turner and Guilding (2013) found that owners 
often focused on short term profits, making it difficult for middle managers to keep up with 
the brand standards of the chain.  
 
Hotels operating under a management contract are managed by a hotel management 
company (which may or may not belong to the hotel chain) on behalf of the owner. The 
middle manager is accountable to both the owner and the hotel management company. In 
most cases owners and management companies have conflicting interests. Hotel 
management companies are often focused on increasing revenues because their fee is 
revenue based, and they have a strategic interest to maintain the value of their brand. Hotel 
owners are more interested in short term profits and asset value (Hodari, Turner, & 
Sturman, 2017; Turner & Guilding, 2013). These differences limit a middle manager’s 
autonomy and decision-making scope. In addition, these divergent roles often lead to 
detailed contracts and extensive monitoring by the owner, which further limits middle 
management’s autonomy (Hodari, Turner, & Sturman, 2017). 
 
The present study investigated a hotel chain that operates three different types of leisure 
parks: managed parks, parks under a management contract, and franchised parks, which 
together represent three different types of networked organizations. Settings with different 
types of parks provide a strong research case to investigate the influence of park type on 
middle managers’ IWB, as recently shown by Turner and Pennington (2015). Hypothesis 3 
summarizes the effect of park type on IWB: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Park type): The higher the constraint caused by type of park, the lower 
a middle manager’s Innovative Work Behavior: Innovative Work Behavior will be 
highest in managed parks, and lowest in franchised parks. 
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4.2.4 Autonomy Based on Spatial Distance 
The fourth factor affecting a middle manager’s IWB is spatial distance to the headquarter 
(Ducruet & Beauguitte, 2014; Illenberger, Nagel, & Flötteröd, 2013). Middle managers are 
often found in large multi-site organizations where a middle manager can be a site or 
subsidiary manager. Working in different, physically distant sites may affect middle manager 
autonomy in at least three ways. 
 
First, being dispersed over different sites reduces the opportunities for middle managers to 
have daily informal face-to-face interactions with each other or with the head office. Despite 
extensive communication facilities, distance often complicates coordination, 
communication, and monitoring (Boschma, 2005; Ducruet & Beauguitte, 2014; 
Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, & Lange, 2016). As a consequence, peer pressure and informal 
control is likely to be weaker, which should translate distal locations providing more 
autonomy for the local middle manager. 
  
Second, distance can affect autonomy and IWB through increased diversity (Ambos & 
Håkanson, 2014). Middle managers in different sites are exposed to specific local situations, 
products and processes that may lead to new ideas and trigger them to innovate. For 
example, previous research showed that subsidiary managers in remote sites tend to contact 
a variety of local sources to solve puzzles or acquire necessary knowledge, often without 
involvement or knowledge of a head office (Tippmann, Scott, & Mangematin, 2014)  
 
Third, conditions at a distal location often differ substantially from the conditions near the 
head office. Though corporate policies may be meant to benefit all subsidiaries, they often 
do not necessarily match with the requirements of the local conditions in the periphery of 
the organization, as a result of which they may not be feasible there (Boyett & Currie, 2004). 
This forces middle managers to become innovative and adapt corporate policies to local 
conditions. Their intimate knowledge of local market conditions and contexts helps local 
managers to adapt corporate policies to local requirements (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998).  
 
In sum, higher distance to the head office may lead to situations in which middle managers 
are forced to adapt corporate policies, are exposed to new practices, and face less direct 
control. Hence, a higher distance to an organization’s head office may lead to a higher level 
of middle managers’ IWB.  
 
Several studies indeed have already found a positive association between distance to the 
head office and innovative behavior. In a case study of an international telecom company, 
Boyett and Currie (2004) show that local managers deviate from corporate strategies in 
order to adapt to local market conditions. And in an extensive study of the strategy making 
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process in four multinational companies, Regnér (2003) found that while strategy at the 
center is often more deductive and based on formal analysis and planning, strategy making 
in the periphery of an organization is generally more inductive and externally oriented, often 
including exploratory activities like trial and error and experiments when deviating from 
formal corporate policies. This leads to the following fourth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (Spatial distance): The larger the spatial distance of a middle manager’s 




4.3 Research Method 
 
4.3.1 Population and data collection 
To test the hypotheses, we collected data on the innovative behavior and performance of 
middle managers in a subsidiary of an internationally listed company. The subsidiary, A 
Leisure Company (ALC), operates seventy-five leisure and holiday parks in Europe. The park 
managers together with the senior managers at ALC’s head office constitute the group of 
middle managers in our study. The parks are either managed, operated under a 
management contract, or franchised (Turner, Hodari, & Blal, 2016).  
 
In the case of managed parks, the assets are in most cases owned by a separate owner 
(usually an investment company) and then leased to or rented by ALC. This means ALC has 
full discretion to operate these parks as they see fit, and the park manager manages the park 
on behalf of ALC. Employees are employed by ALC and the park manager is a pivot between 
head office and operational staff.  
 
In parks operated under a management contract, the assets are owned by a separate party, 
who also operates the park and employs the employees. The owning company has 
contracted ALC to manage he park on behalf of the owner and the park manager is therefore 
employed by ALC. This means that the park manager has to serve the interests of both ALC 
and the park owner.  
 
In a franchised park, the owner (franchisee) also manages the park, which means that all 
employees, including the park manager, are employed by the franchisee. ALC only operates 
as franchisor, that is, it delivers at least the brand standards and access to the corporate 
sales and distribution channel. Depending on the contract, additional services as HR, 
accounting, or facility management may also be provided. The park manager is employed by 
the franchisee, but depending on the franchise conditions, ALC exerts a strong influence on 
decision making.  
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The data collection was carried out in two steps. It started with document analysis to 
reconstruct key elements of the organization’s history. This was followed by exploratory 
semi-structured interviews with seven different managers (three management parks, one 
management contract park, one franchise park, and two managers working at an office). The 
objective of these interviews was to become familiar with the organization, to explore what 
factors might be of relevance to the IWB of middle managers, and to evaluate the outcomes 
of the longitudinal study. The interviewees were asked to describe their park or department, 
to give examples of their innovative behavior, and to elaborate on factors that might 
influence IWB, in particular the autonomy of managers, the IWB of peer managers and the 
support (or lack of) of the central departments. They were also asked to describe their 
motives for IWB and how these motives relate to the existing rules, routines, and practices 
in the organization. The interviews were fully transcribed. Transcript summary sheets were 
used to capture answers about the influence of the corporate organization on middle 
managers’ IWB. In a next step, these answers were interpreted and related to the different 
hypotheses. A summary of these results can be found in appendix 4.1 of this chapter.  
  
The second part of the research consisted of a longitudinal sociometric panel study among 
the complete management team. This panel study consisted of two waves (October 2013 
and May 2014), using online questionnaires. Complete name rosters were used for the 
network questions. It was explained to the participants that in order to ensure 
confidentiality, their names would be replaced by encrypted identifiers before the analysis 
phase. The whole management team of the organization, consisting of seventy-five park 
managers plus sixty office managers, was involved in this panel study. The group of office-
managers consisted of board members, area managers and managers of staff departments. 
In this way, all management levels between corporate and operational levels were included, 
effectively including all middle managers in the study. Table 4.1 summarizes descriptive 
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Changes in the composition of the sample are common in longitudinal field studies. As can 
be seen from Table 4.1, the number of management positions varies around 130 and has 
been occupied by 137 (128+9) managers during this period. 122 managers started filling out 
a questionnaire at least once and 110 managers filled out a questionnaire completely at 
least once. Comments received by email or telephone indicated that reasons for non-
completion or not responding were the length of the questionnaire, an aversion to answer 
items in which names of colleagues are mentioned, or because being to new or too 
unfamiliar with the organization. 
 
4.3.2 Measures 
Innovative Work Behavior is measured using a six-item scale developed by Scott and Bruce 
(1994), also used by, for instance, Carmeli and Spreitzer (2009). Examples of items are: “I 
seek out new technologies, processes, techniques, and/or product ideas at work.”, “I promote 
and champion ideas to others at work.”, and “I investigate and secure funds needed to 
implement new ideas.” Cronbach’s alpha values for IWB (6 items; a = 0.87 and 0.92, for 
waves 1 and 2, resp.) are good. Average scores for IWB are 4.06 and 4.08, which are rather 
high, with standard deviations 0.54 and 0.61 resp. and range 2.67 to 5.00 for both waves. 
These statistics indicate that the majority of the managers considers themselves to be 
innovative.  
 
Job Autonomy is measured using a five-item scale developed by Hage and Aiken (1967) and 
validated by Dewar, Whetten, and Boje (1980). The scale is used by, for instance, Jansen, 
Den Bosch, and Volberda (2006) to measure centralization of decision making. Examples of 




   
Parks managed 17 17 
Parks under management contract 5 5 
Parks franchised 52 53 
Total parks 74 75 
   
Park managers 69 73 
Managers office 59 58 
Total managers  128 131 
Response 104 70 
   
Managers new/exit  9/6 
Parks new/exit  2/1 
Managers first time participating in survey  18 
Middle manager autonomy and innovative work behavior 84 
and “Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a final decision.” 
Values of Cronbach’s alpha for Job autonomy (5 items; a = 0.81 and 0.76, for waves 1 and 2, 
resp.) are satisfactory. The average scores for job autonomy are 2.40 and 2.37 with standard 
deviations 0.86 and 0.79 and range from 1.0 to 4.4 in wave 1 and 1.0 to 4.8 in wave 2. This 
indicates that managers perceive their autonomy as rather average, but with enough 
diversity in the sample to explore further relations. 
 
Network Constraint was used to measure a middle manager’s structural autonomy, and was 
determined per wave as the extent to which the advice network of managers consists of 
redundant contacts (Burt, 2000). Network constraint measures if a manager’s advice 
network consists of unconnected clusters of relations, or if it is a cohesive group in which 
alters are connected among themselves, leading to many redundant contacts. A high value 
for constraint means there is less opportunity to broker and control information and 
resources between clusters of relations. Constraint was calculated for each individual 
manager i as the sum of direct and indirect relations with all other managers j in the 
network: !" = 	∑ ("))  where (")	 = 	 *+") +	∑ +"-- +-).
/	012	3 ≠ #, $	with +") = 	 678∑ 6799  and :")  
expressing the advice-relation between i and j (advice matrix). The dyadic constraint cij 
measures the degree to which actor j constrains actor i. The first component of cij measures 
the time and energy spend by i to reach j. The second component measures how j is tied to 
other contacts of i.  When an actor i invests times and energy in a relation with actor j who is 
also tied to many other contacts of j the dyadic constraint cij will be high and i will not bridge 
structural holes. A low dyadic constraint cij will be found when actors j don’t have many ties 
to other contacts of i. !" is measured on a scale from 0 to 1. A value close to 0 means the 
manager is less constrained by his personal network. The average constraint is 0.11 with a 
standard deviation of 0.15.  The network constraint index !"  cannot be calculated inside the 
RSiena package, therefore it was calculated separately for each wave. This implies that the 
constraint index is treated as an external covariate. Due to SIENA’s co-evolutionary 
approach, it can still be used simultaneously as a dependent and an explanatory variable. 
Note that because the constraint variable does not vary between the waves, the effect of 
constraint is based on the observed values of the first wave only. The advice networks were 
elicited using complete name rosters. Participants were asked to answer the following 
question: “Which of the following colleagues have you approached in the past six months for 
advice or information?“. Answer categories (forced choice) were “Not approached in the 
past six months” or “Yes, approached in the past six months”. 
 
Spatial Distance. The logarithm of the distance in kilometers from the park to the head 
office. To calculate the distance, the actual addresses were converted into GPS-coordinates 
using the site http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/geocoder/. Using the R-package fossil, (version 
0.3.7, Vavrek, 2012) these GPS-coordinates were used to calculate the Euclidean distances 
between parks and head office. The Euclidean distance was converted to its logarithm to 
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remove skewness. The average (non-logarithmic) distance is 169 km with standard deviation 
2013, minimum 0, and maximum 1,114 km. 
 
There is no existing measure for the influence of the structure of the formal organization, 
and therefore we used park type as a proxy measure for the level of constraint due to the 
structure of the formal organization. This proxy is constructed using an ordinal scale: “1” for 
managers working at the head office, “2” for park managers that manage a managed park, 
“3” for managers that manage a management contract park, and “4” for managers that 
manage a franchised park. Higher values reflect higher levels of formal constraint on the 
middle manager. Managers at a management park only have to deal with an owner who is 
committed to a long-term lease or rent contract. At a management contract park, the owner 
operates the park, and therefore is more likely to exercise influence to operate the park 
according to his or her interests. In a franchise park, the park manager is even more obliged 
to take the interests of the franchisee into consideration as the manager is formally 
employed by the franchisee. The park type of each manager was based on a list of parks 
(offices) with the names of the park manager and the type of each park, provided by ALC.  
 
Table 4.2 summarizes descriptive information on the variables.  
 
Table 4.2 Description of attribute variables. 
 Mean (SD) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha Moran’s I 
 W1 W2 W1 W2 W1 W2 
       
Innovative work behavior 4.06 (0.54) 4.08 (0.61) 0.87 0.92 -0.01  0.01 
Autonomy 2.40 (0.86) 2.37 (0.79) 0.81 0.76 -0.03  0.00 
Network constraint 0.11 (0.15)      
Distance (km) to Head Office 169 (2013)      
 
4.3.3 Analytical Strategy 
A longitudinal dataset containing networks cannot be analyzed with standard statistical 
techniques due to the high interdependence of network observations. Therefore, we 
analyzed the data using a stochastic actor oriented model (SAOM; Kalish, 2019; Snijders, van 
de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010; Snijders, 2017). In a SAOM, both network structure and actor 
behavior (IWB) are jointly dependent variables while at the same time influencing each 
other. This co-evolution of network and behavior enables us to analyze the interdependence 
between network dynamics and behavior dynamics.  
 
In a SAOM two categories of parameters can be distinguished. Selection effects to model the 
dynamics and development of the network, and influence effects to model the development 
of the behavior variable (IWB). In the SAOM we estimated, the dynamics of the network 
depends on two subcategories of effects: network effects derived from the network 
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structure and actor attribute effects based on characteristics of the actors. The development 
of the behavior (IWB) similarly depends on these two subcategories of effects. The following 
two sections describes the effects we included in our SAOM. 
 
Network or selection dynamics 
Social networks tend to be governed by a number of self-organizing principles, which means 
that network dynamics are to a certain extent affected by the existing network structure. In 
a SAOM these effects have to be included to ensure a proper and convergent model 
estimation. Therefore, we controlled for a number of these effects. Outdegree is the basic 
tendency to have ties, in our case, to ask for advice. Reciprocity is the tendency of relations 
to be returned. If A asks B for advice, this increases the probability of B asking A for advice. 
3-cycles reflect generalized reciprocity in triadic relations: if A asks B for advice, and B goes 
to C for advice, then it is more likely that C will go to A for advice. Indegree popularity is the 
tendency for actors with high indegrees to receive more advice requests. It means that 
popular actors are likely to become even more popular. Outdegree activity models the effect 
that managers who are used to ask for advice, are more comfortable to do so and as a 
consequence are more likely to approach other managers for advice. The indegree activity 
effect models the tendency of managers who receive many advice requests, to approach 
others more often for advice.  
 
Next to these network effects, the characteristics of the managers may also influence the 
development of the network structure. IWB alter describes the influence of a manager’s 
level of IWB on the probability of being approached for advice. IWB ego describes the 
influence of a manager’s level of IWB on the probability of approaching others for advice. 
IWB similarity describes the tendency to approach other managers who have a similar level 
of IWB. In other words, innovative managers tend to approach innovative managers and the 
less innovative managers prefer to approach other less innovative managers. IWB indegree 
popularity is comparable to the already mentioned indegree popularity. The difference is 
that the probability to attract new ties now no longer depends on the number of incoming 
ties, but on the level of IWB of the existing advice-seekers. A manager becomes interesting 
to approach, not when many others do so, but when this manager is already being 
approached by the innovative managers.  
 
Behavior or influence dynamics 
The influence effects in a SAOM are used to analyze how IWB is influenced by a combination 
of network structures and other characteristics of the managers. In particular, we 
considered the following two network effects. Indegree represents the influence of the 
number of incoming advice request on IWB. It can be interpreted as a manager receiving 
many calls for advice, by receiving the advice requests becomes well informed about recent 
developments and issues, which in turn increases the capability of this managers to become 
innovative. Outdegree represents the influence of asking for advice on innovation, the more 
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advice is asked, the more innovative this manager will become due to the information 
collected. Finally, we included in our SAOM the effects from other attributes on behavior to 
test our hypotheses. These other attributes are Job Autonomy, Network Constraint, Distance 
to the Head Office, and Park Type. 
 
For the estimation, the R package RSiena 4.0, version 1.2-12 (Ripley et al., 2018) was used. 
Joining and leaving actors (managers) were treated according to Huisman and Snijders’ 
(2003) procedure for composition change. Missing data on the behavioral variables were 
treated with the hybrid imputation procedure, which is default in the SIENA software and 
according to Zandberg and Huisman (2019) the optimal strategy to deal with missing data. 
 
After estimating the parameters, the validity of the model was assessed, using two criteria 
(Ripley et al., 2018). First, the convergence of the estimation procedure was checked by 
calculating t-ratios. For convergence of individual parameters, the t-ratios should be smaller 
than 0.10 and the t-ratio for overall convergence should be smaller than 0.25. Second, the 
quality of the SAOM was evaluated by assessing the goodness of fit (GOF) of the model with 
respect to three auxiliary statistics: The indegree, the outdegree, and the IWB distributions. 
For this test, the estimated model is used to create a number of simulated outcomes for the 
cumulative indegree frequency, the cumulative outdegree frequency, and the cumulative 
IWB frequency. These simulated outcomes are compared to the actual cumulative 





4.4.1 Descriptives  
Table 4.3 summarizes the main descriptives of the network at waves 1 and 2. The Jaccard 
index, calculated as the fraction of stable ties compared to the sum of stable, new and 
terminated ties, tests if there is enough stability in the datasets between two waves 
(Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). If there is not enough stability, the SIENA method 
may not be suitable for the data set. The Jaccard index for the change between wave 1 and 
wave 2 is 0.66, much larger than the common minimum of 0.3, and therefore we conclude 
there is enough stability to proceed with estimation. Density, the number of ties as fraction 
of potential ties, is 0.31 and 0.35, for waves 1 and 2, respectively. This means the network is 
very dense and it is common to approach peers with requests for advice and information 
and it suggests a high level of cooperation and trust.  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive network statistics. 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
   
Number of ties 3203 2638 
Density        0.31       0.35 
Average degree      33.61     38.33 
Missing fraction        0.13        0.37 
Jaccard index         0.66 
 
 
The fraction of missing ties is 0.13 in wave 1 and 0.37 in wave 2. The level of missingness in 
wave 2 is high, but due to the hybrid imputation method used to deal with this missingness, 
this is not affecting the conclusions. This hybrid imputation procedure is integrated in the 
estimation procedure of the SAOM, which is explained in more detail in section 2.2 of this 
thesis. We used the method of moments procedure to estimate the parameters of the 
model. In this estimation procedure, missing ties in wave 1 are replaced by the value 0, 
assuming there is no relation between the two actors. A SAOM assumes that the change 
between two consecutive observations can be modeled as a sequence of small steps, and 
uses a simulation to model this process. The simulation of this process is based on all 
variables, including the imputed variables. The calculation of the estimated parameters is 
only based on the observed values, the missing tie variables are excluded from this 
calculation. In this way, missing ties do not have a direct influence on the estimated 
parameters, but still play a role in the simulated co-evolution of network and behavior and 
therefore have only an indirect influence on the non-missing parts of the network. 
Therefore, the method of moments is rather robust, even with a larger level of missingness 
of ties in wave 2. 
 
 
4.4.2 Estimation results 
The estimation results of the SAOM are presented in Table 4.4. Before we discuss individual 
parameters, we will first discuss the overall characteristics of the model.  
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Selection dynamics   
 Network effects   
 Rate parameter 20.98 (1.72) 0.03 
 Outdegree 1.04 (1.34) 0.03 
 Reciprocity 2.01 (0.35) 0.03 
 Cyclic ties 0.10 (0.02) 0.03 
 Indegree popularity -0.02 (0.02) 0.03 
 Outdegree activity 0.05 (0.02) 0.02 
 Indegree activity -0.15 (0.08) 0.02 
Individual attribute effects  
 IWB alter -0.11 (0.19) -0.01 
 IWB ego 0.44 (0.29) 0.00 
 IWB similarity -0.21 (0.43) -0.05 
 IWB indegree popularity -0.24 (0.07) 0.01 
   
Influence dynamics   
 Network effects   
 Rate parameter 1.51 (0.46) -0.02 
 Shape effect -0.07 (1.00) 0.01 
 Indegree 0.01 (0.05) 0.00 
 Outdegree -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 
Individual attribute effects  
 Autonomy 0.04 (0.25) -0.05 
 Network constraint -0.80 (2.59) 0.01 
 Park type -0.08 (0.29) 0.04 
 Distance to Head Office -0.10 (0.21) 0.02 
 
The t-ratio for overall convergence of all parameters = 0.16. 
The Mahalanobis distances for the goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (IWB), outdegree, and 
indegree are 3.43 (p = 0.49), 22.4 (p = 0.09), and 15.3 (p = 0.14). 
 
 
The t-ratio for individual convergence of parameters are all below the 0.10 standard. In 
addition, the overall convergence (0.16) is well below the standard 0.25 limit, therefore we 
conclude that convergence levels are acceptable.  
 
Goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (IWB), outdegree and indegree give Mahalanobis 
distances of 3.43 (p = 0.49), 22.4 (p = 0.09), and 15.3 (p = 0.14). The p-values are all greater 
than 0.05, which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the observed and simulated distributions of the three auxiliary statistics. Therefore, 
we may be confident that the estimated model represents a good fit of the true network and 
behavior dynamics.  
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Since the variable Park Type is based on an ordinal scale with four values, treating it as an 
interval scale in the analysis rests on the strong and untested assumption of equal 
“distances” between the four levels. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we 
reran the analysis using three dummy variables for the managers who do not work at the 
head office: a dummy for managers of a managed park, a dummy for managers of 
management contract parks and a third dummy for managers of franchised parks. The 
outcomes remain the same: there is still no significant effect of Park Type on Innovative 
Work Behavior. Other outcomes are also unchanged. Details of this estimation can be found 
in appendix 4.2. of this chapter. 
 
In the first part of Table 4.4, the selection dynamics due to network effects and actor 
attribute effects are presented. The second part lists the effects that influence IWB. Two 
parameters for standard network effects are not significant: Outdegree (1.04, SE = 1.34) and 
Indegree popularity (-0.02, SE = 0.02). The following parameters for standard network 
effects are significant: Reciprocity (2.01, SE = 0.35), Cyclic ties (0.10, SE = 0.02), Outdegree 
activity (0.05, SE = 0.02), and Indegree activity (-0.15, SE = 0.08). We conclude that the 
effects of the advice network are comparable to the effects of many other networks. The 
individual attribute alter effect has a non-significant parameter (-0.11, SE = 0.19), indicating 
that a middle manager’s IWB is no reason to approach this middle manager for advice. 
Similarly, the non-significance of the IWB ego effect (0.44, SE = 0.29) means that a middle 
manager’s level of IWB has no influence on asking advice. The non-significant IWB-similarity 
effect (-0.21, SE = 0.43) means that there is no evidence of middle managers preferring to 
approach middle managers with a similar level of IWB. The significant but negative 
parameter for IWB indegree popularity (-0.24, SE = 0.07) suggests that there is a barrier to 
approach popular middle managers. 
 
Finally, we will discuss the findings for the four hypotheses. Since none of the hypothesized 
effects were significant, we will immediately contextualize the presentation of the findings 
with background information obtained through the qualitative interviews, in order to 
explore potential reasons for these non-significant effects.  
 
The parameter for job autonomy, Hypothesis 1, is not significant (0.04, SE = 0.25). In a 
response to the question about autonomy, Manager 1 explained the ambiguous setting in 
which middle managers were expected to simultaneously be both entrepreneurial and to 
comply with the extensive corporate regulations. Manager 2 answered that non-compliance 
with corporate policies or not meeting prescribed targets often had no visible consequence 
(e.g., in terms of criticism). These answers indicate that middle managers perceived their 
setting as ambiguous, without clear guidance and strong support for innovative behavior. 
This pattern mirrors earlier research in which explicit and unambivalent support from top 
management was found to be a crucial success factor for middle managers to be 
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entrepreneurial (Kuratko, et al., 2005). Since interviewees suggest this support is largely 
absent in ALC, this may at least partly explain why we see no clear influence of job autonomy 
on middle managers’ IWB. This implies that middle manager IWB depends strongly on their 
ability to deal with such ambiguity caused by a lack of top management’s support. In sum, 
the perceived ambiguity could be a reason why we see no clear influence of job autonomy 
on middle managers’ IWB, and finding no support for Hypothesis 1.  
 
The parameter for network constraint, Hypothesis 2, is also not significant (-0.80, SE = 2.59). 
Asked about the autonomy middle managers experienced to innovate, Manager 4 answered 
that there was some space for initiative, but to be successful, it was crucial to connect to the 
right people in the organization. Through previous positions he had a wide variety of 
contacts within the organization, and he extensively used these contacts to organize support 
when necessary. Manager 2 answered that through a prolonged period he had witnessed a 
very strong trend towards centralization. He had no problem with that, but stressed the 
need for middle managers to be strongly involved in developing these corporate policies. 
Both answers indicate that in order to be successful innovators, middle managers need a 
network that supports them. Rather than constraining IWB, having many contacts and a 
dense personal network may also benefit their IWB. A high network density means that 
information is almost equally available to all managers. This might be a reason why we found 
no significant outcomes for Hypothesis 2, the influence of structural autonomy (network 
constraint) on IWB.  
 
The parameter for park type, Hypothesis 3, was also not significant (-0.08, SE = 0.29). 
Managers 1 and 3 explained additional complexities involved in franchising. First the role of 
the franchisee, who in some cases is very supportive of an entrepreneurial middle manager, 
but in other cases gives very strict instructions that strongly limit the middle managers’ IWB. 
A second factor is the level of support activities that are outsourced to the franchisor. In a 
franchising cooperation at a minimum the branding has to be outsourced to the franchisor. 
In addition to branding, there is an option to outsource other functions, like sales, HR, and 
finance to the franchisor. As a result, different levels of franchising are possible. Both middle 
managers explained that a low level of outsourcing to the franchisor, combined with a 
supportive franchisee, strongly enabled a middle manager to be entrepreneurial and 
innovative. This implies that the details of the contract and the attitude of the franchisee 
might temper the outcomes. The limited influence of park type and the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 could be related to this. 
 
The parameter for distance to the head office, Hypothesis 4, was also not significant (-0.10, 
SE = 0.21). Managers 1 and 3 emphasized the tension between local and central rules. 
Manager 1 explained how local laws and culture complicated the implementation of 
corporate policies. Similarly, Manager 3 mentioned the tension between local and central 
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purchasing. Central purchasing prevented him from purchasing locally that might be 
beneficial for either selling local produce or increasing involvement in local networks.  
 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
  
This longitudinal sociometric study in a complex multi-site networked organization 
investigated to what degree four dimensions of middle manager autonomy jointly affect 
their innovative work behavior. Stochastic actor-oriented modeling revealed no systematic 
association between innovative work behavior and autonomy based on job design, personal 
network structure, distance to the head-office, or the degree of formal organizational 
constraint. Our findings suggest that at least in this particular organization, autonomy may 
not be an important precondition for IWB. We believe this may be caused by two 
characteristics of the particular case, the relative high network density, and the obfuscating 
influence of other factors.  
 
Network density is quite high (0.31 in wave 1 and 0.35 in wave 2), with managers having on 
average 34 and 38 ties. Such high densities leave hardly any possibility for bridging structural 
holes and for benefiting from a brokerage position, as earlier research has shown: actors 
benefit most from bridging structural holes when collaboration in the network is low (Soda, 
Stea, & Pedersen, 2019), and the value of bridging relationships decreases with the ‘age’ of 
the ties (Baum, McEvily, & Rowly, 2012). The high density in our case suggests that middle 
managers cooperate extensively, and that collaboration in the network is high. And many 
managers have been working many years for ALC. This may result in a collaborative culture 
(which is supported by the interviews) and a reduced value of bridging. 
 
Second, the objective of this study was to investigate if a further differentiation of the 
autonomy concept would improve our insights into middle managers’ IWB. The managers’ 
reflections on the non-significant results suggest that there is no straightforward direct link 
between autonomy and IWB in this organization and that a broader set of context conditions 
need to be considered. Top management’s support for IWB and franchisees both seem to 
play a key moderating role. Furthermore, many other small factors that might influence 
middle managers’ IWB were mentioned during the interviews. Examples are a manager’s 
personal background (e.g., being raised in an entrepreneurial family), prior experience in a 
different organization, support or resistance of department heads, attitude of local 
stakeholders, etc. This suggests that the combined influence of all these micro-factors may 
obfuscate the influence of autonomy.  
 
Our findings put into perspective the strong emphasis that autonomy plays in previous 
research as one of the main triggers of IWB. Not only could our study not replicate earlier 
findings related to autonomy based on job design, it also did not find evidence for the 
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autonomy-innovativeness link using a broader conceptualization of autonomy incorporating 
constraints resulting from the formal management of the organization, the informal social 
network of the middle manager, and the spatial distance to the headquarter.  
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Within the organization there are 
many unclarities. A park manager is 
compelled to implement corporate 
policies, but also responsible for 
realizing targets. Park managers have 
to act as entrepreneurs while being 
bound to all sorts of rules at the same 
moment. 
This ambiguous situation causes a situation 
in which a middle managers may flip 
between entrepreneurial or more rule 
observing behavior. This is strongly 
influenced by the middle manager’s ability 
to operate in such ambiguous settings or 
his autonomy. 
M2 Not sticking to regulations or meeting 
targets is often without consequences, 
leading to opaque situations. 
Ambiguity in the organization, no clear 




H2 Influence social network 
 
M2 In the past a park manager had lots of 
freedom, but more and more the 
central organization becomes more 
guiding. This is good because we need 
uniformity as an organization. It means 
that a park manager has to engage in 
this process of central policy 
formulating to exercise influence. 
For a park manager it is critical to network 
internally, in particular within the office. 
This suggest an IWB-enabling role of 
relations. 
M4 Though there is limited space for 
personal initiatives, it is important to 
address the right people and get their 
support. (In his previous roles he had 
to cooperate a lot with managers from 
the head office or other parks and 
therefore knows many people). 
It is important to network within the 
organization and in particular the head 
office. Having many relations is not 




H3 Influence of networked 
organization 
 
M1 The managers of franchise park have 
to deal with park owners while 
management and management 
contract parks are in a different 
situation. The exact contract can also 
an increase of powerful stakeholders leads 
to less autonomy for middle managers 
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hamper implementation of corporate 
policies. 
M1 Franchise parks do have the option to 
cap their franchising to some core 
modules. This gives them freedom to 
for example purchase locally or to 
cooperate with other partners. 
As a result, a park manager of a franchised 
park may have more discretion, but it can 
also result in more and constraining 
influence of the franchise owners.  
M3 Has much freedom to act without ALC’ 
permission because as franchise park it 
has only a light franchise agreement 
with ALC. 
 
M3 The main responsibility is towards the 
franchisee. This manager is blessed 
with a strong franchisee board that 
supports her and gives room for 
entrepreneurship. 
 
M3 To her, corporate account managers 
have no hierarchical authority, but 
contrary are supposed to deliver value 
for money. 
Instead of being constrained by a central 
organization, the central organization is an 
advantage and support. Of course, under 
the condition that you manage the park 
well and you are supported by a strong 
franchisee board. 
M3 Other franchise parks are often run by  
a franchisee board that constrains the 
park manager. 
Between franchise parks there is much 
difference between owners who don or do 








There is a tension between corporate 
policies and local rules. For example, 
parks abroad have to deal with laws 
and cultural differences that make 
implementation of corporate policies 
complicated. 




There is tension between local versus 
central purchasing. 
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Appendix 4.2 Alternative model specification using dummy variables for park type 
 
 





   
Selection dynamics   
 Network effects   
 Rate parameter 20.96 (1.89) 0.05 
 Outdegree 0.96 (1.23) 0.06 
 Reciprocity 2.01 (0.22) 0.06 
 Cyclic ties 0.10 (0.03) 0.06 
 Indegree popularity –0.02 (0.02) 0.06 
 Outdegree activity 0.05 (0.02) 0.06 
 Indegree activity –0.15 (0.08) 0.06 
Individual attribute effects  
 IWB alter –0.10 (0.15) –0.01 
 IWB ego 0.44 (0.27) –0.02 
 IWB similarity –0.18 (0.45) –0.02 
 IWB indegree popularity –0.24 (0.07) –0.02 
   
Influence dynamics   
 Network effects   
 Rate parameter 1.52 (0.42) 0.04 
 Shape effect –0.04 (0.78) –0.05 
 Indegree 0.01 (0.04) –0.05 
 Outdegree –0.01 (0.02) –0.06 
Individual attribute effects  
 Autonomy 0.04 (0.23) 0.00 
 Network constraint –0.74 (1.68) –0.01 
 Distance to Head Office –0.10 (0.25) –0.02 
 Effect from managed park –0.04 (0,60) –0.02 
 Effect from management contract park 0.16 (0.88) –0.00 
 Effect from franchised park –0.33 (0.84) –0.00 
The t-ratio for overall convergence of all parameters = 0.11. 
The Mahalanobis distances for the goodness-of-fit tests for behavior (IWB), outdegree, and 
indegree are 3.38 (p = 0.49), 23.4 (p = 0.09), and 13.1 (p = 0.18). 
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5 Public managers’ networking and innovative work behavior: The 
importance of career incentives 
 
 
This chapter has previously been published as Zandberg, T. & Morales, F.N. (2019). Public 
managers’ networking and innovative work behavior, the importance of career incentives. 





From theories on middle managers’ entrepreneurship in private organizations, it is known 
that the structural network position of middle managers influences their innovative work 
behavior. Our study investigates if in a governmental setting the intra-organizational 
networking behavior of public managers has a similar positive influence on innovative work 
behavior. Because networking mechanisms may depend on the particular context and 
organizational norms, we also investigate the influence of networking motivations. 
According to social network research in private enterprises, social network links can be used 
to advance individual careers. According to public management and Public Service 
Motivation theories, public managers have a collective orientation aimed at producing public 
goods. Therefore, we investigate if next to intraorganizational networking an individual 
career motive or a collective motivation for networking explains innovative work behavior. 
In a case study on public managers of a municipality in Mexico City we find a strong 
influence of networking on innovative work behavior. We also find support for additional 





This study seeks to contribute to the literature on public managers’ innovative behavior by 
looking at intraorganizational managerial networking. Public managers are the linking pin 
between political appointees and bureaucratic operatives. They play an important role in 
daily operation, including duties such as monitoring the provision of services and meeting 
policy and budgetary deadlines. Attention for public managers’ behavior and their role in 
policymaking and public service provision increased in recent years mainly as consequence 
of the rise and institutionalization of the New Public Management movement (Boston, 
2011). Although public managers have been portrayed traditionally as an obstacle to change 
(Huy, 2001), New Public Management and other contemporary administrative reforms build 
on the assumption that managers do play a crucial role in the strategic process of 
governmental organizations (Boston, 2011; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). In addition, a number 
of contributions in the public administration literature have developed the notion that 
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managerial behavior is crucial to organizational performance (e.g., Altman, 1979; Döring, 
Downe, & Martin, 2015). In particular, public managers can play a central role in promoting 
organizational responsiveness, innovation and policy renewal (Chen, Berman & Wang, 2017; 
Vigoda, 2002).  
 
Networking and networks are important antecedents of organizational performance in the 
public sector (Peters et al., 2017; Randma-Liiv, Uudelepp, & Sarapuu, 2015; Torenvlied et al., 
2012). Managerial networking, that is, the frequency of contacts that managers maintain 
with other actors (Wolff & Moser, 2009), seems to have a positive effect on performance by 
increasing access to support and resources (Meier & O’Toole, 2001). This echoes findings in 
the (private) managerial literature, where networking has been associated positively with 
organizational survival, and increased output. Specifically, networking has been associated 
with performance via innovativeness: networking improves access to resources, support, 
ideas and information, which in turn potentiate innovation and overall performance (Pappas 
& Wooldridge, 2007).  
 
There are several ways in which public managers can make use of the social capital 
contained in their social networks. Previous studies in the public administration literature 
have focused by and large on understanding (organizational) performance, and have studied 
mainly processes of interorganizational networking (i.e., networking in interorganizational 
networks between managers and actors in the organizational environment). The core idea of 
these studies is that managers act as boundary spanners between the external environment 
and the internal organization. This boundary-spanning mechanism drives the relation 
between networking and performance. One simplifying assumption of this approach is an 
unitary actor perspective of the organization. This assumption leads to a limited 
interpretation of networking, and neglects possible effects of intraorganizational networking 
(i.e., networking among managers and other actors within the organization). To relax this 
assumption, we need to study intraorganizational networking, and how this allows public 
managers to mobilize resources and information that enable innovation (Burt, Kilduff & 
Tasselli, 2013). 
 
From this perspective, the relation between managerial networking and innovative behavior 
implies that public managers are active intraorganizational networkers. However, such a 
relation does not occur in isolation. Because public managers have limited resources, they 
have to decide if and to what extent they maintain social ties and networks in the 
organization. That is, in order to understand the importance of (intraorganizational) 
networking in enabling innovative behavior, we also need to consider the specific 
motivations that drive public managers. While early research on social networks suggested a 
strong positive influence of brokerage on innovation (Burt, 2004) and career opportunities 
(Burt, 2000), more recent research shows that these relations may be specific for particular 
contexts. A meta-analysis of Fang et al. (2015), found less support for the influence of 
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brokerage. According to this study, brokerage mechanisms are typical for organizations 
where timely access to and control of information are crucial for individual success. This is 
not a surprise as brokerage is typically based on the assumption of the ‘apt individual’ 
(Moran, 2005).  
 
However, institutional characteristics of the public organization may also be associated with 
managerial motivations to network. Previous research found that public managers place 
higher value than their private counterparts on political rewards and loyalty, which may 
indicate a higher propensity to maintain social ties in public organizations (see e.g., Crewson, 
1997; Grindle, 2012; Rainey, 1983; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000).  
 
Although these relations cannot be attributed solely to institutional differences between the 
public and the private sector or to cultural differences, available evidence does suggest that 
the relation between networking and behavioral outcomes (such as innovative work 
behavior) needs to be studied in relation to particular motivations of public managers. This 
study contributes to close this gap by theorizing on the effect of managerial networking in 
the public organization as well as public managers’ motivations to network (particularly, 
teamwork-related motivation and individual career incentives). We then test our ideas using 
data from a sample of public managers from a municipality in Mexico City. The statistical 
analysis allows for testing the relative significance of networking and managerial motives on 
different roles of innovative behavior. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the 
theoretical argument. Section two introduces the empirical study. The third section presents 
the results of the statistical analysis, and the fourth section the conclusions. 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
 
5.2.1 Managerial networking  
In public management research two sorts of networks are studied: Collaborative and 
managerial networks. Collaborative network studies consider the whole network as the unit 
of analysis and analyze the relation between network characteristics and performance. A 
major result coming from this type of studies is that high coordination often results in 
improved performance due to increased stability and cohesion (Akkerman, Torenvlied, & 
Schalk, 2012). Managerial network studies focus on the individual actor and define 
networking as the contact frequency of relations that (high-ranking) managers maintain with 
other managers (Wolff & Moser, 2009).  
 
There are two major types of mechanisms that explain the relation between managerial 
networking and performance. The first one was proposed by academics in the Kennedy 
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School of Public Management. It stresses the importance of external resources. According to 
this argument, support from politicians, the public and other stakeholders is crucial for the 
performance of public managers (Moore, 1995). For example, Moynihan and Pandey (2005) 
found that political support positively influences performance of public sector managers. 
Studies by Meier and O’Toole (2003, 2008) in Texas school districts showed that external 
networking can be used to reduce uncertainty, exploit resources in external networks, and it 
has a stabilizing buffer function in case of external shocks.  
 
 A second type of mechanism is related to internal managerial networking of public 
managers. Recent research (van den Bekerom, Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2016) shows that 
‘downward’ networking, that is, maintaining frequent contact with subordinates and work 
teams, is particularly important in mitigating the negative impact of external shocks on 
performance. It is assumed that downward networking increases coordination, consensus 
around strategic decisions, and may lead to new ideas to deal with external shocks. This 
finding is similar to a meta-analysis of 37 studies on team performance by Balkundi and 
Harrison (2006). These authors found that leadership centrality in a team had a positive 
influence on team performance. Downward networking and a central position of a manager 
in a team improve coordination and increase interpersonal trust and group cohesion, and 
foster organizational learning. As a result, innovation and performance can increase.  
 
5.2.2 Public managers’ innovative work behavior 
The previous section described how the managerial networking of public managers may be a 
determinant of performance in public administration. While the benefits of 
interorganizational networking rely strongly on access to external support and resources, the 
benefits of intraorganizational networking rely also strongly on innovations such as creating 
flexibility, generating new ideas, and promoting alternative use of resources (van den 
Bekerom, Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2016). We define innovation broadly, as a process that 
can involve changes in four areas: Products, processes, markets served, and the organization 
(OECD, 2005, p 46). Public managers play a crucial role in this process. Managers are not 
merely implementers of strategies, but also actively contribute to and shape the strategies 
of superiors and elected officials. Because public managers occupy a linking position 
between political principals and operatives, they can be compared to middle managers in 
private organizations. Similar to middle managers, public managers are not involved in daily 
operations but are responsible for operations and performance of subunits (Floyd, Schmid, 
& Wooldridge, 2008). Middle management theory suggests that middle managers’ 
networking influences their strategic involvement—a variable closely connected to 
innovative work behavior of middle managers (Hornbsy, Kuratko & Zahra, 2002). Similarly, 
public managers can use their networks as a source of information and as a source of 
support and a means to coordinate operations (Burt, 2004; Fang et al. 2015; Mehra et al., 
2006).  
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The contribution of public managers towards innovation can be diverse and depends on 
their strategic role (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). These strategic roles can be described using 
two dimensions. First, involvement can be upward or downward oriented. Second, it can be 
divergent or integrative. The first dimension refers to the direction of strategic involvement. 
The second refers to the nature of the role. Crossing these dimensions results in four 
different roles, which are helpful to categorize innovative involvement of public managers 
(see Figure 5.1). First, managers may champion new initiatives, which refer to the 
introduction and presentation of comprehensive strategic plans to upper management or 
political principals. Second, managers synthesize information, thus evaluating and 
communicating information upwards in the organizational hierarchy. Third, managers 
implement strategies and policies. Finally, managers facilitate adaptability by fostering 






















Figure 5.1 Middle managers’ strategic roles 
From: Floyd & Wooldridge (1997: 467) 
 
 
The first two roles (championing and synthesizing) are upward-oriented and strongly depend 
on new proposals and strategically relevant information. Rapid and precise knowledge of 
environmental developments is necessary to formulate new plans or to brief superiors with 
relevant information. The two other roles (implementing and facilitating) are downward-
oriented (cf. van den Bekerom, Torenvlied, & Akkerman, 2016). Next to passing through 
relevant information, these roles specifically rely on a manager’s ability to galvanize internal 
support and to coordinate teams closely. When this is done successfully, a team or subunit is 
better prepared for change and to deal with external shocks. 
 
Intraorganizational networking can be an important reason for public managers to succeed 
in these different roles. First, networking increases access to resources and information. This 
results in better data, more knowledge and increased support. Resources and information 
obtained through networking can be used upward for championing new initiatives or for 
synthesizing information towards higher echelons, as well as downward in preparing public 
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employees for change and the implementation of policy. Managers in boundary spanning 
positions are supposed to have better and faster access to fresh information and have been 
found to exert more strategic influence than others (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). Increased 
access to information can also be used downward to inform operatives about external 
contingencies, threats and trends. This information can either be used to improve alignment 
of deliberate strategies to the actual situation, or to improve adaptability to change. That is, 
intraorganizational networking can increase managerial innovative involvement, as is 
formulated in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Networking): A higher level of a public manager’s intraorganizational 
networking leads to an increase of his innovative behavior. 
 
5.2.3 Public managers’ motivations 
We hypothesized that public managers are active networkers and that their networking can 
have an important effect on the performance of their departments. We assume that public 
managers are goal-directed and, as a consequence, next to networking these goals influence 
their innovative behavior. To understand the mechanisms behind this influence, we refer to 
social production function theory (Ormel et al., 1997). Located within rational choice theory 
social production function theory claims that people produce their own well-being by 
striving towards two general goals: Social approval and physical well-being. These general 
goals are supposed to consist of instrumental goals. While these general goals are universal, 
the instrumental goals differ for individuals and, depending on individual constraints, may be 
substituted for each other. Networking in the public agency can be seen as a means to 
achieve such instrumental goals. Since several instrumental goals can be identified, it may be 
argued that several motivations for networking can be identified, with each motivation 
leading to differentiated forms of innovative behavior. To define these instrumental goals, 
two characteristic goals/motivations can be identified in the literature that seem particularly 
important to disentangle this puzzle.  
 
The first one originates from public management theory and public service motivation 
research, and assumes that public managers aim to create public value and meet 
organizational and policy objectives (Le Grand, 2003; Moore, 1995). That is, public managers 
are driven by the goal to meet collective objectives and comply with public sector 
expectations. Moreover, organizational norms (such as ‘being a team player’) have been 
identified in the literature as important antecedents for compliance and performance 
(Barker, 1993; Rainey, 2003; Tung-Mou & Maxwell, 2011). Managers who are motivated by 
the creation of public value through commitment to organizational goals and norms are, 
consequently, more likely to also be active in innovation. Furthering these goals requires 
coordination between departments, teams, and individuals, as well as creating an enabling 
environment for team members to perform optimally. Intraorganizational networking is 
instrumental to this because it facilitates obtaining critical resources to implement policy 
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and to improve team performance. Therefore it may be assumed that public managers who 
understand that networking is important to achieve these collective goals, are also more 
successful innovators. This leads to the hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Collective goals): Higher salience of collective goals is related to a 
higher level of innovative behavior. 
 
A second reason for public managers to engage in networking can be found in networking 
theory (Forret & Dougherty, 2001, Wolff & Moser, 2009). In terms of social production 
function theory, a successful career is instrumental to physical well-being. Networking 
Theory suggests that intraorganizational networking may be instrumental to individuals’ 
career goals. Whereas public management theory assumes that goals are normative and 
exogenous to the individual, networking theory relies on the assumption that individuals’ 
behavior is driven by individual gain-goals. Networking results from “individuals’ attempts to 
develop and maintain relationships with others who have the potential to assist them in their 
work or career” (Forret & Dougherty, 2004: 420). Research shows that networking can be 
used to predict career success and salary increases (Forret & Dougherty, 2004; Wolff & 
Moser, 2009). Intraorganizational networking and maintaining a large network also 
contribute to the perception that an individual is valued by her principals (Porter & Woo, 
2015). A successful career dependent on loyalty and the frequency of relations is connected 
to informal networks (Lomnitz, 1990). Informal relations can facilitate and secure career 
opportunities because they function as an asset that secures information and resources for 
the manager herself. 
 
But networking is not the only manner to advance a career. It may be assumed that those 
public managers motivated by career goals will engage with higher probability in innovation, 
to the extent that innovative behavior is deemed instrumental in improving managers’ 
chances of maintaining or increasing career opportunities in the public service:  
 
Hypothesis 3 (Individual career goals): Higher salience of career goals is related to a 
higher level of innovative behavior. 
 
 
5.3 Research method 
 
5.3.1 Background and setting 
We used survey data from n = 64 public managers of the Milpa Alta municipality in Mexico 
City. Data were collected in June 2012. Managers received a personal invitation to 
participate in the study and respond to an online questionnaire (response rate = 69%). Public 
managers from all departments of the municipality were included in the study 
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(administration, government and law enforcement, public works and urban development, 
urban services, economic development, social development, and ecology and environment). 
 
Milpa Alta is a semirural community and the least populated of Mexico City’s 16 boroughs. It 
has the lowest gross domestic product and human development index score of Mexico City 
(although it is way above national average). Milpa Alta government lacks an established civil 
service system, which is not uncommon in Mexico and other developing nations (Grindle, 
2012). This means that managerial positions are often appointed using discretionary and 
political criteria and not necessarily or exclusively professional merit. This characteristic is 
important to our study because it implies that we can directly compare collective versus 
career motivations (because career development is related to public managers’ behavior and 
not determined by an institutionalized career system). Also, the fact that all managers are 




The four dependent variables that represent innovative behavior, championing new 
alternatives, synthesizing information, implementing strategies and facilitating adaptability, 
are each measured using five Likert scale items (1 = strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). 
Examples are “communicate and sell top management initiatives” (implementing), “propose 
new programs to top management” (championing), “assess and communicate business level 
implications of new information to top management” (synthesizing). A complete description 
of the items can be found in (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1996) which is based on (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992). Cronbach’s alpha values for these four scales vary between 0.75 and 
0.81, indicating that the scales, which were originally developed for use in American private 
companies, are also reliable measures in the Mexican case. 
 
In the public management literature, it is common to define networking as the frequency of 
contacts that managers maintain with other actors (van den Bekerom, Torenvlied & 
Akkerman, 2016). We measured networking by the amount of personal contact a public 
manager has with coworkers inside his department, compared to his peers (0 = much less, 4 
= much more).  
 
To measure the influence of network motives on innovative behavior, we asked two 
questions. For the career motivation we asked if knowing people is important to develop a 
career and to measure the collective motivation we asked whether being a team player was 
crucial for success (0 = strongly disagree, 4= strongly agree). 
 
We controlled for a number of other factors that might be of influence. A common 
explanation for the innovative behavior of middle managers is their autonomy. Greater 
autonomy is supposed to result in more strategic involvement. We measured managerial 
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autonomy with a single item by asking how much autonomy public managers have regarding 
daily activities on a five-level Likert scale (0 = no autonomy, 4 = much autonomy). 
Centralization of decision-making is a second measure to check whether there is room for 
public managers to operate, and measured with a single item on a five-level Likert scale (0 = 
very centralized, 4 = very decentralized). Besides these specific variables, we also controlled 
for gender (0 = male, 1 = female), educational attainment (2 = secondary school, 3 = high 
school 4 = bachelor’s degree, 5 = master’s degree, 6 = doctoral degree) and hierarchical 
position (0=head of unit, 1 = deputy director, 2 = director, 3 = director general). Descriptive 
statistics of the variables can be found in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Sample descriptives (n = 64) 
 Cronbach’s 
alpha 
range Rean SD 
     
Championing 0.77 1-5 3.34 0.10 
Synthesizing 0.81 1-5 3.66 0.10 
Implementing 0.76 1-5 3,48 0.10 
Facilitating 
 
0.75 1-5 2.89 0.11 
Networking  0-4 2.84 0.96 
Being a team player  0-4 3.38 0.88 
Career motive 
 
 0-4 2.08 1.40 
Managerial autonomy  0-4 2.15 0.97 
Centralization of decision-making  0-4 1.52 1.05 
     
Gender  0-1 0.21  
Education  2-6 3.82 0.69 
Hierarchical position  0-3 0.95 0.80 
 
 
A potential risk of self-reported measures are systematic measurement errors due to 
common method variance (CMV). As a result, correlations may be inflated or attenuated, in 
either case possibly leading to wrong conclusions. (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Conway & Lance, 
2010; Favero & Bullock, 2015). Despite this risk, we consider self-reports appropriate for our 
study. A number of our variables (networking, collective motivation, career motive) focus on 
the opinion or motivation of participants. Variation in these variables reflects subjective 
judgments of participants and is not necessarily a source of measurement error (Favero & 
Bullock, 2015). Innovative behavior is sometimes measured by counting the number of 
successful innovations. However, such a measure only reflects a part of innovative behavior. 
Innovative behavior starts with an assessment of new developments or information and a 
decision how to respond. Next a plan can be presented, information may be passed through 
or nothing is done. The evaluations that underlie these decisions are only known to the 
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middle managers themselves. Neither top managers, nor lower level managers are fully 
aware of middle managers assessment or innovative behavior and therefore we choose for 
self-reports to measure middle managers’ innovative behavior. 
 
To reduce the risk of common method bias, a personal invitation for an online survey was 
sent to all participants. In this way we could guarantee full anonymity to participants and 
assure that supervisors or peers had no access to the answers. The invitation was also used 
to explain that there were no right or wrong answers and that participants were free to 
express their own opinion. One objective of this explanation was to reduce the risk of 
socially desirable answers. 
 
We also tested the results for evidence of CMV. Several tests to detect CMV are described in 
the literature, many of which do have theoretical drawbacks or limited efficacy. In a 
simulation study, Richardson, Simmering, and Sturman (2009) have investigated the 
characteristics of three tests in different settings. Their findings are that the CFA-marker 
technique (confirmatory factor analysis; Williams, Hartman, & Cavazotte, 2010) is the only 
test that works reasonably to detect CMV. This CFA-marker technique uses a latent marker 
variable to represent measurement effects. This marker variable shares measurement 
characteristics with the substantive variables but is otherwise uncorrelated. Testing for 
common method bias can be done by comparing the fit of two similar models, one with and 
one without influence of the marker on the correlation between the variables of interest. 
We have carried out this test for each of the four dependent variables, using the R-package 
Lavaan. The pairwise comparison of these models using chi-square difference tests leads to 
chi-square values ranging from 1.86 to 5.66, with six degrees of freedom. These values are 
smaller than the 0.05 chi-square critical value (12.59), meaning we find no evidence for the 
influence of common method bias on the correlation of variables we have researched. More 





Because the four innovative roles are clearly distinct (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997), we 
estimated a different model for each role. To investigate the three hypotheses, we carried 
out a linear regression analysis. The results of the analysis can be found in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 Regression outcomes for different dependent variables 
 Championing Facilitating Synthesizing Implementing 
     
(Intercept) 0.47 (0.99) 0.25 (0.98) 0.61 (1.02) 1.56 (1.01) 
Networking 0.36 (0.13)** 0.44 (0.13)** 0.42 (0.13)** 0.34 (0.13)* 
Team motive 0.10 (0.11) 0.07 (0.11) 0.18 (0.11) -0.01 (0.11) 
Career motive 0.18 (0.08)* 0.19 (0.08)* 0.18 (0.08)* 0.09 (0.08) 
     
Managerial  
Autonomy 0.12 (0.12) -0.10 (0.12) 0.17 (0.13) -0.05 (0.13) 
Centralization of 
departmental 
decision making 0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) -0.04 (0.1) 0.01 (0.09) 
Gender 0.10 (0.23) -0.08 (0.23) -0.01 (0.24) 0.00 (0.24) 
Education 0.18 (0.14) 0.20 (0.14) 0.11 (0.14) 0.16 (0.14) 
Organizational 
position 0.16 (0.10) 0.14 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 0.30 (0.10)** 
     
R2 0.26 0.34 0.25 0.29 
Durbin-watson 1.86 2.28 2.23 1.96 
VIF-min 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 
VIF-max 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Shapiro-wilks  
Significance  0.35 0.86 0.21 0.61 
Standard deviations n parentheses. 
* = 0.05 and ** = 0.01 significance.  
 
 
To justify the use of linear regression analysis, we tested common assumptions of linear 
regression. The Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation in the residuals varies between 1.86 
and 2.28, indicating that there is almost no autocorrelation. To test for collinearity, the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were calculated for estimated coefficients. These factors are 
all close to one and smaller than five, hence it can be concluded that there are no indications 
of collinearity. To test for the normality of residuals, Q-Q plots were visually inspected and 
showed no anomalies. Above this, Shapiro-Wilks statistics for testing of normality were 
calculated. The p values of these statistics are all well above 0.05 and there is no reason to 
doubt the assumption that residuals are normal distributed. 
 
The championing, facilitating and synthesizing roles show similar results and appear to be 
comparable. In all models there is a highly significant and positive result for networking, 
varying between 0.34 and 0.44 (unstandardized). This clearly supports hypothesis 1. In all 
four models we could not find any significant influence of a teamwork motivation on 
innovative behavior. However, in the championing, facilitating, and synthesizing models, we 
found a clear influence of career motivations with a parameter around 0.18. In the 
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implementing model we found no evidence of career motives affecting implementing 
behavior. The control variables showed no influence, apart from the organizational level 
positively influencing implementing behavior. This suggests that managers occupying higher 





Our first hypothesis states that intraorganizational networking of a public manager leads to 
an increase of innovative behavior. Existing research on public managers’ networking has 
shown the value of managerial networking for organizational performance by securing 
access to external resources and by improving internal coordination and consensus 
(Torenvlied et al., 2012). Managerial networking of public managers is considered 
particularly useful in dealing with external turbulence and problems (van den Bekerom, 
Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2016). However, the specific question whether managerial 
networking leads to increased innovative behavior (and thus induce increased performance), 
to the best of our knowledge, has never been researched in governmental settings.  
 
Research on middle management in for-profit organizations has already shown that 
intraorganizational networking specifically can contribute to innovative behavior and so can 
contribute to increased performance (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007). Our findings on 
hypothesis one clearly indicate that also in a public organization the networking behavior of 
public managers contributes to increased innovative behavior. One implication of this 
finding is that theories of middle managers’ innovative behavior and strategic involvement 
that are developed in Western private companies (Floyd, Schmid, & Wooldridge, 2008), can 
be extended to a public management setting in a developing country. Though further 
research is necessary, it suggests that other causal mechanisms related to middle 
management may also be informative in public settings as well. 
 
The second and third hypotheses of our study explore the motivations behind public 
managers’ networking and their effect as additional factors on innovative behavior. We 
reject the hypothesis that a collective motive influences innovative behavior. However, in 
our case study we found evidence supporting the hypothesis that career-driven motivations 
for networking do influence (three of the four) innovative roles. Only for the implementing 
role we found no evidence of influence of career-driven networking motivation. It has to be 
noted that the implementing role is different from the other three roles in being oriented at 
a rather straightforward implementation of top management’s strategies. The other three 
roles—championing new initiatives, synthesizing information and facilitating adaptability—
all involve own initiative, as well as clear judgment.  
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An explanation for these results might be the politico-administrative specifics of our case. As 
mentioned above, in Milpa Alta managerial positions are often appointed based on 
discretionary criteria. As a result, managers’ behavior may not necessarily be primarily 
aimed at meeting public goals or the successful implementation of policies, but instead may 
be mainly motivated by furthering individual career opportunities. This does not discard 
more normative public service ideas, which claim that public managers strive for higher 
collective goals in order to create public value, but rather supplements them by stressing the 
importance of career incentives in the absence of institutions that reduce public officials’ 
career uncertainty. 
 
The previous also suggests that a certain hierarchy of motivations may be at play. A primary 
goal is the public manager’s career goal. Only after this goal is secured and a reasonable 
career perspective is guaranteed, other higher order goals such as creating public value or 
being a team player can become salient in inducing innovative behaviors. Studies on 
bureaucracies in the public sector (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Rauch, 2001) show that offering 
civil servants rewarding and long-term careers leads to increased corporate coherence, a 
long-term focus on public goals and reduced likelihood of unethical behavior. If such a career 
perspective is not offered, individual motives and interests become more prevalent. This 
shows that in both social network analysis and in public management, the specific context 
influences the relative importance of individual versus collective goals. In our case there is 
no long-term career perspective for public managers and not a strong collective orientation. 
This supports our findings that a career motive is more influential than a collective motive in 
explaining public managers’ innovative behavior.  
 
The career motive for networking correlates with three of the four innovative roles, 
championing new initiatives, synthesizing information, and facilitating adaptability. It does 
not correlate with the fourth innovative role, implementing deliberate strategies. Rather 
unexpectedly we found that hierarchical position positively influences this role. Though one 
significant outcome in a small sample is always a reason for caution, these results seem to 
support our previous discussion. Higher-ranked public managers already have achieved a 
successful career, so this motive becomes less important for them. They also have higher 
power to execute plans; therefore, it is plausible that higher-ranking public managers can 
more often than lower-ranking managers take on the implementation of policies and 
innovations. 
 
Clearly, additional research is needed to disentangle some of issues mentioned above. 
However, our data and results do suggest that intraorganizational networking and 
motivations arising from the institutional characteristics of the public organization may be 
important in explaining public managers’ innovative behavior. Results also imply that the 
relation between networking and performance may run, in the case of some public 
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organizations, through innovative behaviors and the relative importance of career 
incentives.  
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Appendix 5.1 Questionnaire items 
The scales for measuring innovative work behavior roles are from Floyd and Wooldridge 
(1996) and are slightly adapted from the original publication (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). 
Additionally, we used the following items: 
1. In comparison to your coworkers in the department how much personal contact do you 
have with coworkers from your own department? (0 = much less, 4 = much more)? 
2. Being a team player is considered crucial for the success of the department. (0 = strongly 
disagree, 4 = strongly agree)? 
3. “Who knows you and whom you know” is an important factor to develop a career in this 
department. (0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree)? 
4. Regarding daily activities, how much autonomy do middle managers have? (0 = no 
autonomy, 4 = much autonomy)? 
5. How centralized is the decision-making process in your department? (0 = very 
centralized, 4 = very decentralized)? 
6. What is your gender? (0 = male,1 = female)? 
7. In which year were you born? 
8. What is your last finished educational level? (2 = secondary school, 3 = high school 4 = 
bachelor’s degree, 5 = master’s degree, 6 = doctoral degree)? 
9. What is your hierarchical level in the organization? (0 = Head of unit, 1 = Deputy director, 
2 = Director, 3 = Director General)? 
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Appendix 5.2 CFA-marker tests for common method variance 
In this appendix we describe the results of the CFA-marker test for common method 
variance. A detailed description of the test procedure can be found in (Williams, Hartman, & 
Cavazotte, 2010). As marker we selected the variable change as source of trouble, a self-
reported variable based upon three items (Continuous changes in public policy priorities are 
an important source of trouble; Lack of personnel continuity [turnover] is a source of 
trouble; Continuous changes in the leadership of the organization are an important source of 
trouble). Theoretically this marker is not likely to be correlated to either of the substantive 
variables and observed correlations are also low.  
 
The CFA-marker technique requires the specification of five different latent variable models. 
The models were estimated with the R-package lavaan version 0.6-3. In the first (CFA) 
model, loadings from the marker indicators on the marker variable are estimated, as well as 
correlations between marker variable and all substantive variables. Loadings from the 
marker variable to the substantive indicators are fixed to zero. For the single-item constructs 
(networking, being a team player, and career motive) we artificially inserted latent variables 
for these constructs that were loaded on their single item with a coefficient fixed to 1.  
 
In the second (Baseline) model the substantive variables are still correlated to each other, 
but the marker variable is orthogonal. The loadings from the marker indicator on the marker 
variable and the unstandardized error variances of the marker are fixed to the estimates 
obtained from the CFA model. This Baseline model serves as a reference for further model 
specifications.  
 
The third Method-C (Constrained) model is similar to the Baseline model, but has additional 
factor loadings from the marker variable to the indicators of the substantive factors. These 
loadings are constrained to be equal. A comparison of the Method-C model to the Baseline 
model provides a test of the assumption that the marker has equal effects on the 
substantive indicators. Table 5.3 shows for the several models Chi-squares ranging from 
21.78 to 27.81 with df = 4, all exceeding the 0.05 critical value of 9.49. Hence the null-
hypothesis of equal loadings influence on all indicators is rejected for all models. 
 
Table 5.3 CFA-marker method comparison tests 
 
 c2    df c2 -0.05 
critical value 
 Champ Fac Syn Imp   
       
Baseline vs. Method-C 25.95 27.81 21.78 26.93 4   9.49 
Method-C vs. Method-U 29.71 26.46 28.70 16.91 7 14.07 
Method-C/U vs. Method-R 1.86 5.00 5.66 3.95 6 12.59 
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The fourth Method-U (Unconstrained) model is similar to the Method-C model, the 
difference is that the loadings of the marker on the substantive indicators are no longer 
constrained to be equal. Comparing the Method-U model to the Method-C model tests the 
assumption that the marker factor has unequal loadings on the substantive indicators. In the 
four models we find Chi-squares ranging from 16.91 to 29.71 with 7 degrees of freedom all 
exceeding the 0.05 Chi-square critical value of 14.07, and we conclude that the Method-U 
model performs best in modeling marker variance. 
 
The fifth and final Method-R (Restricted) model is identical to Method-C or Method-U 
models, but now the correlations between the substantive variables are fixed to their values 
from the baseline model. A comparison of the Method-R to the Method-U model, provides a 
test for method bias between the substantive variables that is due to the marker. As can be 
seen from table 5.3, the Chi-squares range from 1.86 to 5.66, df = 6, and are all smaller than 








The four studies in this dissertation address the overall question why some middle managers 
exhibit more innovative work behavior than others. One study is methodological in nature 
and investigates strategies to handle a frequently occurring problem in longitudinal social 
network studies in real life organizations: How to deal with missing attribute data? The other 
three chapters are empirical studies that explore different sets of conditions that may play a 
role in innovative work behavior of middle managers: (1) Do middle managers have 
sufficient autonomy to innovate? (2) Do middle managers possess the necessary personal 
characteristics to be innovative? (3) Does the social network facilitate or constrain middle 
managers’ innovative behavior? The empirical studies are set in three different contexts, 
students at a business school who will likely become middle managers in the near future, an 
international multi-site company with a complex organizational structure that operates over 
a hundred leisure parks, and a municipality in Mexico City. This concluding chapter 
summarizes the main findings and discusses implications for future research. 
 
Study 1  Methods to deal with missing data 
Longitudinal social network data sets based on real-world organization studies often contain 
missing data. Up until now, relatively little is known how to address this problem, and in 
particular research into the impact of missing attribute data (behavior or other individual 
characteristics) in longitudinal network data is scarce. In the first study, several methods to 
deal with missing behavior data for stochastic actor-oriented models were investigated. 
Stochastic actor-oriented models are designed to analyze the co-evolution of network 
relations and individual attributes. In a simulation study based on four real-life datasets, we 
used three criteria to compare seven alternative methods to deal with missing behavior 
data: model convergence, parameter bias, and parameter coverage. The default method in 
the RSiena software (Ripley et al., 2017) was found to outperform the alternative methods. 
This simulation study provided an important methodological foundation for correctly 
interpreting the findings of the three substantive chapters in this dissertation. More 
specifically, since we did not find significant influences of social network on innovative 
behavior in these substantive chapters, this study on missing data shows that it is highly 
unlikely that missing data have caused this insignificance.  
 
 
Study 2  The business school, students as future managers 
Study 2 used data from two cohorts of international students in a Dutch business school to 
investigate the first two research questions: The influence of social networks and personal 
characteristics on innovative work behavior. The dependent variable in this study was 
personal initiative, which was used as proxy of innovative work behavior. Table 6.1 
summarizes the hypotheses, Figure 6.1 visualizes the underlying conceptual model. 
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Table 6.1. Hypotheses for the business school case (2 cohorts of 42 and 47 students) 
Hypothesis Outcome 
  
H1 Independent personality effect model 
The higher an individual’s (a) conscientiousness or (b) openness to experience, 
the higher the level of personal initiative.  
Yes (H1a) 
H2 Independent network effect model 
The higher an individual’s structural autonomy, the higher this individual’s 
level of personal initiative.  
No 
H3 Network mediation model 
The higher an individual’s (a) conscientiousness or (b) openness to experience, 
the higher this person’s level of structural autonomy. 
No 
H4 Network outcome model 
The higher the level of an individual’s personal initiative, the higher this 
















Figure 6.1 Conceptual model of the business school students’ case. A bold line indicates an 
accepted hypothesis, while a dotted line means the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
Of the four hypotheses, significant results were obtained only for H1a: Personality 
(conscientiousness) positively influences personal initiative. No evidence was found for 
significant influence of the social network (friendship) on personal initiative, neither did we 
observe that social network position was influenced by personality or personal initiative. In 
our discussion we described that some specific network characteristics as well as the context 
of the network may have led to these outcomes.  
 
First, group size might be relevant. The effectiveness of brokerage increases with the 
number of disconnected groups. The sample sizes of both studies were relatively small (n = 
42 and n = 47) and with each of the two cohorts being further divided into two subgroups, 
brokerage hardly ever involved bridging otherwise disconnected groups. This may limit the 











A second possible explanation is that developing personal initiative may not be the primary 
goal of young students and therefore a network position is not seen as a means to increase 
personal initiative. The latter explanation would be in line with the findings of a meta-
analysis (Fang et al., 2015), according to which brokerage only works in settings in which 
early access to information is crucial for performance, for example, for managers in 
knowledge intense industries like the banking sector. 
 
 
Study 3  A public-listed international Leisure Company 
Study 3 analyzed longitudinal sociometric data from a complex international multi-site 
networked organization. It investigated to what degree four dimensions of middle manager 
autonomy jointly affect middle managers’ innovative work behavior: Job design, personal 
network structure, distance to the head office, and the degree of formal organizational 




Table 6.2 Hypotheses for the leisure company case (110 middle managers). 
Hypothesis Outcome 
  
H1 Job Autonomy 
The higher a middle manager’s job autonomy, the higher a middle manager’s 
innovative work behavior. 
No 
H2 Social network 
The higher a middle manager’s structural autonomy, the higher a middle 
manager’s innovative work behavior. 
No 
H3 Park Type 
The higher the constraint caused by type of park, the lower a middle 
manager’s innovative work behavior: innovative work behavior will be highest 
in managed parks, and lowest in franchised parks. 
No 
H4 Spatial distance 
The larger the spatial distance of a middle manager’s location to the 
organization’s headquarter, the higher a middle manager’s innovative work 
behavior.  
No 


















Figure 6.2 Conceptual model of Leisure Company case. A bold line indicates an accepted 
hypothesis, while a dotted line means the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
We found no significant effects, which suggests that at least in this organization there is no 
systematic association between autonomy and innovative work behavior of middle 
managers. The following factors might explain the absence of significant results. First, 
according to in-depth interviews with some middle managers, a wide variety of factors such 
as tenure, prior experience, or local differences affect middle managers’ innovative 
behavior. It seems these factors may obfuscate the potential impact of the social network. 
This suggests that just as in the case of the students, context is an important factor for the 
influence of social network. 
 
Second, the networks are characterized by a high density, with managers having on average 
36 peers (out of 110) to which they turn for advice. This high density may be due to the fact 
that many middle managers have been with the firm for many years and know each other 
very well. As a result of this strongly collaborative pattern, there may be hardly any 
opportunity to benefit from bridging structural holes, as earlier research has shown, actors 
benefit most from bridging structural holes when collaboration in the network is low (Soda, 
Stea, & Pedersen, 2019), and the value of bridging relationships decreases with the age of 
the ties (Baum, McEvily, & Rowly, 2012).  
 
A third factor is the fuzzy boundary of the network. Organizational boundaries have become 
fluid and middle managers have probably more contacts outside than inside their 
organization. This makes it difficult to ascribe behavioral changes to changes in the internal 
middle manager network. 
 
 
Study 4 Mexico City municipality 













Study 4 used a cross-sectional survey among 64 managers of a Mexican municipality in order 
to investigate to what degree managerial networking, individual career motivation, and 
collective public orientation leads to increased innovative behavior in a public setting. Table 








A higher level of a public manager’s intra-organizational networking leads to 
an increase of his innovative behavior.  
Yes 
H2 Collective goals 
Higher salience of collective goals is related to a higher level of innovative 
behavior.  
No 
H3 Individual career goals 




















Figure 6.3 Conceptual model of Mexican municipality case. A bold line indicates an accepted 
hypothesis, while a dotted line means the hypothesis is rejected. 
 
We found significant influence of networking behavior on innovative work behavior and 
support for additional influences of individual career motives, but no evidence for collective 
motivations. The outcomes may be explained by the specific context, in which managerial 
positions are often filled on discretionary and political criteria instead of professional merit, 
and job security is absent. As a result, the individual career motive to secure job positions or 













The findings also suggest there is a similar contextual influence of individual versus collective 
orientation in public sector studies and in social network studies. Studies on bureaucracies in 
the public sector (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Rauch, 2001) show that offering civil servants 
rewarding and long-term careers leads to increased corporate coherence (higher and middle 
management sharing the vision, mission and goals of the organization) and a long-term 
focus on public goals. If, like in our study, such a career perspective is not offered, individual 
motives and interests become more prevalent. Similarly, in social-network theory, the 
brokerage mechanism is an individualistic mechanism, while the cohesion mechanism has a 
collective orientation based upon the embeddedness of the individual in the group. 
Brokerage is often found in organizations in which early access to new information is crucial, 
like in financial companies (Fang et al., 2015), whereas cohesion is more important in high 
commitment organizations (Xiao & Tsui, 2007). In the Mexican municipality under 
investigation, there is no secure long-term career perspective for middle managers and not a 
strong collective orientation. Middle managers appear to be mainly motivated by their own 
benefit when aiming for high performance and use networking to achieve this goal. This 
suggests that the prevailing individual orientation is related to a positive influence of 





Summing up, the following answers can be given to the three questions formulated in the 
introductory chapter.  
 
The first question addresses the potential influence of social network position on innovative 
work behavior. Our results do not show any relation between the level of network constraint 
in a personal network, and innovative work behavior. A reason may be that a potential 
influence of social network position is obfuscated by other factors. Our findings support 
earlier research that brokerage mechanisms work well in in an individual culture, but less in 
a collective and collaborative culture.  
 
The second question addresses individual characteristics. Our findings suggest that personal 
characteristics play a role in understanding innovative work behavior. In particular 
personality (conscientiousness) and goal orientation (career focus) influence the level of 
innovative work behavior. 
  
The third question focusses on the concept of autonomy. It is commonly assumed that a 
certain level of autonomy in job design is a necessary condition for a middle manager to be 
innovative. We expanded this concept of autonomy to investigate if it would lead to 
increased understanding of innovative work behavior, but found no evidence.  
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In addition, the problem of missing behavior data in longitudinal network studies was 
researched. The findings suggest that SIENA’s default method to deal with missing data 
outperforms other methods.  
 
The studies in this dissertation show that explaining innovative work behavior of middle 
managers may be more complex than previous research would suggest. Unlike earlier 
studies (Kuratko et al., 2005), we did not find a relation between a variety of autonomy 
dimensions and innovative work behavior. Neither did we find a systematic association 
between network position and innovative work behavior. The only dimension that was 
found to significantly increase innovative work behavior are personal characteristics: 
personality (conscientiousness) and an individual motive for networking. 
 
Our analysis of missing data suggests that the estimates of effect parameters in stochastic 
actor-oriented models were not systematically influenced by data availability. This suggests 
that the absence of significant network effects in our three studies may not be due to 
missing data. Instead, it may be the specific characteristics of the networks under 
investigation which may prohibit the exploitation of structural holes: Opaque network 
boundaries, high network density, and small network sizes. 
 
In the case of international students, social networks were dense and cohesive, and bridging 
positions had little added value for their performance. In the case of the leisure company, 
the high number and age of ties reflect a dense pattern of collaboration and suggest that 
brokerage is less important for performance. Here too, early access to new information is 
also not necessarily crucial for performance. In the case of the Mexican municipality, a 
strong individual goal orientation suggests that cohesion and collaboration are less 
important, and networking serves mainly to realize personal goals. Middle managers appear 
to be mainly motivated by their own benefit when aiming for high performance and use 
networking to achieve this goal. This suggests that a prevalence of individual goal orientation 
is related to a positive influence of networking behavior on performance and that a 
collective and collaborative culture will reduce a potential constraining effect of network 
position on performance and innovative behavior. 
 
These findings support claims in the social-network literature that organizational context 
conditions influence the relevance of brokerage mechanisms. In a meta-analysis based on 
138 samples, Fang et al. (2015) concluded that much of the evidence supporting the claims 
related to brokerage mechanisms comes from companies for which timely access and 
control of information is a crucial success factor. As Baum, McEvily, and Rowley (2012) show, 
exploiting brokerage positions works well with young ties in rapidly changing environments 
where novelty and uniqueness quickly lose their value. However, once ties have grown 
older, closure mechanisms become stronger.  
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The final question of the thesis, based upon the relatively unexplored application of 
longitudinal network analysis on organizational behavior, was how useful or suitable 
network analysis is for research in organizational behavior. Though it is obvious that this 
research is inadequate to answer this question in a conclusive manner, at least some 
cautious remarks can be made, including some suggestions for further research. This final 
reflection can be split into empirical and theoretical considerations 
 
Starting with the empirical considerations, we observed that missingness in data not 
necessarily leads to problems in stochastic actor oriented modelling. It must be stressed this 
does not imply that researchers can go easy on data collection in network studies. Contrary, 
sociometric studies demand a collection of all data in a network, including network relations 
and relevant attributes. The data collection is further complicated by the non-anonymous 
character of the data collection and the need for repeated sampling in longitudinal studies. 
As has been experienced in this research, even with the full support of the organization, it 
will often be difficult to realize complete sampling in organizational studies.  
 
What we did witness is that the influence of network position on innovative behavior is 
obfuscated by other factors. This seems surprising at first, as social-network literature in 
general has delivered a strong case about the relation or co-evolution between network 
position and behavior in general. Perhaps this strength might be the reason we didn’t find a 
relation between network position and innovative behavior. Behavior consists of a multitude 
of elements that are not necessarily correlated with each other. A network position will then 
never be able to explain all these elements of behavior and perhaps only those behavioral 
elements that are important to the person are potentially related to network position. This 
might explain the lack of significance we found. This suggests that factors other than 
network position might be more relevant to innovative work behavior. 
 
Related to this is the problem of opaque boundaries (Cohen & Nair, 2017). Network studies 
are based on stable groups with a clear boundary. It is clear who belongs to a group and who 
doesn’t. In many cases this works fine in, for example, classrooms or socially isolated groups. 
However, in real life firms, identifying a group is not always straightforward. Cooperation 
partners, joint ventures, investors, preferred suppliers are just a few examples of partner 
organizations that are closely integrated in operations and individual members of such 
organizations are likely to exert influences similar to network effects. Similarly, within an 
organization a network of peers like middle managers discards network effects coming from 
other organizational layers like supervisors or top management (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; 
Shi, Markoczy, & Dess, 2009).  
  
Taken together, the difficulties in collecting the data, a myriad of other factors that might 
obfuscate network influences and difficulties in defining relevant network boundaries 
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together create substantial empirical challenges in applying network analysis in 
management research.  
 
Besides these empirical issues, there are also some theoretical considerations regarding the 
suitability of social network analysis for management research in general and middle 
manager’s innovative work behavior in particular.  
 
In the thesis, network effects are based on the brokerage principle in which a personal 
network is seen as an enabling or constraining factor. We’ve seen that this competitive 
brokerage mechanism does not work in the studies because collaboration is a strong feature 
in the organizational culture. This is supported by research of, for example, Soda, Stea, and 
Pedersen (2019), who in an empirical study found that actors benefit most from bridging 
structural holes when collaboration in the network is low, while in a closed network, 
collaboration will positively influence creativity. An alternative to the brokerage mechanism 
is to focus on indegree effects as for example Fang et al. (2015) and Wong and Boh (2014) 
did. This might be a recommendation for further research. 
 
Brokerage is purely structure-oriented and among others based on the rather strong 
assumption that all relations are identical and that all individual actors are equally able to 
take advantage of their network position (Moran, 2005). Such a strong assumption is in line 
with the graph-theoretical foundations of network analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Obviously, relations are not identical and hence will also differ in conveying influence. Little 
is known how such diversity in tie-strength might be of influence. 
 
Taken together, the results of this thesis suggest that applying social network analysis to 
organizational behavior is less straightforward than sometimes expected. Not all challenges 
can be solved, for example the problem with data collection or boundary identification are 
difficult to solve. Further research is needed into alternative brokerage mechanisms, the 









This thesis focuses on the question why some middle managers are more innovative than 
others. To answer this question, several theoretical explanations for innovative behavior in 
general have been explored. In particular, this thesis focuses on the following three drivers 
of innovative behavior: The enabling or constraining influence of middle managers’ social 
network position, the personal characteristics of middle managers, and the discretionary 
space or autonomy of middle managers to innovate. 
 
It is increasingly recognized that middle managers play a crucial role in innovation. They are 
not only responsible for supporting top management in drafting and executing corporate 
strategies, but also for providing input for new strategies. Middle managers are familiar with 
market developments and contribute to an organization’s success by pioneering new 
initiatives and responding to changes in an organization’s environment. At the same time, 
the role of middle managers has become more complex. Delayering of organizations, 
combined with the increased information available to top management, has resulted in 
increased control of top management over middle managers, reduced middle managers’ 
scope to make decisions in general, and reduced their ability to realize innovations. 
Organizational structures have become increasingly complex, creating an opaque 
environment for middle managers and making it more complicated for middle managers to 
operate. It is in this complex and difficult setting, in which middle managers are increasingly 
held responsible for realizing innovations, that three factors that might drive middle 
managers’ innovative work behavior are researched. 
 
These factors originate in three different perspectives, a sociological perspective, an 
individual or personality perspective, and an organizational perspective. The first 
(sociological) factor is related to the core role of middle managers: Processing and conveying 
information. Due to their central and pivotal position in the organization, middle managers 
have a strong insight in both operational and corporate developments. In addition, they 
maintain intense relations with an extensive set of peers and external partners. This suggests 
that the competence of a middle manager to exploit the information in his or her social 
network might be a strong factor behind innovative work behavior. Following Burt’s theory 
of social capital, we have explored how a structural network position may enable or 
constrain a middle manager’s innovative work behavior.  
 
Next to an external social network, individual characteristics are also known to affect 
behavior in general. In particular some personality traits (e.g., conscientiousness) positively 
influence innovative behavior. In this thesis, the individual personality perspective is not 
considered contrary but rather supplementary to the network approach. The network 
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position of a middle manager may provide certain information or other advantages, it still 
depends on personal traits if a middle manager is able to capitalize on those advantages.  
 
Thirdly, from an organizational perspective, one must consider that nowadays middle 
managers are often found in complex organizations. Middle managers often operate in 
multi-site organizations at a certain spatial distance from head office and peers. Middle 
managers also face complex cooperative structures like franchising, joint ventures, and other 
organizational structures. As a result, a middle manager is faced with multiple stakeholders, 
potentially with different interests. Taken together this implies that modern organizational 
structures potentially influence the discretionary space and autonomy of middle managers, 
and so affect innovative work behavior.  
 
To investigate these questions, three empirical studies have been conducted, each focusing 
on one or more of those questions. These empirical studies are set in three different 
contexts, students at a business school who will likely become middle managers in the near 
future, an international multi-site company with a complex organizational structure that 
operates over a hundred leisure parks, and the administration of a municipality in Mexico 
City. 
 
These research questions have led to the use of stochastic actor oriented modelling to 
model the longitudinal co-evolution of behavior and social network position, implemented in 
the SIENA software. This is a rather new method in management research and collecting the 
necessary complete longitudinal data sets proved to be a major challenge. To address this 
missing data challenge, an additional simulation study, using four real-life data sets, was 
conducted to establish an optimal strategy to deal with missing attribute data in longitudinal 
network studies.  
 
The research resulted in the following outcomes. First, the results showed no relation 
between network constraint and innovative behavior. We ascribe this to contextual factors 
such as a collaborative organizational culture and a cohesive network. Additional interviews 
also indicate that potential network influences might be obfuscated by other factors. The 
findings also suggest that personal characteristics play a role in understanding innovative 
work behavior. In particular personality (conscientiousness) and goal orientation (career 
focus) positively influence the level of innovative work behavior. In addition, we found no 
evidence that autonomy due complex organizational structures or multi-site operations 
affects innovative work behavior of middle managers. 
 
Concerning strategies to deal with missing attribute data in longitudinal network studies, we 
found that the default SIENA method performs satisfactorily as a strategy to properly 
address this missingness. This suggests that the lack of significant results is unlikely to be due 
to missingness in the data.  
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To conclude, middle managers’ innovative work behavior is likely to be influenced by 
individual differences in personality and goal orientation, finding influences of network 
position is difficult also due to some empirical challenges, and influences of organizational 
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Centraal in dit proefschrift staat de vraag waarom sommige middenmanagers meer 
innovatief zijn dan anderen. Het onderzoek naar deze vraag heeft verschillende theoretische 
gezichtspunten gehanteerd. Meer specifiek richt deze thesis zich op drie verklaringen van 
innovatief gedrag: De mogelijkheden en beperkingen die het sociale netwerk van een 
middenmanager biedt, de persoonlijke kenmerken van een middenmanager, en de 
autonomie die een middenmanager heeft om te innoveren.  
 
De cruciale rol van middenmanagers in innovatie wordt steeds meer herkend. Zij zijn niet 
alleen verantwoordelijk voor ondersteuning van topmanagement bij het opstellen en 
uitvoeren van strategieën, maar leveren ook input voor nieuwe strategieën. 
Middenmanagers zijn bekend met ontwikkelingen in de markt. Zij dragen bij aan het succes 
van een organisatie door nieuwe initiatieven te nemen en te reageren op veranderingen in 
de externe omgeving. Tegelijkertijd is de rol van middenmanagers complexer geworden. Het 
verminderen van managementlagen, gecombineerd met een betere beschikbaarheid van 
informatie voor topmanagers, heeft ertoe geleid dat topmanagers meer controle hebben 
over middenmanagers. De autonomie van middenmanagers om beslissingen te nemen en 
innovaties te realiseren is daardoor genomen. Organisatorische structuren zijn steeds 
complexer geworden en maken het voor middenmanagers soms moeilijk opereren. In dit 
proefschrift is onderzoek gedaan hoe de drie eerdergenoemde factoren het innovatief 
gedrag van middenmanagers bepalen. 
 
Deze factoren zijn op drie verschillende perspectieven gebaseerd, een sociologisch 
perspectief, een individueel of persoonlijkheidsperspectief, en een organisatorisch 
perspectief. De eerste (sociologische) factor houdt verband met de belangrijke taak van 
middenmanagers: het verwerken en doorgeven van informatie. Door hun centrale positie in 
organisatie hebben middenmanagers een scherp inzicht in zowel operationele als 
strategische ontwikkelingen. Bovendien onderhouden ze intensieve contacten met andere 
middenmanagers en externe partners. Dit suggereert dat de structuur van een sociaal 
netwerk mogelijk invloed heeft op innovatief gedrag. In navolging van Burt zijn theorie over 
sociaal kapitaal is onderzocht hoe een structurele netwerkpositie innovatief gedrag mogelijk 
maakt of juist beperkt.  
 
Behalve door een extern sociaal netwerk wordt in het algemeen gedrag ook bepaald door 
individuele kenmerken. Meer specifiek hebben persoonlijkheidskenmerken zoals 
consciëntieusheid een positieve invloed op innovatief gedrag. In dit proefschrift wordt het 
persoonlijkheidsperspectief niet als tegengesteld maar juist als aanvullend gezien met 
betrekking tot de netwerkbenadering. Want ook al bevat de netwerkpositie van een 
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middenmanager een potentieel voordeel, het zijn de individuele eigenschappen die bepalen 
of hij/zij hier gebruik van weet te maken. 
 
Als derde factor richt het organisatieperspectief zich op de complexiteit van moderne 
organisaties. Middenmanagers opereren vaak in organisaties met meerdere locaties die zich 
op zekere afstand van het hoofdkantoor bevinden en in complexe samenwerkingsverbanden 
zoals franchising of joint ventures. Als gevolg hiervan worden middenmanagers vaak 
geconfronteerd met verschillende belangen van meerdere stakeholders. Dergelijke 
complexe structuren beïnvloeden de autonomie en daarmee het innovatief gedrag van 
middenmanagers. 
 
Om deze vragen te onderzoeken zijn er drie empirische studies uitgevoerd die zich elk op 
één of meer van deze vragen richten. Elke empirische studie is in een andere context 
uitgevoerd: Studenten van een managementopleiding die zeer waarschijnlijk een positie als 
middenmanager zullen vervullen in de nabije toekomst, een internationaal bedrijf met een 
complexe organisatorische structuur en meerdere locaties dat meer dan honderd 
vakantieparken exploiteert, en het bestuur van een gemeente in Mexico City. 
 
Om de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden is er gebruik gemaakt van Stochastic Actor-
Oriented Models waarmee de longitudinale co-evolutie van gedrag en sociale 
netwerkpositie gemodelleerd kan worden. Deze voor de bedrijfskunde betrekkelijk nieuwe 
methode is geïmplementeerd in de SIENA-software. Het verzamelen van de benodigde 
complete longitudinale data is in de praktijk vaak lastig te realiseren. Om dit probleem op te 
lossen is er, gebaseerd op vier bestaande datasets, een additionele simulatiestudie 
uitgevoerd. Het doel van deze simulatiestudie was het bepalen van een optimale strategie 
voor het omgaan met ontbrekende attribuut data in longitudinale netwerkstudies.   
 
De onderzoeken hebben de volgende resultaten opgeleverd. Ten eerste is er geen relatie 
gevonden tussen netwerkpositie en innovatief gedrag. Mogelijke verklaringen liggen in de 
context, zoals een organisatiecultuur waarin samenwerken belangrijk is of een sterk 
geïntegreerd en samenhangend netwerk. Aanvullende interviews geven ook aan dat een 
potentieel effect van netwerkpositie mogelijk ondersneeuwt door andere factoren. De 
uitkomsten suggereren dat persoonlijke kenmerken een rol spelen bij het verklaren van 
innovatief gedrag. In het bijzonder persoonlijkheid (consciëntieusheid) en doeloriëntatie 
(carrièrefocus) hebben een positief effect op innovatief gedrag. Er is geen bewijs gevonden 
voor de hypothese dat complexe organisatorische structuren of meerdere locaties innovatief 
gedrag beïnvloeden.  
 
Voor wat betreft de vraag naar een strategie voor ontbrekende attribuut data in 
longitudinale netwerkstudies vonden we dat de default SIENA-methode voldoende 
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presteert. Dit betekent dat het ontbreken van significante uitkomsten in de studie 
waarschijnlijk niet het gevolg is van ontbrekende data. 
 
Samenvattend: De resultaten suggereren dat innovatief gedrag van middenmanagers 
waarschijnlijk wordt beïnvloed door individuele verschillen in persoonlijkheid en doel-
oriëntatie. Potentiële invloeden van netwerkpositie zijn niet gevonden. Invloed van 
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